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Abstract 
 
 
Food borne illness today still results in high societal costs, even though FBOs have 
implemented food safety control systems. In addition, the susceptibility to food borne diseases 
of the human population is likely to increase in the coming decades. Thus food safety control 
needs to be improved. Since 2005, a new EU food safety policy aims to improve food safety 
through shifting primary responsibility for food safety from government to FBOs and through  
shifting food safety control from company level to supply chain level. This research aims to 
contribute to improvement of food safety by analyzing private incentive mechanisms aimed at 
food safety control on supply chain level. It focuses on the two stage supply chain between pig 
producers and slaughter company in the Netherlands. 
A framework for designing and developing incentive mechanisms for food safety control is 
developed. An incentive mechanism aimed at food safety control is defined as the set of the 
performance and compliance measurement system and the compensation scheme between 
buyer and supplier, which aims to induce the supplier to apply measures to control food safety 
hazards as the buyer requests. The framework includes all important characteristics of 
incentive mechanisms for food safety and their relationships. In this thesis the influence on 
supplier behaviour of four important characteristics of incentive mechanisms for food safety 
control are analysed, namely 1) the type of performance compensation, 2) the causes for 
variability in performance between suppliers, 3) the accuracy of a test to determine supplier 
performance, and 4) the reliability of information provided by the supplier. It uses different 
food safety hazards in pork: lesioned livers, Mycobacterium avium, and residues of antibiotics. 
Results show that a penalty for each lesioned liver was more effective to induce pig producers 
to use control measures than a collective premium. Variability in liver lesion prevalence 
between pig producers with a penalty for each lesioned liver occurred because each pig 
producer used different control measures with different effectiveness. The accuracy of a 
Mycobacterium avium test showed to have a significant impact on pig producer behaviour to 
use control measures if an incentive mechanism was in place. Finally, information about the 
use of antibiotics provided by pig producers without an incentive system for the reliability of 
the information was insufficiently reliable to guarantee absence of residues in pork. It is 
concluded in this thesis that private incentive mechanisms can be used to reduce opportunistic 
behaviour of pig producers, thereby improving food safety control on supply chain level and 
helping to raise food safety control to the next level. For optimal inducement it is important 
that the performance and compliance measurement system is attuned to the compensation 
scheme.  
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Summary 
 
1 
Summary 
 
 
Food safety is an essential food attribute for consumers and a key policy dossier for 
governments, making it a critical decision item for food business operators (FBOs), such as 
retailers, food processors and primary producers. Notwithstanding the safety control systems 
which FBOs have implemented, food borne illness today still results in high societal costs. 
This combined with the likely increase in susceptibility to food borne diseases of the human 
population shows the need to improve food safety control. Two recent changes in the EU food 
safety policy aiming to improve food safety can be observed. The first change is the shift of 
primary responsibility for food safety from government to FBOs. The second change concerns 
the shift of controlling food safety at company level to supply chain level. FBOs are looking 
for strategies to induce suppliers to use inputs and production processes that improve raw 
material safety given the presence of information asymmetry and possible opportunistic 
behaviour. Supply chain management literature argues that incentive mechanisms can be used 
to induce trading partners to apply behaviour which improves performance. Incentive 
mechanisms thus might be used to improve food safety performance on supply chain level. 
Knowledge on how incentive mechanisms can effectively induce food safety control on supply 
chain level is lacking. This research aims to contribute to improvement of food safety by 
analyzing incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control. It focuses on the two stage 
supply chain between pig producers and slaughter company in the Netherlands. To realise the 
aim of this research, the following five research questions were posed: 
1) What are key elements of incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control? 
2) How effective are incentive mechanisms with a collective insurance premium and a price 
reduction per lesioned liver in reducing liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs? 
3) What causes variability in liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs of pig producers 
subjected to an incentive mechanism with a price reduction per lesioned liver? 
4) What is the impact of the accuracy of a Mycobacterium avium test on the Mycobacterium 
avium prevalence in finishing pigs of pig producers subjected to an incentive mechanism 
with financial compensation aimed at Mycobacterium avium prevalence? 
5) What is the reliability of information about antibiotics usage in finishing pigs provided by 
pig producers used as compliance measurement in an incentive mechanism without 
compliance compensation? 
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2 
Methods and results 
 
To answer the research questions, 5 studies were conducted presented in chapter 2 to 6. In 
chapter 2 a framework for designing and analyzing incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety 
control is developed. The framework combines relevant aspects of food safety control on 
company level and on supply chain level. Key elements of incentive mechanisms aimed at food 
safety control were identified in a literature review on actual and theoretical incentive 
mechanisms aimed at food quality and food safety control. An incentive mechanism aimed at 
food safety control is defined as the set of performance and compliance measurement system 
and compensation scheme between buyer and supplier, which aims to induce the supplier to 
apply measures to control food safety hazards as the buyer requests. Performance relates to 
intrinsic product attributes in the products of a FBO, such as a contamination level. 
Compliance is the extent to which a FBO follows (EFSA, 2007)procedures that aim to control 
food safety, such as HACCP–procedures. Key elements of incentive mechanisms are the 
performance and compliance measurement system and the compensation scheme. The 
performance and compliance measurement system is characterised by the indicators to 
determine food safety performance and compliance, the accuracy of the measurement, and the 
actor who conducts and determines performance and compliance measurement. The 
performance and compliance compensation scheme is characterised by the type of 
compensation. 
Chapter 3 to 6 address how specific characteristics of performance and compliance 
measurement system and compensation scheme influence supplier performance and 
compliance. Chapter 3 analyses the relationship between the type of compensation and actual 
performance. The effectiveness of two types of performance compensation for liver lesion 
prevalence in finishing pigs, a collective insurance premium per delivered finishing pig and a 
price reduction per delivered finishing pig with a lesioned liver, was analysed with an out–of–
sample forecast test on a time series of liver lesion inspection data of Dutch finishing pigs from 
2003 to 2006. After introduction of the price reduction, mean liver lesion prevalence decreased 
from 9 to 5%. A reduced liver lesion prevalence ranging from 0 to 46 percentage points was 
observed on 67% of 1069 farms that delivered both during the insurance and the price 
reduction period. The number of farms with a liver lesion prevalence of 5.0% or less increased 
from 52 to 68%. However, even with the incentive mechanism with price reduction, variability 
in liver lesion prevalence between pig producers was observed. Concluding, chapter 3 
demonstrates that an incentive mechanism with a penalty on products off–specification was 
more effective in inducing pig producers to reduce liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs than 
an incentive mechanism with a collective insurance fee. 
Chapter 4 addresses variability in liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs observed in 
chapter 3 and analyses the relationship between decision making, actions used, and actual 
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performance. Regression and correlation analyses were applied on liver lesion inspection data 
of Dutch finishing pigs combined with data from a farmer survey about control measure used 
and factors underlying the decision to use control measures. Factors underlying the decision 
were based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Results show that of the 185 pig producers in 
the analysis, 96% used anthelmintics, i.e. medication to control infections with the roundworm 
Ascaris suum, the main cause of liver lesions in finishing pigs. These pig producers used a 
variety of combinations of active compounds, application methods, and duration of application. 
Application of anthelmintics by sprinkling over feed was associated with 2.4% higher liver 
lesion prevalence compared to other application methods. Furthermore, pig producers 
underestimated their liver lesion prevalence, thus reducing their need to apply effective 
management practices to lower liver lesion prevalence. In conclusion, chapter 4 shows that 
variability in liver lesion prevalence of pig producers subjected to an incentive mechanism with 
a price reduction per lesioned liver was caused by using different control measures with 
varying effectiveness and underestimation of liver lesion prevalence. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between performance measurement accuracy, actions 
and performance. A dynamic optimization model with a grid search of deliveries of finishing 
pigs from pig producers to a slaughterhouse, which included a possible future control system 
for Mycobacterium avium (Ma), was developed to analyse how accuracy of a new 
serodiagnostic test to determine Ma seroprevalence influenced finishing pig producer 
incentives to control Ma seroprevalence. Model input combined data collected from literature 
with expert estimations. Serodiagnostic test accuracy was defined by sensitivity, i.e. the 
probability of correctly qualifying a product with increased risk, and specificity, i.e. the 
probability of correctly qualifying a product without increased risk. Results show that higher 
sensitivity and lower specificity resulted in usage of more intense Ma control measures applied 
by pig producers, higher producer costs and lower Ma prevalence. The minimal penalty value 
needed to comply with a threshold for average Ma seroprevalence in finishing pigs at slaughter 
was lower at higher sensitivity and lower specificity. With imperfect specificity a larger sample 
size decreased pig producer incentives to control Ma seroprevalence, because the higher 
number of false positives resulted in an increased probability of rejecting a batch of finishing 
pigs irrespective of whether the pig producer took control measures. Concluding, chapter 5 
shows that higher sensitivity and lower specificity of a serodiagnostic test lowers expected 
average Ma seroprevalence in finishing pig deliveries of pig producers subjected to an 
incentive mechanism with a penalty for deliveries with increased Ma prevalence. With 
imperfect testing specificity and low hazard prevalence, a larger sample size can decrease pig 
producer incentives to improve performance. 
Finally, chapter 6 investigates the relationship between reliability of compliance 
information provided by the supplier and monitoring of residues of antibiotics in finishing pigs. 
No control system to check the reliability of provided compliance information existed in 
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practice. A dataset of 479 deliveries with information about antibiotics usage in finishing pigs 
during 60 days prior to delivery to a slaughter company provided by finishing pig producers 
was combined with screening results for antibiotics residues in the same finishing pigs. A 
Pearson chi–square test was used to analyse reliability of provided information. Results show 
that twice as much pig producers reported using antibiotics in the group of 82 pig producers 
with detected antibiotics residues (11.0%) as in the group without detected antibiotics residues 
(5.5%). For 89% of deliveries with a finishing pig with detected antibiotics residues ‘did not 
use antibiotics’ was reported. In conclusion, chapter 6 demonstrates that without a control 
system to check its reliability, the information about antibiotics usage during 60 days prior to 
delivery reported by pig producers, did not guarantee absence of antibiotics residues in the 
finishing pigs. This information was, therefore, insufficiently reliable to be used in a control 
system for antibiotics residues in finishing pigs by a slaughterhouse. 
This thesis analyses the influence of a number of important characteristics of incentive 
mechanisms for food safety control on supplier behaviour. It demonstrates that incentive 
mechanisms can be used to reduce opportunistic behaviour of suppliers, thereby helping to 
raise food safety control to the next level. For optimal inducement of suppliers it is important 
that the performance and compliance measurement system is attuned to the compensation 
scheme. 
 
Theoretical contribution 
 
This thesis contributes to food safety management, incentive and supply chain management 
theory. This thesis has three contributions to food safety management theory. First, private 
incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control can be used to aid the shift of food safety 
control at company level to supply chain level. Second, the developed framework provides 
insight on how to combine relevant technological and managerial aspects to improve food 
safety control on supply chain level. Third, this thesis was the first study to analyse the impact 
of diagnostic testing accuracy on supplier incentives to control food safety. 
This thesis has one contribution to incentive theory. The influence of the inaccuracy of a 
diagnostic test on supplier incentives to exert effort implies that inaccuracy in performance 
measurement must be considered in incentive Theory and in principal–agent models used to 
analyse incentive problems. 
This thesis has three contributions to supply chain management theory. First, properly 
designed incentive mechanisms can align company interests to improve supply chain 
performance. Second, the performance and compliance measurement system and the 
compensation scheme should be set coherently to optimally induce suppliers to improve 
performance. Third, opportunistic behaviour cannot be neglected as reason for distortion of 
information exchanged in supply chains. 
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Managerial implications 
 
A number of general managerial implications can be drawn from this thesis, of which the most 
important ones are presented here. A penalty on products off–specification is effective to 
induce suppliers to improve food safety performance. Parameters of the performance and 
compliance measurement system, such as diagnostic testing accuracy and sample strategy, and 
of the compensation scheme should be attuned for optimal inducement of suppliers to control 
food safety. Only if reliability of information about used control actions provided by a supplier 
can be checked easily, it can be used in incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control as 
compliance measurement. 
A number of specific managerial implications for pig producers and pig slaughter 
companies can also be drawn from this thesis. Pig producers should be induced to apply 
anthelmintics to finishing pigs in feed, in water or by injections instead of sprinkling over feed, 
because sprinkling over feed showed to be less effective to lower liver lesion prevalence than 
other application methods. Pig slaughter companies should increase effort to provide pig 
producers with information about their actual liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs, because 
a more accurate estimation of liver lesion prevalence can help to increase the need to treat 
Ascaris suum infections and lower liver lesion prevalence. The Dutch pork chain can 
implement an incentive mechanism, similar to that of liver lesions, to lower prevalence of other 
lesions in finishing pigs detected at slaughter, such as lung lesions, pleurisy, skin lesions and 
leg lesions. Pig slaughter companies or governments in other countries can also implement an 
incentive mechanism similar to the Dutch mechanism to lower liver lesion prevalence in 
finishing pigs. 
 
Further research 
 
Based upon the discussion in this thesis many suggestions for further research can be made. 
The three most important suggestions are as follows. First, further research is needed to 
investigate applicability and effectiveness of alternative performance and compliance 
measurement indicators and alternative types of performance and compliance compensation to 
induce suppliers to control food safety, that are not evaluated in this research. Second, for 
improved design of new incentive mechanisms further analysis of the relationship between 
supply chain characteristics, supplier–buyer relationship characteristics and the optimal settings 
of incentive mechanism parameters is needed. Third, research is advised which includes public 
health effects into analyses of food safety control on supply chain level in order to provide 
policy advise for optimal setting of food safety objectives and for determining the optimal 
privatization level of combined public and private food safety control and verification. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
Incentive mechanismen voor beheersing van voedselveiligheid in 
varkensvleesketens: Een onderzoek naar de relatie tussen 
vleesvarkenshouders en slachterijen in Nederland 
 
Voedselveiligheid is een essentieel voedsel attribuut voor consumenten en een zeer belangrijk 
beleidsdossier voor overheden. Hierdoor is voedselveiligheid cruciaal voor 
levensmiddelenbedrijven zoals retailers, verwerkers en primaire producenten. Echter, ondanks 
de invoering van beheerssystemen voor voedselveiligheid door levensmiddelenbedrijven 
blijven voedselgerelateerde infecties grote maatschappelijke gevolgen hebben. Dit, 
gecombineerd met de waarschijnlijke toename van bevattelijkheid voor voedselgerelateerde 
infecties van de humane bevolking, toont de noodzaak tot verder verbeteren van de 
voedselveiligheid. Twee recente veranderingen in het Europese voedselveiligheidsbeleid om de 
voedselveiligheid verder te verbeteren kunnen worden geobserveerd. De eerste verandering 
betreft de verschuiving van de primaire verantwoordelijkheid voor voedselveiligheid van 
overheid naar bedrijfsleven. De tweede verandering betreft de verschuiving van de beheersing 
van voedselveiligheid op bedrijfsniveau naar beheersing op ketenniveau. 
Levensmiddelenbedrijven zijn dan ook op zoek naar strategieën om hun leveranciers ertoe aan 
te zetten die grondstoffen en productieprocessen te gebruiken, die de veiligheid van de 
geleverde producten verbeteren. Hierbij dient wel rekening te worden gehouden met 
asymmetrische informatie en opportunistisch gedrag. In de keten management literatuur wordt 
beargumenteerd dat incentive mechanismen kunnen worden gebruikt om handelspartners ertoe 
aan te zetten gedrag te vertonen dat de prestatie verbetert. Incentive mechanismen lijken dus 
geschikt om de voedselveiligheid op ketenniveau te verbeteren. Echter, kennis over hoe 
incentive mechanismen effectief voedselveiligheid op ketenniveau kunnen verbeteren 
ontbreekt. Dit onderzoek heeft als doel om bij te dragen aan de verbetering van de 
voedselveiligheid door het analyseren van incentive mechanismen gericht op beheersing van 
voedselveiligheid op ketenniveau. Het richt zich op de twee schakel keten tussen 
vleesvarkenshouders en slachterij in Nederland. Om het doel van dit onderzoek te realiseren, 
zijn de volgende vijf onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd: 
1) Wat zijn kernelementen van incentive mechanismen gericht op beheersing van 
voedselveiligheid? 
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2) Hoe effectief zijn incentive mechanismen met een collectieve verzekeringspremie en met 
een prijskorting per afgekeurde lever in het verlagen van de prevalentie afgekeurde levers 
in vleesvarkens? 
3) Wat veroorzaakt variabiliteit in de prevalentie afgekeurde levers in vleesvarkens van 
vleesvarkenshouders die onderworpen zijn aan een incentive mechanisme met een 
prijskorting per afgekeurde lever? 
4) Wat is de impact van de accuratesse van een test op Mycobacterium avium op de 
Mycobacterium avium prevalentie in vleesvarkens van varkenshouders die onderworpen 
zijn aan een incentive mechanisme met financiële compensatie gericht op Mycobacterium 
avium prevalentie? 
5) Hoe betrouwbaar is door varkenshouders aangeleverde informatie over het 
antibioticagebruik in vleesvarkens gebruikt als maat voor naleving binnen een incentive 
mechanisme zonder compensatie voor naleving? 
 
Methode en resultaten 
 
Om de onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden zijn 5 onderzoeken uitgevoerd, die worden 
gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 6. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een raamwerk ontwikkeld voor 
het ontwerpen en analyseren van incentive mechanismen gericht op beheersing van 
voedselveiligheid. Het raamwerk combineert relevante aspecten van beheersing van 
voedselveiligheid op bedrijfsniveau met die op ketenniveau. Kernelementen van incentive 
mechanismen gericht op beheersing van voedselveiligheid zijn geïdentificeerd via een 
literatuuronderzoek naar bestaande en theoretische incentive mechanismen gericht op 
beheersing van voedselkwaliteit en voedselveiligheid. Een incentive mechanisme gericht op 
beheersing van voedselveiligheid is gedefinieerd als de set van het systeem om prestatie en 
naleving te meten en het compensatie schema tussen leverancier en koper, met als doel de 
leverancier ertoe aan te zetten om maatregelen te nemen die de voedselveiligheid beheersen 
zoals de koper wenst. Prestatie verwijst naar intrinsieke product attributen, zoals 
besmettingsniveau. Naleving verwijst naar de mate waarin voedingsmiddelenbedrijven 
procedures volgen die gericht zijn op de beheersing van voedselveiligheid, zoals HACCP–
procedures. Kernelementen van incentive mechanismen zijn het systeem om prestatie en 
naleving te meten en het compensatie schema. Het systeem om prestatie en naleving te meten 
wordt gekenmerkt door de indicatoren om de prestatie en naleving vast te stellen, de 
accuratesse van deze meting, en de actor die de meting uitvoert en prestatie en naleving 
vaststelt. Het compensatie schema wordt gekenmerkt door het type compensatie. 
Hoofdstuk 3 tot en met 6 behandelen hoe specifieke kenmerken van het systeem om 
prestatie en naleving te meten en van het compensatie schema de prestatie en naleving van 
leveranciers beïnvloeden. Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert de relatie tussen type compensatie en 
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prestatie. De effectiviteit van twee typen compensatie voor prevalentie afgekeurde levers in 
vleesvarkens, een collectieve verzekering per afgeleverd vleesvarken en een prijskorting per 
afgeleverd vleesvarken met een afgekeurde lever, is geanalyseerd met een out–of–sample 
forecast test op een tijdreeks van 2003 tot en met 2006 van lever inspectie resultaten van 
vleesvarkens geleverd aan een grote Nederlandse slachterij. Na introductie van de prijskorting 
daalde de gemiddelde prevalentie afgekeurde levers van 9 naar 5%. Op 67% van de 1069 
varkensbedrijven, die zowel in de periode met de verzekering als de met de prijskorting 
vleesvarkens leverden, werd een verlaagde prevalentie afgekeurde levers gevonden, variërend 
van 0 tot 46 procentpunten. Het aantal varkensbedrijven met 5,0% of minder afgekeurde levers 
nam toe van 52 tot 58%. Echter, zelfs met het incentive mechanisme met de prijskorting, bleef 
variabiliteit in prevalentie afgekeurde levers tussen varkenshouders bestaan. Concluderend, 
hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat een incentive mechanisme met een boete op producten buiten 
specificatie effectiever was om varkenshouders ertoe aan te zetten om de prevalentie 
afgekeurde levers in vleesvarkens te verlagen dan een incentive mechanisme met een 
collectieve verzekeringspremie. 
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de variabiliteit in prevalentie afgekeurde levers in vleesvarkens, 
zoals vastgesteld in hoofdstuk 3. Het analyseert de relatie tussen besluitvorming, gebruikte 
acties, en prestatie. Regressie en correlatie analyses zijn toegepast op lever inspectie resultaten 
van vleesvarkens geleverd aan een grote Nederlandse slachterij gecombineerd met gegevens uit 
een enquête onder varkenshouders over gebruikte beheersmaatregelen voor leverafwijkingen 
en onderliggende factoren van het besluit om beheersmaatregelen te gebruiken. De 
onderliggende factoren zijn gebaseerd op de Theory of Planned Behaviour. De resultaten laten 
zien dat van de 185 varkenshouders in de analyse er 96% antiwormmiddelen (anthelmintica) 
gebruikten om een infectie te beheersen met de rondworm Ascaris suum, de belangrijkste 
oorzaak van afgekeurde levers in vleesvarkens. De varkenshouders gebruikten een variatie aan 
combinaties van werkzame stoffen, toedieningmethoden, en duur van toedieningen. Toediening 
van antiwormmiddelen via strooien over voer werd geassocieerd met 2,4% hogere prevalentie 
afgekeurde levers in vergelijking met de andere toedieningmethoden. Verder onderschatten 
varkenshouders de prevalentie afgekeurde levers, wat bij hen de noodzaak verlaagt om 
effectieve methoden toe te passen voor het verlagen van de prevalentie afgekeurde levers. 
Concluderend, hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat variabiliteit in prevalentie afgekeurde levers in 
vleesvarkens tussen varkenshouders onderworpen aan een incentive mechanisme met een 
prijskorting per afgekeurde lever werd veroorzaakt door het gebruik van verschillende 
beheersmaatregelen met verschillende effectiviteit en door het onderschatten van de prevalentie 
afgekeurde levers. 
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op de relatie tussen de accuratesse van de prestatie meting, acties en 
prestatie. Een dynamisch optimalisatiemodel met een grid search van leveringen vleesvarkens 
van varkenshouders aan een slachthuis is ontwikkeld om te analyseren hoe de accuratesse van 
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een nieuwe serodiagnostische test op Mycobacterium avium (Ma) incentives van 
varkenshouders beïnvloedt om Ma seroprevalentie te beheersen. Hiertoe bevat het model een 
mogelijk nieuw beheersingssysteem voor Ma seroprevalentie. Input voor het model is 
gebaseerd op literatuur en expert schatting. Serodiagnostische test accuratesse is gedefinieerd 
door de sensitiviteit, de kans op het correct classificeren van een product als met verhoogd 
risico, en de specificiteit, de kans op het correct classificeren van een product als zonder 
verhoogd risico. De resultaten laten zien dat een hogere sensitiviteit en een lagere specificiteit 
leiden tot gebruik van striktere beheersmaatregelen door varkenshouders, tot hogere kosten 
voor varkenshouders, en tot lagere Ma seroprevalentie. De minimale waarde van de boete om 
aan een grenswaarde voor gemiddelde Ma seroprevalentie te voldoen was lager bij een hogere 
sensitiviteit en bij een lagere specificiteit. Bij imperfecte specificiteit waren incentives van 
varkenshouders om Ma seroprevalentie te beheersen lager bij een grote steekproefomvang dan 
bij een kleine steekproefomvang, omdat het groter aantal vals positieven leidde tot een 
verhoogde kans van afwijzen van een levering ongeacht of een varkenshouder 
beheersmaatregelen nam. Concluderend, hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat hogere sensitiviteit en lagere 
specificiteit van een serodiagnostische test de verwachte gemiddelde Ma seroprevalentie 
verlaagde in leveringen vleesvarkens van varkenshouders onderworpen aan een incentive 
mechanisme met een boete voor leveringen met verhoogde Ma seroprevalentie. Bij imperfecte 
test specificiteit verlaagde een grotere steekproefomvang incentives van varkenshouders om 
hun prestatie te verbeteren. 
 Tot slot, hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de relatie tussen nalevinginformatie aangeleverd door de 
leverancier en het monitoren van residuen van antibiotica in vleesvarkens zonder een systeem 
om de juistheid van geleverde nalevinginformatie te controleren. Een dataset van 479 
leveringen vleesvarkens met informatie over het gebruik van antibiotica in deze vleesvarkens 
gedurende de 60 dagen voor levering aan een groot Nederlands slachthuis, zoals aangeleverd 
door varkenshouders, was gecombineerd met resultaten van een test op residuen van antibiotica 
in de vleesvarkens. Een Pearson chickwadraat test is gebruikt om de betrouwbaarheid van 
geleverde informatie te analyseren. De resultaten laten zien dat twee keer zoveel 
varkenshouders aangaven antibiotica te hebben gebruikt in de groep van 82 varkenshouders 
waarbij residuen van antibiotica werden gevonden (11,0%) als in de groep varkenshouders 
waarin geen residuen van antibiotica werden gevonden (5,5%). Bij 89% van de leveringen 
waarin minstens één vleesvarken werd gevonden met een residu van antibiotica werd ‘geen 
antibiotica gebruikt’ gemeld door de varkenshouder. Concluderend, hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat 
zonder een systeem om de betrouwbaarheid te controleren van door varkenshouders 
aangeleverde informatie over het gebruik van antibiotica gedurende 60 dagen voor levering, 
deze informatie onvoldoende betrouwbaar was om de afwezigheid van residuen van antibiotica 
in vleesvarkens te kunnen garanderen. Deze informatie was dus onvoldoende betrouwbaar om 
te worden gebruikt in een beheersingssysteem voor residuen van antibiotica in vleesvarkens. 
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Dit proefschrift analyseert de invloed op het leveranciergedrag van een aantal belangrijke 
kenmerken van incentive mechanismen gericht op beheersing van voedselveiligheid. Het laat 
zien dat incentive mechanismen kunnen worden gebruikt om opportunistisch gedrag van 
leveranciers te verminderen, waarmee het helpt om de beheersing van voedselveiligheid naar 
een hoger niveau te tillen. Om leveranciers optimaal ertoe aan te zetten voedselveiligheid te 
beheersen via een incentive mechanisme, is het belangrijk dat binnen een incentive 
mechanisme het systeem om prestatie en naleving te meten is afgestemd op het compensatie 
schema. 
 
Wetenschappelijke bijdrage 
 
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan voedselveiligheidsmanagement theorie, incentive theorie en 
supply chain management theorie. Dit proefschrift heeft drie bijdragen aan 
voedselveiligheidsmanagement theorie. Ten eerste, private incentive mechanismen gericht op 
beheersing van voedselveiligheid kunnen de verandering van de beheersing van 
voedselveiligheid op bedrijfsniveau naar beheersing op ketenniveau ondersteunen. Ten tweede, 
het ontwikkelde raamwerk biedt inzicht in hoe relevante technologische en management 
aspecten in de beheersing van voedselveiligheid te combineren om de beheersing van 
voedselveiligheid op ketenniveau te verbeteren. Ten derde, dit proefschrift was de eerste studie 
die de impact van de accuratesse van een diagnostische test op leverancier incentives om 
voedselveiligheid te beheersen heeft geanalyseerd. 
Dit proefschrift draagt ook bij aan incentive theorie. De invloed van de accuratesse van een 
diagnostische test op leverancier incentives om acties te ondernemen, impliceert dat de 
accuratesse van de methode om prestatie en naleving te meten onderdeel moet uitmaken van 
incentive theorie en van principaal–agent modellen, gebruikt om deze problemen te analyseren. 
Dit proefschrift heeft drie bijdragen aan supply chain management theorie. Als eerste, 
correct ontworpen incentive mechanismen kunnen belangen van meerdere bedrijven in een 
keten op een lijn brengen en daarmee ketenprestaties verbeteren. Als tweede, het systeem om 
prestatie en naleving te meten en het compensatie schema moeten in samenhang worden 
vastgesteld om ervoor te zorgen dat leveranciers optimaal ertoe worden aangezet prestatie en 
naleving te verbeteren. Als derde, opportunistisch gedrag kan niet genegeerd worden als 
oorzaak van het uitwisselen van onjuiste of onvolledige informatie in ketens. 
 
Aanbevelingen voor de praktijk 
 
Verschillende aanbevelingen voor de praktijk volgen uit dit proefschrift. De belangrijkste 
worden hier gepresenteerd. Een boete op producten buiten specificatie is effectief om 
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leveranciers ertoe aan te zetten de beheersing van voedselveiligheid te verbeteren. De 
parameterwaarden van het systeem om prestatie en naleving te meten en van het compensatie 
schema moeten in samenhang worden vastgesteld om ervoor te zorgen dat leveranciers 
optimaal ertoe worden aangezet prestatie en naleving te verbeteren. Alleen als de 
betrouwbaarheid van informatie over gebruikt acties aangeleverd door een leverancier 
eenvoudig gecontroleerd kan worden, kan deze informatie worden gebruikt als maat voor 
prestatie en naleving in incentive mechanismen gericht op de beheersing van voedselveiligheid. 
Uit dit proefschrift volgen verschillende aanbevelingen voor varkenshouders en 
varkensslachterijen. Varkenshouders moeten worden gestimuleerd om antiwormmiddelen aan 
vleesvarkens te geven via de toedieningmethoden door het voer, in het water of via injecties, 
omdat strooien over voer geassocieerd is met een hoger prevalentie afgekeurde levers dan de 
andere toedieningmethoden. Varkensslachterijen worden aanbevolen om varkenshouders 
informatie te verstrekken met hun werkelijke prevalentie afgekeurde levers in de vleesvarkens, 
omdat een meer accuraat beeld van de prevalentie afgekeurde levers de noodzaak bij 
varkenshouders kan helpen vergroten om Ascaris suum infecties te beheersen en daardoor de 
prevalentie afgekeurde levers te verlagen. De Nederlandse varkensketen kan incentive 
mechanismen vergelijkbaar aan dat van afgekeurde levers implementeren om de prevalentie 
van andere slachtafwijkingen zoals longafwijkingen, pleuritis, huid afwijkingen en 
pootafwijkingen, te verlagen. Varkensslachterijen en/of overheden in andere landen kunnen 
ook een incentive mechanisme vergelijkbaar aan het Nederlandse mechanisme implementeren 
om de afgekeurde lever prevalentie in vleesvarkens te verlagen. 
 
Verder onderzoek 
 
Gebaseerd op de discussie in dit proefschrift kunnen vele suggesties voor verder onderzoek 
worden gedaan. De drie belangrijkste suggesties zijn de volgende. Ten eerste, verder 
onderzoek is nodig naar de toepasbaarheid en effectiviteit van alternatieve indicatoren om 
prestatie en naleving te meten en van alternatieve typen van prestatie en naleving compensatie 
ingezet om leveranciers ertoe aan te zetten de voedselveiligheid te beheersen. Ten tweede, om 
het ontwerpen van nieuwe incentive mechanismen te verbeteren is verder onderzoek nodig naar 
de relatie tussen karakteristieken van de keten, karakteristieken van de leverancierkoper relatie, 
en de optimale setting van parameters van een incentive mechanisme. Ten derde, om 
beleidsadviezen te verbeteren ten aanzien van optimale publieke doelen betreffende 
voedselveiligheid en ten aanzien van het optimale niveau van privatisering in een system dat 
publiek en privaat toezicht en controle betreffende voedselveiligheid combineert, wordt 
aanbevolen om volksgezondheidseffecten te integreren in analyses van het beheersen van 
voedselveiligheid op ketenniveau. 
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Chapter 1 
 
General introduction 
 
 
1.1. Food safety 
 
Food safety is an essential food attribute for consumers and a key policy dossier for 
governments, making it a critical decision item for food business operators (FBOs), such as 
retailers, food processors and primary producers. To guarantee food safety FBOs have 
implemented control systems such as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP), Good 
Hygienic Practices, ISO 9001, ISO 22000, British Retail Consortium, and Global–GAP 
(Luning et al., 2006). Notwithstanding, food borne illness today still has a high societal impact 
(EFSA, 2010; Mead et al., 1999; Scharff, 2010). Societal impact of food borne illness is not 
likely to decrease in the next decades, because susceptibility of the human population to food 
borne illness is expected to increase. Increased susceptibility arises from growing number of 
persons aged 65 and over (Eurostat, 2010), of people with diabetes (IDF, 2009), and of 
immunodeficient individuals suffering from diseases as cancer and chronic viral diseases, 
because improved treatments increase survival rates (La Vecchia et al., 2010; Palella et al., 
1998). This shows the need to improve food safety control. 
In the EU two changes aiming to improve food safety can be observed recently. The new 
EU food safety policy, implemented with the General Food Law (GFL) in 2005 puts primary 
food safety responsibility with FBOs and prescribes that food safety control must be based on 
an integrated approach throughout the supply chain. The first change is the shift from primary 
responsibility for food safety from government to FBOs. The second change concerns the shift 
of food safety control from company level to supply chain level. This thesis aims to support 
improvement of food safety control through the development of private initiatives for food 
safety control on supply chain level. 
 
1.1.1. From public to private responsibility 
The first change concerns the shift of primary responsibility for food safety from government 
to FBOs. The EU food safety policy at the end of the 20th century was insufficiently equipped 
to deal with societal expectations about food safety control (EFSA, 2007). Therefore, in 2005 
the EU put into force a new food safety policy with Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, the GFL. 
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The GFL prescribes that FBOs have primary responsibility for food safety, whereas 
governments keep the responsibility for supervising that marketed products are safe. In 
addition, the GFL states that food safety control must be based on science, risk assessment and 
an integrated approach throughout the supply chain. 
Having primary responsibility for food safety control, the food industry is looking for 
private initiatives to improve food safety control. Such private initiatives can replace public 
food safety control if effectiveness of private initiatives equal or exceed effectiveness of public 
control. Shleifer (1998) argued that private ownership is the crucial source of incentives to 
innovate and to become efficient. Jayasinghe–Mudalige and Henson (2006) showed that 
private market–based incentives had a greater impact on food safety responsiveness of firms in 
the Canadian red meat sector than government regulatory actions. Ollinger and Moore (2008) 
observed that private actions accounted for about 80% and regulation about 20% of the overall 
reduction in the share of samples of cattle and hog carcasses, ground beef, and broilers testing 
positive for salmonella. This suggests that private initiatives of the food industry can indeed 
improve food safety control compared to public control. 
 
1.1.2. From company level to supply chain level 
The second change concerns the shift from food safety control on company level to supply 
chain level. Currently adopted food safety control systems focus on controlling food safety 
hazards on company level without considering the rest of the supply chain (Luning et al., 
2006). But, many food safety hazards can enter the supply chain in multiple stages (Alban and 
Stärk, 2005; Nauta et al., 2005; Valeeva et al., 2004). If food safety hazards can enter in earlier 
stages in the supply chain, safety of food items not only depends on control of these hazards in 
a FBO’s production processes, but also on safety of the raw materials as purchased from its 
suppliers. Hence, further improvement of food safety can be realised through improving safety 
of purchased raw materials. This suggests that food safety control on supply chain level can 
indeed improve food safety. But, how to improve food safety of purchased raw materials? 
 
1.1.3. Incentive mechanisms 
Safety of raw materials results from processes and inputs used by the supplier. Food safety 
attributes of raw materials are often difficult and costly to verify (Unnevehr et al., 2004). In 
addition, it is often difficult or even impossible for a buyer to observe the production processes 
used by a supplier. The increasing number of suppliers and global sourcing of raw materials 
due to, amongst others, consolidation and product proliferation in the food industry further 
complicates verification of food safety attributes of all purchased raw materials. This results in 
information asymmetry between supplier and buyer about the safety of raw materials, creating 
room for opportunistic behaviour of a supplier (Hirschauer and Musshoff, 2007). So, FBOs are 
looking for strategies to induce suppliers to use inputs and production processes that improve 
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raw material safety given the presence of information asymmetry and possible opportunistic 
behaviour. 
Interactions in the presence of information asymmetry are addressed in Incentive Theory 
(Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Incentive theory considers how a buyer can optimally cope 
with private information of a supplier. According to incentive theory a principal, e.g. a buyer, 
delegates a task, e.g. producing safe raw materials, to an agent, e.g. a supplier. The supplier 
exerts effort to fulfil the task, if expected utility of exerting effort exceeds expected utility of 
not exerting effort. Suppliers can be induced to increase food safety performance, by ensuring 
that expected utility if the supplier exerts effort that improves food safety exceeds expected 
utility if he does not. Supply chain management literature argues that incentive mechanisms 
can be used to induce trading partners to apply behaviour which improves performance 
(Jeschonowski et al., 2009; Otley, 1999). An incentive mechanism does so by rewarding 
performance and sharing risk (Boehlje, 1999). Incentive mechanisms are widely used by 
traders, food processors, and livestock slaughter plants to improve product quality of purchased 
raw materials (Boys et al., 2007; Chalfant et al., 1999; Hueth and Ligon, 2002; Hueth et al., 
2007). This suggests that incentive mechanisms might be used to improve food safety 
performance on supply chain level. Although incentive mechanism aimed at food safety 
control exist in practice (e.g. Alban et al., 2002), they are scarce and knowledge on how 
incentive mechanisms can effectively induce food safety control on supply chain level is 
lacking. 
 
1.1.4. The Dutch pork supply chain as research object 
This research was initiated and partly conducted within the Dutch Transforum Agro&Groen 
project DRIVE (“Sustainable Reassessment and innovation in the pork supply chain”). The aim 
of DRIVE was to achieve a new design of the Dutch pig meat supply chain in which relevant 
sustainability goals could be implemented. To realize and guarantee sustainability goals in the 
Dutch pork supply chain, DRIVE proposed to analyse incentive mechanisms based on 
individual farmer interests. Specifically, DRIVE focused on food safety control to improve 
both public health and the international competition of the Dutch pig meat sector. Participation 
of a major Dutch slaughter company in DRIVE ensured that data was available and accessible. 
To analyse incentive mechanisms for food safety, the pork supply chain is an interesting 
case, because pig meat and products thereof 1) can contain different relevant food safety 
hazards, such as campylobacter, salmonella and Mycobacterium avium (EFSA, 2010; 
Tirkkonen et al., 2007; Van der Gaag et al., 2004) and 2) are recognised as an important source 
for food–borne outbreaks (EFSA, 2010). Because many of the relevant hazards can enter the 
pork supply chain in primary production, it is an important stage in the pork supply chain to 
control food safety hazards. This suggests that incentive mechanisms between pig producers 
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and slaughter companies that induce pig producers to control food safety can be important to 
control food safety in the pork supply chain. 
Research on incentive mechanisms for food safety control between pig producers and 
slaughter companies in the Netherlands is especially interesting, because pig producers and 
slaughter companies in the Netherlands are independent organisations. The Dutch pork supply 
chain between pig producers and slaughter companies lacks long term contracts. Dutch 
slaughter companies compete actively for receiving finishing pigs. Pig producers can shift 
easily between slaughter companies and to exporting finishing pigs. In this setting initialization 
of new incentive mechanisms to improve food safety by an individual slaughter company 
might be a viable method to improve food safety performance of Dutch pig producers. 
 
1.2. Research aim and research questions 
 
This research aims to contribute to the improvement of food safety and public health by 
analyzing incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control of the two stage supply chain 
between pig producer and slaughter company in the Netherlands. To realise the aim of this 
research five studies were carried out, which are subsequently presented in the next five 
sections. 
 
1.2.1. Framework for incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control 
Before focussing on incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control between pig producer 
and slaughter company in the Netherlands, the aim of study 1 is to develop a framework to 
design and analyse incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control. First, relevant aspects 
of food safety control on company level are identified. Second, additional relevant aspects of 
food safety control on supply chain level are discussed. This includes identification of key 
elements of incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control in a literature review focussing 
on actual and theoretical incentive mechanisms aimed at food quality and food safety control. 
Third, the relevant aspects and key elements are combined in a framework for designing and 
analysing incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control. Study 1 aims to answer the 
research question: 
 
RQ1 What are key elements of incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control? 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of incentive mechanisms 
Study 1 shows performance and compliance measurement system and compensation scheme as 
the key elements of an incentive mechanism aimed at food safety control. A characteristic of 
the performance and compliance compensation scheme is the type of compensation. Study 2 
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analyses the impact of two types of performance compensation on supplier performance in 
terms of liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs. Lesioned livers are unfit for human 
consumption, so each pig slaughtered in the EU must be inspected for liver lesions (Regulation 
(EC) No 854/2004). The main cause for liver lesions is an infection with the roundworm 
Ascaris suum (A. suum) on the farm (Stewart and Hale, 1988). So, liver lesions in finishing 
pigs should be controlled at farm level. A slaughterhouse can only market lesioned livers 
against lower revenue. In the Netherlands pig producers compensate slaughterhouses for these 
financial consequences. Compensation is arranged through an incentive mechanism, which 
also induces pig producers to lower liver lesion prevalence. Two incentive mechanisms with a 
different type of performance compensation existed successively in the last decade. In July 
2004, a collective insurance premium per delivered pig was replaced by a price reduction per 
delivered pig with a lesioned liver. The effectiveness of these types of performance 
compensation is analysed with an out–of–sample forecast test on a time series of liver lesion 
inspection data of Dutch finishing pigs from 2003 to 2006. Study 2 aims to answer the research 
question: 
 
RQ2 How effective are incentive mechanisms with a collective insurance premium and a 
price reduction per lesioned liver in reducing liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs? 
 
1.2.3. Impact incentive mechanism on supplier actions and performance 
Study 2 shows that average liver lesion prevalence halved after implementation of the incentive 
mechanism with a price reduction for each pig with a lesioned liver. However, study 2 also 
shows large variability in liver lesion prevalence between individual pig producers when the 
price reduction was in place. The price reduction could have induced only part of the pig 
producers to use management practices to lower liver lesion prevalence, or some pig producers 
might use less effective management practices. If management practices or the lack of it, that 
result in high liver lesion prevalence are known, a new incentive mechanism can be designed to 
deal with these inefficient management practices. Study 3 identifies management practices 
associated with high liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs. It uses regression and correlation 
analysis on liver lesion inspection data of Dutch finishing pigs combined with data from a 
farmer survey about management practices used and factors underlying the decision to use 
control actions. Factors underlying the decision are based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour. 
Study 3 aims to answer the research question: 
 
RQ3 What causes variability in liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs of pig producers 
subjected to an incentive mechanism with a price reduction per lesioned liver? 
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1.2.4. Impact of performance measurement accuracy in incentive mechanisms 
on supplier performance 
Study 1 shows the performance and compliance measurement system as the other key element 
of an incentive mechanism next to the performance and compliance compensation scheme. A 
characteristic of performance and compliance measurement system is the accuracy of the 
performance measurement. Knowledge on how reward schemes and measurement scale must 
be set together for optimal incentive provision is lacking (Jeschonowski et al., 2009). 
Literature about the impact of testing accuracy on supplier incentives to control food safety 
was lacking. Study 4 analyses the impact of performance measurement accuracy on supplier 
performance in terms of Mycobacterium avium (Ma) seroprevalence if a penalty on products 
off–specification is used. Because pigs may be a reservoir for Ma infections in humans, pig 
meat from Ma infected pigs needs to be excluded from the pork supply chain (Komijn et al., 
1999). Currently, detection of Ma infections in pigs is based on product testing in the 
slaughterhouse, i.e. palpation and incision of the lymph nodes, which is characterised by a 
relatively high number of false negatives (Komijn et al., 2007; Wisselink et al., 2006). This 
renders the current control system insufficient to guarantee public health. A new system is 
needed to control Ma in the pork supply chain. Control points of Ma in the pork supply chain 
are all located at primary production level (Pavlík et al., 2005). Thus, a new control system 
could include an incentive mechanism to steer pig producer behaviour towards using 
production processes that result in a low risk of Ma infections. Study 2 shows that an incentive 
mechanism with a penalty on products off–specification can be used to steer finishing pig 
producer behaviour. For Ma, a new serodiagnostic test has been developed for which the 
accuracy needs further optimization (Wisselink et al., 2010). Study 4 analyses how accuracy of 
the new Ma serodiagnostic test to determine performance influences food safety performance 
when an incentive mechanism with a penalty on products off–specification is used. It uses a 
dynamic optimization model with grid search of deliveries of finishing pigs from producers to 
a slaughterhouse and includes a possible future control system for Ma. Study 4 aims to answer 
the research question: 
 
RQ4 What is the impact of the accuracy of a Mycobacterium avium test on the 
Mycobacterium avium prevalence in finishing pigs of pig producers subjected to an 
incentive mechanism with financial compensation aimed at Mycobacterium avium 
prevalence? 
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1.2.5. Information provided by suppliers as compliance measurement in 
incentive mechanisms 
In study 1 the actor who conducts performance and compliance measurement and determines 
performance and compliance is identified as another characteristic of the measurement system. 
Differences in performance can originate from suppliers using different actions to control a 
hazard, as study 3 shows. Identification of control actions used by a supplier prior to delivery 
can help to distinguish suppliers with a higher risk from those with a lower risk. This provides 
opportunity to design a risk–based control system. In studies 2, 3 and 4 the buyer conducts 
performance and compliance measurement. However, it is often difficult or even impossible 
for a buyer to observe the control actions used by a supplier. A simple way of gathering 
information about the control actions used by the supplier is suppliers providing information 
about the control actions they used. The provided information, however, can only be used in an 
incentive mechanism to determine compliance if it is reliable. Opportunistic behaviour can be a 
reason for provision of unreliable performance information (Feldmann and Müller, 2003). 
Literature on reliability of compliance information was, however, not available. Study 5 
analyses reliability of compliance information about antibiotics usage in finishing pigs 
provided by pig producers. Antibiotics residues can only be prevented if pig producers 
correctly use antibiotics. To analyze reliability of provided information, a Pearson chi–square 
test is used on a dataset with screening results for antibiotics residues in finishing pigs 
combined with provided information by pig producers about antibiotics used in the same 
finishing pigs during 60 days prior to delivery to a slaughter company. Study 5 seeks to answer 
the research question: 
 
RQ5 What is the reliability of information about antibiotics usage in finishing pigs 
provided by pig producers used as compliance measurement in an incentive 
mechanism without compliance compensation? 
 
1.3. Outline of the thesis 
 
Figure 1.1 presents the outline of the thesis with the relationship between the chapters. Chapter 
two presents the key elements of incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control (study 1). 
Chapter three to six each analyse a specific characteristics of the key element of an incentive 
mechanism aimed at food safety control. Chapter three presents the effectiveness of two types 
of performance compensation in an incentive mechanism to induce pig producers to control 
liver lesions in finishing pigs (study 2). Chapter four identifies the actions taken by pig 
producers to control liver lesions with a price reduction per finishing pig with a lesioned liver 
in place (study 3). Chapter five analyses the impact of test accuracy on supplier performance 
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using Ma in finishing pigs if a penalty on products off–specification is used (study 4). Chapter 
six analyses if information provided by pig producers to a slaughter company about usage of 
antibiotics in delivered finishing pigs is sufficiently reliable to be used as compliance 
measurement in an incentive mechanism, if no performance compensation scheme is enforced 
(study 5). Finally, chapter seven integrates the findings in the general conclusion and 
discussion. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Outline of the thesis with relationship between chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Framework for designing and analyzing 
incentive mechanisms for food safety control 
in EU supply chains1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The EU food industry has full responsibility for food safety control since 2005. This requires 
new relationships within supply chains and between food business operators and governments. 
For optimal food safety control on supply chain level in the EU, this chapter proposes a 
framework for designing and analyzing incentive mechanisms for food safety control. 
Incentive mechanisms, which consist of a performance and compliance measurement system 
and a compensation scheme, induce suppliers to control food safety. Multiple incentive 
mechanisms together between at least two stages of a supply chain make up an incentive 
system. The framework can be used to design and analyze incentive mechanisms in supply 
chains in which food business operators must cooperate with trading partners from other 
supply chain stages. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Food safety is an important food attribute for consumers, governments and food business 
operators (FBOs). To control food safety in recent decades FBOs in the EU adopted quality 
assurance systems, as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP), Good Hygienic 
Practices, ISO 9001, ISO 22000, British Retail Consortium, and Global–GAP (Luning et al., 
2006). However, in 2008 the EU still reported 5332 food borne outbreaks resulting in 45,622 
cases of human zoonoses, 6230 hospitalizations and 32 deaths (EFSA, 2010). Reported cases 
are only a fraction of food borne illnesses. Societal costs of food borne illnesses are expected to 
be high, although reports are scarce. The EU estimated its costs of food–borne salmonella in 
                                                 
1
 C.P.A. van Wagenberg , G.B.C. Backus, J.G.A.J. van der Vorst and H.A.P. Urlings. 
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2003 at €2.8 billion (European Commission Press Release IP/03/1306). Mangen et al. (2005) 
estimated the costs of campylobacteriosis in the Netherlands in 2000 at €21 million. 
Demographic and public health developments in the EU will likely increase the population’s 
susceptibility to food borne illness. The number of people of 65 years and older in the EU–27 
is expected to grow from 16% of the population in 2004 to 30% in 2050. The number of 
immunocompromised people with increased susceptibility to food safety hazards is also 
expected to grow, because more people will be cured from diseases as cancer with 
chemotherapy and radiation treatment (La Vecchia et al., 2010), more people will longer 
survive chronic viral diseases as HIV (Palella et al., 1998), and more people will have diabetes 
(IDF, 2009). So, without further improvement of food safety control, food borne illness and 
associated societal costs are likely to increase. 
Quality assurance systems currently adopted by EU FBOs focus on food safety control 
within FBOs without considering the rest of the supply chain (Luning et al., 2006). But, many 
food safety hazards must be simultaneously controlled in multiple supply chain stages (Alban 
and Stärk, 2005; Luning et al., 2006). Current quality assurance systems are thus insufficiently 
equipped to control food safety on supply chain level. For further improvement of food safety 
control, new systems focusing on supply chain level are needed. 
Food safety legislation in the EU at the end of the 20th century, being fragmented and 
based on prescriptive laws using governmental inspection and compliance testing (EFSA, 
2007), was insufficiently equipped to improve food safety control. With Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002 the EU adopted new legislation to control food safety based on integrated risk 
analysis throughout the supply chain. Primary legal responsibility lays with FBOs, 
governments have final responsibility to supervise that marketed products are safe. Regulation 
(EC) No 882/2004 on official controls opens possibilities to use private control systems in 
public food safety control, the so–called verification–of–control principle. A government 
verifies if FBOs’ private control systems sufficiently guarantee safety of marketed products 
without using public control herself. In this setting FBOs can design and implement effective 
and efficient solutions on supply chain level to improve food safety control. But, this requires 
new relationships between FBOs in supply chains and between FBOs and governments. 
To arrange cost–effective strategic food safety control on supply chain level that can meet 
future EU–targets for food safety, this chapter proposes and discusses incentive mechanisms. 
First, relevant aspects of food safety control at FBO level are discussed in section 2.2. Second, 
additional relevant aspects of food safety control at supply chain level are discussed in section 
2.3. The aspects are combined in a framework of incentive mechanisms for food safety control 
at supply chain level in section 2.4. Finally, section 2.5 concludes. 
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2.2. Food safety control at food business operator level 
 
Food safety is the “assurance that food will not cause harm to the consumer when it is prepared 
and/or eaten according to its intended use” (Codex Alimentarius, 2003). A food product is safe 
for human consumption if it has been produced by applying all food safety requirements 
appropriate to its intended use, meets risk–based performance and process criteria for specified 
hazards, and does not contain hazards at levels that are harmful to human health (Codex 
Alimentarius, 2005). In their techno–managerial approach Luning and Marcelis (2006) argue 
that a food product’s safety depends on food behaviour and human behaviour. Food behaviour 
relates to food safety hazards and control measures, which are discussed first in this section. 
Because food safety is a public good, food safety legislation is important to consider. Human 
behaviour relates to decision making, which according to Simon et al. (1987) is evaluating and 
choosing among alternatives to reach a goal, or a company objective for food safety. Company 
objectives for food safety and the legal environment are discussed next. Finally, decision 
making on food safety control is discussed. 
 
2.2.1. Food safety hazards 
Food safety problems are caused by insufficient control and detection of food safety hazards. 
The Codex Alimentarius (2003) distinguishes microbiological (e.g. bacteria, viruses, parasites, 
protozoa, fungi), chemical (e.g. residues of pesticides and medicines, heavy metals, 
xenobiotics) and physical hazards (e.g. radiation, foreign bodies as glass, metal, wood, stone). 
Food safety hazards can be characterized in how they enter and evolve in a product. A 
contaminant is “any biological or chemical agent, foreign matter, or other substance not 
intentionally added to food which may compromise food safety or suitability” (Codex 
Alimentarius, 2003). Examples are microbiological hazards. In contrast, other hazards can only 
enter a product if specific operating procedures are used, as residues and needles. For 
microbiological hazards that can multiply as salmonella, food safety risks can increase after 
entering a product. Conversely, chemical and physical hazards do not multiply in a product. 
Because hazards can differ in their characteristics, optimal control strategies can also differ 
between hazards. 
 
2.2.2. Control measures 
To control food safety FBOs can use control measures as heating, cooling, pasteurisation, 
cleaning, disinfection, logistical processing, and using hazard free raw materials. A control 
measure is “any action and activity that can be used to prevent or eliminate a food safety 
hazard or reduce it to an acceptable level” (Codex Alimentarius, 2003). Only if all FBOs in a 
supply chain apply adequate control measures, end product safety can be guaranteed. A control 
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measure can reduce risks of multiple hazards or a combination of control measures can be 
necessary to reduce the risk of a single hazard. Preventive and corrective measures can be 
distinguished. Preventive measures ensure a hazard does not enter a product. Corrective 
measures eliminate or reduce a hazard in a product. Hazards, for which no corrective measures 
exist, can be controlled by preventive measures, or products contaminated with such hazards 
can be processed separately for markets for which these hazards pose no risk. For 
contaminants, a combination of preventive and corrective control measures can be necessary. 
Hazards which can only enter a product if specific operating procedures are used, can be 
precluded by abandoning these procedures. Hazard and process properties determine the set of 
relevant control measures. 
 
2.2.3. Company objectives for food safety 
A company objective for food safety is the food safety level of its end products a FBO aims at. 
Company objectives can be related to products and processes. Product related company 
objectives focus on intrinsic product attributes as contamination level for relevant hazards or 
Performance Objectives and Performance Criteria (EFSA, 2007). Process related company 
objectives focus on compliance with procedures that aim to control food safety, for example 
the level at which food safety guidelines as HACCP–procedures are followed. In recent years, 
with the legal prescription of HACCP, food safety control in the EU has shifted increasingly 
from product to process control. Company objectives can focus on effectiveness, the extent to 
which food safety is improved, and on efficiency, relating costs and benefits to effectiveness. 
Company objectives can aim at compliance with food safety legislation or with private norms. 
Private norms should include legal norms and can include additional norms, and can be used as 
a strategic marketing tool. For most hazards, a company objective of zero risk is generally 
unrealistic due to unintentional entrance in products. Currently, company objectives for food 
safety are generally set roughly through the obligatory HACCP–system. Concrete company 
objectives are, however, mostly still lacking. 
 
2.2.4. Legal environment 
The legal environment sets requirements to FBOs. It can prescribe usage of specific control 
measures or safety control systems, for example HACCP. It can also prohibit usage of specific 
control measures, for example in the EU, irradiation of food products. The legal environment 
can prescribe company objectives or be used as a guideline to set them. General food laws and 
product liability laws apply to all hazards. Product liability laws can induce FBOs to improve 
food safety, if contaminations can be traced to the source and the responsible FBO faces 
liability costs (Buzby et al., 2001). Difficulty to identify the source limit product liability laws 
to improve food safety on farms and processing plants (King et al., 2007). Product liability 
laws can differ between countries. For example, punitive damages and class action law suits 
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are less well developed in the EU than in the USA. For specific chemical hazards, EU 
Regulations (EC) No 396/2005, 2377/90 and 1881/2006 establish process and product norms. 
For microbiological hazards, the European Food Safety Authority defined Appropriate Level 
of Protection, Food Safety Objective, Performance Objectives, and Performance Criteria 
(EFSA, 2007). Criteria for some specific microbiological hazards in specific products are set in 
EU Regulations (EC) No 2073/2005 and 2160/2003. But, these criteria and criteria for other 
hazards and products still need further development in EU food safety laws to set concrete 
objectives for food safety control. The legal environment provides guidelines for setting food 
safety objectives for FBOs and legal constraints to the set of relevant control measures. 
 
2.2.5. FBO decision making on food safety control 
If a FBO with the applied control measures does not meet company objectives, it should apply 
more effective control measures. The decision which control measures to apply is thus 
essential for food safety. Costs and turnaround time are important in FBO decision making. 
Control measures can increase costs through labour, investment in equipment, and redesign of 
production processes. Testing and sampling require investment in technologies and labour of 
FBO and laboratory personnel. Audits and inspections require labour of auditors, inspectors 
and FBO personnel. Control measures, sampling, testing, audits and inspections can be time 
consuming (Unnevehr et al., 2004), increasing turnaround time and lowering shelf life of 
products. But, control measures can also have positive externalities as lower production and 
processing costs, higher sales prices, increased sales, and increased market access. 
Control measures aim to decrease contamination levels in products and number of 
products with a relevant food safety risk, thereby lowering internal and external failure costs. 
Internal failure costs are additional processing and production costs for the FBO of products 
not within specification. External failure costs are financial consequences for other supply 
chain stages, as additional processing and production costs, and for society due to human 
illness and death. Financial consequences for society can be calculated with the human capital 
or the friction cost method (Koopmanschap and Van Ineveld, 1992) using Quality of Life, 
Quality Adjusted Life–Year or Disability Adjusted Life–Year (Abelson, 2003; Mangen et al., 
2005). A FBO that caused external failure costs, only faces these costs when traceability shows 
that it is involved (Van der Vorst, 2006). External failure costs are revealed through product 
recalls (Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001), damaged relationships with suppliers and subsequent 
trade implications, and liability for public health problems (Buzby et al., 2001). FBOs can 
sometimes insure themselves against external failure costs. In a sense, control measures are an 
insurance against failure costs with their costs as insurance premium. How costs and 
turnaround time are weighted in the decision to control food safety depends on the decision 
making organisation. Generally, FBOs focus more on direct costs and gains and attributable 
external failure costs, whereas public organisations on societal costs. 
Chapter 2 
 
32 
Drivers of human decisions also drive FBO decisions. Rational people maximize expected 
utility knowing all options, probabilities and effects. However, bounded rationality makes 
human behaviour deviate from rational behaviour (Simon, 1955). Deviations, as systematic 
errors in assessing probabilities and predicting values under uncertainty (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974), comparison of gains and losses to a reference value (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), valuing losses twice as heavy as gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), contra 
productive financial incentives (Pokorny, 2008), fairness considerations (Rabin, 1993), 
reciprocity (Fehr et al., 1997), and non–linear discounting (Frederick et al., 2002), impact real 
decision making to apply control measures. 
Drivers of FBO decisions to apply control measures as costs and turnaround time are key 
elements in food safety control and must be considered in an incentive system for food safety 
control. For accurate ex–ante evaluation of food safety control systems, insight into real FBO 
decision making is essential. 
 
2.3. Food safety control at supply chain level 
 
To enhance performance of a supply chain, FBOs must coordinate goals and activities (Schulze 
Althoff et al., 2005). For improved food safety performance on supply chain level, FBOs must 
coordinate their decisions about food safety control. To coordinate FBO decision making, 
incentive systems can be used, which include incentive mechanisms as price premiums, profit 
and cost–sharing arrangements, qualified supplier programs, and long–term commitments 
(Boehlje, 1999). Valeeva (2005) argues that incentive mechanisms are promising to improve 
coordination of food safety activities over FBOs in a supply chain. Between each two stages of 
a supply chain an incentive mechanism aimed at food safety control can be implemented. An 
incentive system aimed at food safety control is defined here as the set of incentive mechanisms 
aimed at food safety control implemented in a supply chain, which aims to achieve the 
incentive system objectives for food safety. Figure 2.1 provides an example of an incentive 
system. The next two sections discuss incentive mechanisms for food safety control and 
incentive system objectives. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Example of an incentive system for food safety control (light gray) with three 
incentive mechanisms between four supply chain stages (dark gray). 
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2.3.1. Incentive mechanisms 
To induce quality control at suppliers FBOs have implemented incentive mechanisms that 
measure and compensate performance (e.g. Chalfant and Sexton, 2002; Hueth and Ligon, 
2002). Similarly, to induce food safety control at suppliers, buyers can use incentive 
mechanisms. An incentive mechanism aimed at food safety control is defined here as the set of 
performance and compliance measurement system and compensation scheme between buyer 
and supplier, which aims to induce the supplier to apply control measures to control food 
safety hazards as the buyer requests. Key elements of incentive mechanisms for food safety 
control were determined in a literature review on incentive mechanisms for food quality 
control and for food safety control, which are successively discussed. 
For food quality control, the literature review revealed a number of incentive mechanisms 
in animal and plant production (Table 2.1). Incentive mechanisms aimed at high product 
quality and efficient use of inputs. Absolute and relative indicators were used to measure 
performance on quality attributes of raw materials and end products, and compliance with 
process attributes. Absolute indicators measure a supplier’s performance and compliance 
independent of other suppliers, relative indicators benchmark with reference suppliers. The 
buyer or a third party conducted performance and compliance measurement. Samples and tests 
were used to measure product related indicators, and audits and inspections for process related 
indicators. Several reports mentioned sampling errors in measuring performance and 
compliance. Quality performance and compliance was compensated with a fixed or variable 
piece rate, a financial reward per produced item. Each quality attribute used its own 
measurement indicator and compensation. 
For food safety control, the literature review revealed that actual incentive mechanisms are 
scarce (Table 2.2). Only Alban et al. (2002) describe an actual incentive mechanism that is 
used in practice, the others theoretical mechanisms. Measurement indicators were product and 
output based and included prevalence, residue level, and probability that unsafe products 
remained undetected within an epidemiological unit, the type–II–error. Average performance 
of multiple deliveries was used to average out variance in performance over deliveries. Most 
reports considered the measurement accuracy through sample size. Performance compensation 
included financial penalties for products with increased food safety risk, additional internal 
costs, liability costs and rendering costs. 
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The literature review only showed financial compensation. However, non–financial 
compensation might also be used to induce suppliers in supply chains. Displaying hygiene 
grade cards in restaurant windows increased inspection scores (Jin and Leslie, 2003). Internal 
esteem and animal health equally motivated dairy farmers as monetary rewards (Valeeva et al., 
2007). Non–financial awards as orders, medals and decorations are used in monarchies, 
republics, non–profit organizations and companies to incite individuals (Frey, 2007). 
Key elements of incentive mechanisms for food safety control are the performance and 
compliance measurement system and compensation scheme (Figure 2.2). The performance and 
compliance measurement system is characterised by the measurement indicators, measurement 
accuracy, and the actor who conducts performance and compliance measurement and 
determines performance and compliance. The performance and compliance compensation 
scheme includes the compensation types, such as financial or non–financial and bonus or 
penalty. Knowledge about impact of incentive mechanisms on food safety performance in 
practice is still limited. Insight is needed into how aspects, as self–reporting of performance, 
measurement accuracy, non–financial compensation, and alternative measurement indicators as 
type–II–error, influence effectiveness and efficiency of incentive mechanisms for food safety 
control. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Key elements of an incentive mechanism for food safety control. 
 
2.3.2. Characteristics of the supplier–buyer relationship 
Because an incentive mechanism for food safety control is implemented between supplier and 
buyer, it must consider characteristics of their relationship. This relationship can be 
characterized by processes, product flow, financial aspects, information flow, incentives and 
governance structure (Boehlje, 1999). Financial aspects and incentives were discussed 
previously. Processes, product flow, information flow and governance structure are discussed 
subsequently. 
Incentive mechanism for food safety control 
Performance and compliance 
compensation scheme 
• What compensation types to 
apply? 
Performance and compliance 
measurement system 
• Which indicators to apply to measure 
product performance and process 
compliance? 
• What is the accuracy of performance and 
compliance measurement? 
• Who conducts performance and 
compliance measurement? 
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Processes in food supply chains have specific characteristics (Van der Vorst et al., 2009) 
to be considered in an incentive system. Biological mechanisms, weather, pests and other 
biological hazards result in large variation in quantity and product quality. Seasonality in 
production necessitates global sourcing to provide a year round supply. Quality decay, while 
products pass through the supply chain, limits shelf life of products. To restrict decay, 
conditioned processing, transportation and storage is essential. Notwithstanding, for certain 
products a short turnaround time from harvest to consumption is essential to prevent spoilage. 
Product flow concerns supply assurance. If two FBOs have different acceptance levels for 
a hazard in a product due to private standards or different local legislation, and suppliers can 
shift deliveries from one buyer to another, the additional effort for compliance with the tighter 
level can result in suppliers to cease delivering to the FBO with the tightest level, endangering 
its supply assurance. Supply assurance interacts with the market organisation, because the risk 
of loosing supply assurance is smaller for a buyer who needs one out of ten available suppliers 
than for a buyer who needs one out of two available suppliers. 
Information flow relates to the extent to which FBOs share information. Information 
asymmetry about food safety is present in organizational interactions due to three reasons. 
First, limitations to cognitive abilities of people and high transaction costs make all contracts 
incomplete (Williamson, 2002). Second, for other stakeholders as consumers, other FBOs or 
governments it is difficult or costly to observe if a FBO applies control measures (Hirschauer 
and Musshoff, 2007). Third, organizations refrain from information sharing fearing 
information misuse by trading partners (Mohtadi and Kinsey, 2005) and diminished bargaining 
power (Clemons and Row, 1993). Transactions in the presence of information asymmetry are 
addressed in Incentive Theory (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). A principal, e.g. a buyer, 
delegates a service to an agent, e.g. its supplier, shifting part of his risk of reaching the desired 
outcome to the supplier. The buyer compensates the supplier for the risk based on performance 
of the service. Two agency problems can arise. First is the adverse selection problem. Prior to 
contracting the buyer does not know which suppliers use what control measures. The buyer 
only offers low compensation to avoid paying high compensation to suppliers who don’t use 
control measures. Low compensation is sufficient for suppliers who don’t use control 
measures, but not for suppliers who do, due to their higher costs. So, suppliers who use control 
measures are not contracted and driven out of the market. Second is the moral hazard problem. 
After delegation of a service, the buyer cannot observe the effort of suppliers to fulfil the 
service. This might tempt suppliers to perform less effort, resulting in lower performance than 
the buyer desires. Organizational interactions with such conflicting interests are addressed in 
non–cooperative Game Theory (Kreps, 1990). A Nash equilibrium exists when neither FBO 
can improve performance by one–sidedly deviating from a contract. 
Governance structure involves ownership structure and market organization. The 
ownership structure in a supply chain, as cooperative or investor owned firm, determines 
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distribution of returns between FBOs and optimal food safety control measures for each FBO 
(King et al., 2007). The market organisation of food supply chains has specific characteristics 
to be considered in an incentive system. A large number of spatially dispersed primary 
producers deliver products to few wholesalers or processing companies. Most primary 
producers are small compared to wholesalers and processing companies. In market 
organizations where a buyer has few suppliers, he can easier control food safety risk, than in 
market organizations where a buyer has numerous suppliers. 
We conclude that specific processes characteristics, supply assurance, information 
asymmetry, ownership structure and market organization are important factors for setting 
incentive mechanism parameters. Exactly how these factors influence optimal incentive 
mechanism parameters is still unknown. 
 
2.3.3. Incentive system and incentive mechanism objectives 
Incentive system objectives are food safety levels the system aims at, comparable to company 
objectives, and can provide strategic guidance for setting company objectives. Incentive system 
objectives are set by the system’s owner. Government systems aim at compliance with food 
safety legislation, private systems at compliance with private norms. Incentive system 
objectives can focus on end products and be differentiated to intermediate products and 
processes. If an incentive system aims to induce food safety control simultaneously in multiple 
supply chain stages, it encompasses a separate incentive mechanism for each stage. Each 
incentive mechanism has its own incentive mechanism objectives derived from the incentive 
system objectives. Objectives of the incentive mechanisms are coherently set to ensure the 
incentive system objectives can be achieved. Practical incentive system and incentive 
mechanism objectives should be realistic, because zero–tolerance and 100% compliance do not 
exist in real life. If all external failure costs are attributed to FBOs, incentive system objectives 
are endogenous in the system. If not, incentive system objectives must be set exogenously 
based on an ex–ante determined optimal food safety level. However, it is unclear what food 
safety level is optimal. Also, practical incentive system objectives for food safety are lacking. 
 
2.4. Framework 
 
The framework for designing and analysing incentive mechanisms for food safety control in 
EU supply chains combines the aspects elaborated upon in previous sections (Figure 2.3). The 
framework consists of two cycles. The first is the strategic cycle on the right side of Figure 2.3, 
which concerns the translation of the incentive system objectives into incentive mechanism 
parameters. The incentive system’s owner, which can be the buyer, a third party or the 
government, sets incentive system objectives, for example a specific expected salmonella 
Chapter 2 
 
40 
prevalence level in consumer products, considering relevant food safety hazards and the legal 
environment. Incentive system objectives are translated into incentive mechanism objectives, 
for example a specific maximum salmonella prevalence level in products delivered by the 
supplier. Measurement system parameters of the incentive mechanism, such as sample size and 
diagnostic test, and compensation scheme parameters, such as a penalty on products that have a 
salmonella level exceeding a specific threshold value, are set based on incentive mechanism 
objectives. The parameters are set considering the supplier–buyer relationship characteristics. 
The performance and compliance measurement system assesses actual product performance 
and process compliance of the supplier to determine measured performance and compliance. 
Measured performance and compliance is evaluated by the incentive system owner whether it 
sufficiently contributes to reaching the incentive system objectives and incentive mechanism 
objectives. If measured performance and compliance is insufficient to reach either incentive 
system or incentive mechanism objectives, incentive mechanism parameters are reset. The 
likely increase in susceptibility to food borne illnesses of the EU population’s could necessitate 
to tighten incentive system and incentive mechanism objectives, providing another reason for 
resetting incentive mechanism parameters. 
The second cycle is operational and concerns the inducement of the supplier through the 
incentive mechanism. The supplier delivers products with a specific performance and 
compliance, which results from the specific control measures used. Measured performance and 
compliance is determined by the performance and compliance measurement system assessing 
the real product performance and process compliance of the supplier, also used in the strategic 
cycle. Performance and compliance compensation for the supplier is determined using the 
measured performance and compliance and the performance and compliance compensation 
scheme. The supplier considers performance and compliance compensation, effectiveness of 
relevant and legal control measures, and their impact on costs and turnaround time, in its 
selection of control measures to use. The set of relevant and legal control measures is 
determined by the relevant food safety hazards and legal environment. 
In a supply chain, the buyer in Figure 2.3 can also be a supplier of another buyer. If the 
incentive system extents to the other buyer, an incentive mechanism can be implemented 
between the other buyer and its supplier. Both incentive mechanisms objectives are derived 
from the incentive system objectives. Parameters of both incentive mechanisms are coherently 
set given incentive mechanism objectives and supplier–buyer relationships. For each supplier–
buyer relationship the system functions as described above. 
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Figure 2.3: Framework for designing and analysing incentive mechanisms for food safety 
control in supply chains. The incentive mechanism is the light gray box. Actors are 
represented in dark gray boxes with dotted lines. Boxes with a thin solid line indicate key 
aspects for food safety control that are determined by the actors. Boxes with thin dotted 
lines correspond to aspects that result from control measures used by the supplier. 
External factors of influence on the incentive mechanism are represented without boxes. 
Solid arrows stand for ‘A determines B’, dotted arrows for ‘A influences B’. The two 
cycles are indicated by bold italic letters and bold arrows. 
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In Figure 2.3 the incentive system owner can be the buyer, a third party or the government. 
If the buyer is the owner of the incentive system, incentive system objectives, incentive 
mechanism objectives and the incentive mechanism in Figure 2.3 are integrated into the buyer. 
Public and private organisations can also implement an incentive system together. In public–
private cooperation, governments and FBOs can set incentive system and company objectives, 
design incentive mechanisms, set incentive mechanism parameters to improve food safety, and 
make agreements on who absorbs which failure costs. For example, in transition periods to 
tighter objectives, governments can temporarily absorb external failure costs to provide FBOs 
with sufficient time to develop and implement new, more effective control measures. 
 
2.5. Conclusion and outlook 
 
This chapter presents a framework for incentive mechanisms for food safety control in EU 
supply chains, which emphasizes key aspects of food safety control and provides guidelines for 
designing and analysing such mechanisms. Inter–company incentive mechanisms induce 
supplying FBOs to apply control measures. Multiple incentive mechanisms combined make up 
an incentive system that aims to control a hazard on supply chain level. The framework can be 
used to analyse and assess food safety control in EU supply chains and to set achievable public 
and private targets for food safety hazards. 
It is important to recognize that the knowledge of how to apply incentive mechanisms for 
food safety control in practice is still limited. Elements of incentive mechanisms as the 
performance and compliance measurement system and the compensation scheme should be 
attuned to reach effective and efficient food safety control. Although impact on food safety 
performance of some elements has received attention (Backus and King, 2008; Hirschauer and 
Musshoff, 2007; King et al., 2007; Starbird, 2005; Starbird, 2007), more insight into impact of 
these and other elements is needed. To improve design of new incentive mechanisms, insight 
into variation in efficacy of incentive mechanisms between FBOs is needed. Alternatives to 
reduce measurement costs, as self–reporting of performance and compliance by suppliers, have 
to be examined for practical applicability. Knowledge is lacking about efficacy of non–
financial compensation and of alternative performance indicators as the type–II–error to induce 
suppliers to control food safety, and the impact of measurement accuracy on performance and 
compliance. Also, incentive system, incentive mechanism and company objectives for food 
safety are lacking in practice. 
The framework was developed for the case of food safety control in EU supply chains. But 
it can be adapted for all settings necessitating coordinated actions of multiple FBOs, for 
example, to determine key elements of certification systems as used for green label producers. 
The framework can be a valuable tool for analysing and assessing incentive mechanisms and 
systems in settings where FBOs must cooperate with partners from other supply chain stages. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Incentive mechanisms for liver lesion control 
in finishing pigs in the Netherlands2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Liver lesion prevalence in slaughtered finishing pigs in the Netherlands remained relatively 
high from the mid–1990s until 2004, although sufficient measures existed to control the main 
cause, an infection with the roundworm Ascaris suum. In July 2004 a new incentive 
mechanism was installed to induce finishing pig producers to increase control of Ascaris suum 
infections. This chapter compares the effectiveness of two Dutch incentive mechanisms: a 
collective insurance, in place prior to July 2004, and a reduction in producer payment for each 
delivered pig with a liver lesion, in place from July 2004. Liver inspection data of pigs 
slaughtered in 2003–2006 by a major Dutch slaughter company were analysed with an out–of–
sample dynamic forecast test and non–parametric bootstrapping. Results showed that after 
introduction of the price reduction, mean liver lesion prevalence decreased from 9 to 5%. A 
reduced liver lesion prevalence ranging from 0 to 46 percentage points was observed on 67% 
of 1069 farms that delivered both during the insurance and the price reduction. The number of 
farms with a liver lesion prevalence of 5.0% or less increased from 52 to 68%. The price 
reduction for each pig with a liver lesion was a more effective incentive mechanism to induce 
finishing pig producers to control Ascaris suum infections than the collective insurance. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Liver lesions are an important quality and safety attribute in pork production. In the 
Netherlands from the mid–1990s until 2004 mean liver lesion prevalence in slaughtered pigs 
fluctuated around 9%. For the 20.1 million finishing pigs reared in the Netherlands in 2003 
(PVE, 2004), this amounted to around 1.8 million pigs with lesioned livers. The main cause of 
liver lesions was an infection with the roundworm Ascaris suum (A. suum). Pigs infected with 
                                                 
2
 C.P.A. van Wagenberg, G.B.C. Backus, W.E. Kuiper, J.G.A.J. van der Vorst and H.A.P. Urlings. 
Published in Preventive Veterinary Medicine 93(1), pp. 19-24. 
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A. suum had a higher feed intake, a lower growth rate, a lower health level, and a lower lean 
meat percentage, leading to substantial economic losses for pig producers (Stewart and Hale, 
1988; Roepstorff, 2003). In addition, the devaluation of livers with pathological lesions caused 
by A. suum resulted in economic losses of slaughterhouses. To compensate slaughterhouses in 
the Netherlands for these economic losses, a mandatory collective insurance with a premium 
per pig delivered to a slaughterhouse was in place since the 1940s. The premium was paid by 
the pig producers. To reduce economic losses caused by lesioned livers, in 2004 the Dutch pig 
industry changed this to a market–based incentive mechanism: a €1 reduction in the payment 
to producers for each pig with a lesioned liver. This chapter aims to analyze if the market–
based price reduction provided higher incentives to finishing pig producers than the collective 
insurance to control A. suum infections as measured through liver lesion prevalence. We 
compared liver lesion prevalence at aggregate and individual farm level between a period in 
which the collective insurance was effective and a period in which the market–based price 
reduction was effective. 
Section 3.2 provides background on liver lesions in finishing pigs in the Netherlands. 
Material and methods are provided in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the results and section 
3.5 the discussion. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.  
 
3.2. Liver lesions in finishing pigs in the Netherlands 
 
Most lesions in the liver are caused by an infection with the roundworm A. suum. Adult A. 
suum worms produce eggs in the pig's intestines which are excreted with the faeces. After oral 
ingestion of A. suum eggs, larvae hatch, penetrate the pig's intestines and migrate through 
cecum, liver and heart to the lungs. The larvae migrate further to the trachea, are coughed up, 
swallowed, and end up in the small intestine where they mature into adult worms and start 
producing eggs. A. suum infections are controlled with anthelmintics during breeding and 
fattening. This mainly prevents new eggs being produced through termination of larvae and 
adult worms. Eggs remain infectious for years. The efficacy of different anthelmintics ranged 
from around 70 to 100% (Yazwinski et al., 1997; Lacey, 1990; Stewart et al., 1999; Ayoade et 
al., 2003). Correct application of anthelmintics reduced liver lesion prevalence to 2–4% of the 
herd (Van Meirhaeghe and Maes, 1996). 
Since the 1990s individual inspection results of all pigs delivered for slaughter are 
recorded in the Netherlands. Since 2006 EU legislation EG/854/2004 prescribes this as well. 
Pathological inspection results include lesions of livers, skin, legs, lungs and pleurisy. All 
slaughterhouses are legally enforced to use the Dutch inspection procedure developed by the 
National Inspection Service for Livestock and Meat in the early 1990s (PVV, 2006). Inspection 
of carcasses is conducted by official assistants, under direct supervision of veterinarians from 
the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority. This guarantees independence of 
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inspection. Inspected livers are classified on basis of the degree of pathological deformation 
due to an A. suum infection. When larvae migrate through the liver, the immune response leads 
to inflammatory tissue that shows as white spots. A liver has minor lesions if it has one or two 
white spots on the front side. These are declared unfit for human consumption, but fit for 
animal consumption. A liver is rejected, and consequently declared unfit for human and animal 
consumption, when it has three or more white spots. 
To compensate Dutch slaughterhouses for the economic losses of pathological slaughter 
lesions including liver lesions, a mandatory collective insurance with a premium per pig 
delivered to a slaughterhouse was in place from the 1940s to 2004. It was based on the 
slaughterhouse losses and an organizational surcharge. In 2003 it was €0.31 per pig and 
included €0.02 for lesioned livers. The insurance provided limited incentives to an individual 
pig producer to control A. suum infections. Only if sufficient producers simultaneously lowered 
liver lesion prevalence, the premium would decrease. For a specific producer his premium did 
not decrease if he reduced liver lesion prevalence on his farm. Consequently, producers with 
high liver lesion prevalence received the same market price as producers with low liver lesion 
prevalence. The expected reduction in additional production costs due to A. suum infections 
was the only incentive for producers to control it. Persisting high liver lesion prevalence 
indicated that pig producers had insufficient incentives to control A. suum infections. 
On 5 July 2004 the Dutch pig industry removed lesioned livers from the insurance and 
replaced it by a €1 reduction in the payment to pig producers for each pig with a lesioned liver. 
Other pathological lesions remained insured. All Dutch slaughterhouses implemented the 
reduction and it is still in place in 2009. Research indicates that incentive mechanisms that 
related economic consequences to output quality induced producers to improve quality control 
(Prendergast, 1999). Economic incentive mechanisms were used to induce farmers to produce 
the desired quality at the correct time (Hueth and Ligon, 2002; Martinez and Zering, 2004) and 
thereby contributed to higher food quality levels (Jayasinghe–Mudalige and Henson, 2007) or 
to the same food quality levels at lower costs (King et al., 2007). Economic benefits for pig 
producers of controlling A. suum infections with the price reduction exceeded those with the 
insurance system. Mean liver lesion prevalence with the price reduction was therefore expected 
to be equal or lower than with the insurance system. 
Mean liver lesion prevalence is a measure of the effectiveness of an incentive mechanism 
to induce pig producers to control A. suum infections. However, this measure does not show 
the heterogeneity in producer responses to an incentive mechanism. Individual producer 
responses are needed to gain insight into the extent to which the incentive mechanisms actually 
induce all producers to control A. suum infections. Agricultural producers are heterogeneous in 
many aspects. Pig producers were heterogeneous in risk attitude (Pennings and Leuthold, 
2000). Broiler producers differed in abilities that affect production performance (Knoeber and 
Thurman, 1994). To induce agents with heterogeneous abilities to exert effort, a set of 
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individualised contracts was optimal in a situation without transaction costs (Levy and Vukina, 
2002). Reversely, under an incentive mechanism with one incentive level for all agents, or a 
uniform incentive mechanism, each agent exerted a different effort. Thus, only agents who 
experienced sufficient motivation of a uniform incentive mechanism exerted action. Both 
insurance and market–based price reduction are uniform incentive mechanisms. Consequently, 
differences are expected between pig producers in the control of A. suum infections and in liver 
lesion prevalence. The fraction of producers with a low liver lesion prevalence is a second 
measure of effectiveness of an incentive system. A more effective incentive system has a larger 
fraction. Because the economic benefits of controlling A. suum infections are higher with the 
price reduction than with the insurance, a larger fraction of producers was expected to be 
motivated to control A. suum infections by the price reduction than by the insurance. 
 
3.3. Material and methods 
 
3.3.1. Dataset 
The dataset included liver inspection results of each delivery of finishing pigs at a Dutch 
slaughter company from January 2003 to December 2006. It contained 234,880 deliveries from 
7829 suppliers including imports covering 3.1 million pigs in 2003, 3.5 million in 2004, 6.4 
million in 2005 and 7.9 million in 2006. This represented 22% of all pigs slaughtered in the 
Netherlands in 2003, 24% in 2004, 44% in 2005, and 56% in 2006. 
Coding of livers with minor lesions (one or two white spots) and rejected livers (more than 
two white spots) varied between slaughterhouse locations and in time. In some locations 
rejected livers and livers with minor lesions were both coded ‘rejected’, in other locations all 
were coded ‘livers with minor lesions’ and this changed in time for some locations. Therefore, 
no distinction was made between livers with minor lesions and rejected livers in this analysis, 
and the sum of prevalence of livers with minor lesions and rejected livers was used. 
 
3.3.2. Statistical analysis of the aggregate impact 
First, we used the Box–Jenkins method (Box and Jenkins, 1970) to derive a univariate time 
series model of liver lesion prevalence for the insurance period (week 1–79). Then, this model 
was used to forecast liver lesion prevalence in the price reduction period (week 80–209). 
Finally, an out–of–sample dynamic forecast test (Clements and Hendry, 1998) on the time 
series of weekly weighted mean liver lesion prevalence was used to determine impact of the 
change from the insurance period (week 1–79) to the price reduction period (week 80–209). 
This test assumes that the error terms εt in the time series are uncorrelated and have mean zero. 
The time series included lesion liver prevalence of each delivery of each supplier and 
weighting factor was delivery size. Data were analyzed with SAS 9.1 (SAS, 2002). 
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3.3.3. Statistical analysis at individual producer level 
Effect at individual producer level of the change from insurance to price reduction was 
estimated by comparing mean liver lesion prevalence between the insurance period and the 
price reduction period. No long–term contracts existed between pig producers and slaughter 
companies. Dutch slaughter companies competed actively for pigs with each other and with 
plants in neighbouring countries. In this setting, producers could regularly shift deliveries from 
one slaughter company to another. A decrease in mean liver lesion prevalence could thus have 
originated from producers switching slaughterhouses. Suppose that producers with a high 
prevalence switched from slaughterhouse A in the insurance period to slaughterhouse B in the 
price reduction period while producers with a low prevalence switched from B to A, then a 
reduction in mean liver lesion prevalence in slaughterhouse A did not originate from lower 
prevalence at individual producer level but from switching. Therefore, only producers who 
delivered in both periods were used in the analysis. 
It is unclear to what extent seasonal influence of A. suum infections on liver lesions in 
finishing pigs existed (Roepstorff, 1991; Elbers et al., 1992). We used the same calendar 
periods to overcome possible seasonal influences. Period 1 with insurance was defined from 1 
July 2003 to 30 June 2004 (sample S1) and period 2 with price reduction from 1 July 2005 to 
30 June 2006 (sample S2). Imports were excluded from S1 and S2 because these were not 
traceable to individual producers. Also, deliveries from possibly non–commercial producers 
with less than 500 pigs delivered in period 1 or in period 2 were excluded from S1 and S2. This 
resulted in 1069 producers with 2.23 million pigs in 27,483 deliveries in S1 and with 2.65 
million pigs in 26,934 deliveries in S2. Including all producers that delivered at least one 
finishing pig in period 1 and period 2 yielded similar empirical results. 
The impact of the price reduction was defined as the difference between weighted mean 
liver lesion prevalence per producer in S1 and in S2. A positive difference indicated a higher 
liver lesion prevalence in S1 than in S2 and thus a decrease from period 1 to period 2. Using 
paired data, the null hypothesis to test was H0: µ(S1–S2) ≤ 0, with S1–S2 the distribution of 
the paired difference between S1 and S2 and µ(S1–S2) weighted mean of S1–S2. The 
weighting factor for a producer was the average number of delivered pigs in these two periods. 
Non–parametric bootstrapping (MacKinnon, 2002) was used to test H0, because a 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov goodness of fit test statistic for a normal distribution of 0.20 indicated 
that S1–S2 was not normally distributed (p < 0.01). To compare the fraction of producers with 
a low prevalence between S1 and S2, producers were categorized into two categories in both 
S1 and S2: ‘low’ when weighted mean liver lesion prevalence was 5.0% or less, and ‘high’ 
otherwise. Four possible outcomes were ‘low’ to ‘low’, ‘low’ to ‘high’, ‘high’ to ‘low’, and 
‘high’ to ‘high’. Moreover, for each outcome the null hypothesis H0: µ(S1–S2) ≤ 0 was 
formally tested. 
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3.4. Results 
 
3.4.1. Development of liver lesion prevalence 2003–2006 
The development of weighted weekly mean liver lesion prevalence from January 2003 (week 
1) to December 2006 (week 209) is presented in Figure 3.1. Weighted mean liver lesion 
prevalence decreased from 8–10% to 4–6%. Decline in liver lesion prevalence started 40–50 
weeks after introduction of the price reduction. 
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Figure 3.1: Observed weighted weekly mean liver lesion prevalence and predicted 
weighted weekly mean liver lesion prevalence with the lower 95% confidence level and 
upper 95% confidence level of finishing pigs delivered to a major Dutch slaughter 
company in 2003–2006 (3.1 million in 2003, 3.5 million in 2004, 6.4 million in 2005, 7.9 
million in 2006). The predicted weighted weekly mean liver lesion prevalence and its 
confidence interval in weeks 80–209 were forecasted using data of weeks 1–79. The bold 
vertical line marks 5 July 2004, introduction date of the price reduction in week 80. The 
dashed vertical lines indicate period 1 with insurance (week 27 to week 78) and period 2 
with price reduction (week 132 to week 183). 
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3.4.2. Aggregate impact 
Box–Jenkins yielded an AR(3) model (1 + a1B + a2B2 + a3B3)·xt = c + εt, with xt mean liver 
lesion prevalence in week t, B the lag operator defined as Bi·xt = xt−i for all i ∈{…,−1, 0, 1,…}, 
c a constant, and εt the error term. Removal of extreme outliers week 37, 38 and 70 as well as 
three following weeks 39–41 and 71–73 – to avoid outliers influencing estimates through 
lagged variables – resulted in a predicted txˆ of 
 
3)0012.0(2(0.0192)1(0.2224)(0.2748)
40668.0 0.27592   0.14360  0.01491  ˆ
−−−
⋅+⋅+⋅+= ttt xxxtx
 (1) 
 
The p values in parentheses showed that coefficients of lagged terms were all significant 
except the one of xt−1. The model had R2 = 0.33. The stationary AR(3) model captured all 
univariate dynamics in the sample as indicated by chi–squared tests for autocorrelation 
between residual at week t and lags from 1 up to and including 6, 12, 18, or 24 (all p > 0.245). 
With the model as described in (1) aggregate weighted mean liver lesion prevalence values for 
week 80–209 were forecasted. After week 135 observed aggregate liver lesion prevalence 
dropped below the lower level of the 95% confidence interval of the forecasts indicating that 
observed prevalence was significantly (p < 0.05) smaller than the forecasts (Figure 3.1). 
 
3.4.3. Impact at individual producer level 
Weighted mean, median, 5% percentile, and 95% percentile of livers lesion prevalence of S1 
were higher than those of S2 for the 1069 producers that delivered in both period 1 and period 
2 (Table 3.1). The 1% percentile of the non–parametric bootstrap (1000 replications, seed 0) of 
0.017 to test H0: µ(S1–S2) ≤ 0, indicated that S1–S2 was significantly different from 0 with 
p < 0.001. For producers that delivered in both periods weighted mean liver lesion prevalence 
on aggregate level was significantly lower in period 2 than in period 1. 
 
Table 3.1: Liver lesion prevalence statistics of the 1069 finishing pig producers who 
delivered at least 500 pigs to a major Dutch slaughter company in the insurance period 
from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 (sample S1) and in the price reduction period from 1 
July 2005 to 30 June 2006 (sample S2). 
Liver lesion prevalence statistic  S1 S2 
Weighted mean 0.073 0.051 
Standard deviation 0.085 0.054 
Median 0.041 0.035 
Minimum 0.003 0.004 
5% percentile 0.017 0.012 
95% percentile 0.268 0.152 
Maximum 0.621 0.533 
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Of the 1069 individual producers from S1 and S2, 67% (719) showed a decrease in 
weighted mean liver lesion prevalence ranging from 0 to 46 percentage points (Figure 3.2). Of 
350 producers with an increase 84% (294) showed an increase less than 5 percentage points. 
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Figure 3.2: Development in weighted mean liver lesion prevalence of the 1069 finishing 
pig producers who delivered both in the insurance period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 
2004 (S1) and in the price reduction period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 (S2) to a 
major Dutch slaughter company. Developments were rounded to the nearest higher 1%–
development level. A positive S1–S2 indicates a decrease in weighted mean liver lesion 
prevalence.  
 
Of the 557 producers in S1 with a low mean liver lesion prevalence (≤5.0%) in the 
insurance period, 87% (482) retained this in S2 in the price reduction period (Table 3.2). Of the 
512 producers with a high prevalence (>5.0%) in S1, 48% (246) had a low prevalence in S2. 
The fraction of producers with a liver lesion prevalence of 5.0% or less increased from 52% in 
the insurance period to 68% in the price reduction period. Additionally, producers that retained 
a high prevalence also significantly reduced mean prevalence. 
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Table 3.2: Number of finishing pig producers Ntotal, number of finishing pigs with a mean 
liver lesion prevalence of ≤5.0% in S2 Nlow in S2, number of finishing pigs with a mean liver 
lesion prevalence of >5.0% in S2 Nhigh in S2, and weighted mean liver lesion prevalence µ in 
a prevalence category of S1 related to a prevalence category of S2 for the finishing pig 
producers who delivered at least 500 pigs to a major Dutch slaughter company in the 
insurance period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 (sample S1) and in the price reduction 
period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 (sample S2).  
Total Prevalence category in S2  
   
≤5.0% >5.0% 
Prevalence 
category in 
S1 Ntotal µ(S1)a µ(S2)a Nlow in S2  µ(S1)a µ(S2)a Nhigh in S2  µ(S1)a µ(S2)a 
≤5.0% 557 2.9% 3.1% 482 2.8% 2.4% 75 3.3% 7.4% 
>5.0% 512 15.5% 8.5% 246 11.5% 3.1% 266 19.2% 13.4% 
a
 µ(S1) and µ(S2) are weighted mean liver lesion prevalence from sample S1 and sample S2 respectively. Bootstraps 
(1000 replications, seed 0) showed that all differences between µ(S1) and µ(S2) within each category in S1 were 
significant with p < 0.001.  
 
3.5. Discussion 
 
This chapter analysed liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs in the Netherlands in a period 
with a collective insurance with a premium per finishing pig and a period with a reduction in 
producer payment per finishing pig with a lesioned liver. The analysis demonstrated the value 
of the price reduction as an incentive mechanism to reduce liver lesions compared to the 
insurance. 
Use of empirical data resulted in some limitations. Changes in external factors such as the 
weather, the inspection procedure, the housing systems, and the price of anthelmintics could 
contribute to the decrease in liver lesion prevalence. High temperature and little rain decreased 
the survival rate of A. suum eggs on pastures (Larsen and Roepstorff, 1999). The Netherlands 
has a temperate climate. In 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 the monthly mean temperature varied 
between 1.8–19.3 °C, 3.2–18.8 °C, 2.4–17.7 °C and 1.5–22.3 °C, respectively. The monthly 
mean rainfall varied between 9–96 mm, 31–127 mm, 50–159 mm and 9–181 mm, respectively. 
Only 2006 showed a higher maximum temperature than in the other years. However, this was 
in July, after the price reduction period analysed in this chapter. In addition, more than 99% of 
the finishing pigs in the Netherlands were kept indoors in controlled climatic conditions with 
only a marginal influence of the weather. Finally, Germany, eastern neighbour to the 
Netherlands, had a similar climate as the Netherlands and finishing pigs were kept in similar 
housing conditions. Available data from a slaughterhouse in North–West Germany showed that 
annual mean liver lesion prevalence remained around 9% from 2001 to 2006 (Personal 
communication H.J. Möller of VION Food Hamburg AG, 2006). This suggested that the 
weather did not cause the decrease in liver lesion prevalence as seen in the Dutch 
slaughterhouses. As the meat inspection procedures did not change since 2003, it is not to be 
expected that this contributed to the decrease either. It is unlikely that all 1069 finishing pig 
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producers who delivered both in the insurance and price reduction period, renovated their 
housing systems simultaneously in 2004 and 2005. Housing systems are renovated around 
every 10 years for equipment and slatted floors to around every 40 years for the carcass (ASG, 
2008). Changes to the housing systems are not expected to have caused the observed decrease 
in liver lesion prevalence. Finally, pig producers could have intensified A. suum infection 
control due to a structural decrease in the prices of anthelmintics. However, the prices of 
anthelmintics did not structurally decrease from 2003 to 2006. It is not expected that the prices 
of anthelmintics caused the decrease in liver lesion prevalence in the Dutch slaughterhouses. 
Because no change was observed in all other possible factors, that to our knowledge could have 
resulted in the decrease in liver lesion prevalence, the change in incentive mechanism remained 
as the main cause. 
Increased efforts to control liver lesions required an increase in amount of purchased and 
used anthelmintics. The Farm Accountancy Data Network dataset of LEI Wageningen UR 
included medicine use of around 70 individual pig producers in the Netherlands. These data 
showed that amount of anthelmintics purchased in 2005 and 2006 was 16–18% higher than in 
2004. This indicated that Dutch pig producers were more inclined to administer a worm 
treatment in 2005 and 2006 than in 2004. 
Decline in liver lesion prevalence started 40 weeks after introduction of the price reduction 
(Figure 3.1). This can be explained by producers only starting to apply anthelmintics in new 
groups of finishing pigs. In normal Dutch production systems with three fattening rounds a 
year all groups are replaced after 4 months. Furthermore, consequent application of 
anthelmintics stops the production of new eggs and, in time, thus the infection pressure. Field 
tests also showed that after starting a treatment it took up to 18 months to reduce liver lesion 
prevalence (Van Meirhaege and Maes, 1996). 
The mean liver lesion prevalence in S1 of the 1069 finishing pig producers who delivered 
both in the insurance period and in the price reduction period was 7.3%, lower than the 8–10% 
in Figure 3.1. So, the mean liver lesion prevalence of the deliveries excluded from S1 was 
higher than that of the deliveries in S1. The mean liver lesion prevalence of producers in S2 
equalled the level in Figure 3.1. Thus, on average, producers that were not included in the 
sample had a larger decrease in liver lesion prevalence than the producers in the sample. 
Valleeva et al. (2007) distinguished between three groups of dairy farmers that each had a 
different motivation to control mastitis. Common economic ground was appropriate for 37% of 
the sample, 35% was motivated by having an efficient (well–organized) farm that easily 
complied with regulatory requirements, and 28% responded to alternative designs for premium 
or penalty incentive programs. In this chapter we found that economic grounds provided 
sufficient incentives to control A. suum infections for 52% of the producers. The €1 price 
reduction increased this number by an additional 16% of the producers. A further reduction in 
mean prevalence must come from the 32% of producers with a high prevalence level in the 
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price reduction period. Understanding what differentiates this group of producers from other 
groups can help to design more effective incentive mechanisms that provide sufficient 
incentives for all producers. Further research is needed to determine how all producers can be 
motivated to control A. suum infections. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
In July 2004 the mechanism to compensate Dutch pig slaughterhouses for their costs of 
lesioned livers changed from an insurance with a fixed cost level per pig notwithstanding the 
prevalence of liver lesions on the farm, to a reduction in producer payment of €1 per pig with a 
lesioned liver. This introduced an additional financial incentive for finishing pig producers to 
control for A. suum infections. As a consequence, mean liver lesion prevalence dropped and the 
fraction of producers with a low liver lesion prevalence increased. The market–based price 
reduction for pigs with a lesioned liver was a more effective incentive mechanism to reduce 
mean liver lesion prevalence than the collective insurance. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Management practices associated with high 
liver lesion prevalence on Dutch finishing 
pig farms3 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter analyses management practices associated with high liver lesion prevalence on 
Dutch finishing pig farms. Liver lesion inspection data of pigs slaughtered in 2005–2007 by a 
major Dutch slaughter company were combined with questionnaire results from 185 finishing 
pig producers about management practices used and factors underlying the decision to control 
Ascaris suum infections. Of respondents 96% applied anthelmintics using combinations of 
application methods, active compounds, and application durations. Sprinkling anthelmintics 
over feed resulted in 2.4% higher liver lesion prevalence than other application methods. Most 
respondents underestimated liver lesion prevalence, with larger underestimation when liver 
lesion prevalence was higher. This suggests that inducing finishing pig producers to apply 
anthelmintics through feed, through water or by injections and improving perception of liver 
lesion prevalence could lower mean liver lesion prevalence in the Netherlands. Adoption of 
these aspects in the current incentive mechanisms could improve its effectiveness. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Liver lesions in finishing pigs are an important quality and safety attribute in the pork supply 
chain. Insufficient control of the main cause of liver lesions, an infection with the roundworm 
Ascaris suum (A. suum), leads to substantial economic losses for pig producers and 
slaughterhouses. Research showed that pigs infected with A. suum had higher feed intake, 
                                                 
3
 C.P.A. van Wagenberg, F.J.H.M. Verhees, G.B.C. Backus, J.G.A.J. van der Vorst and H.A.P. Urlings. 
Revision submitted to an ISI journal. 
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lower growth rate, lower health level, and lower lean meat percentage (Stewart and Hale, 1988; 
Roepstorff, 2003). Pathological lesions to pig livers also result in economic losses of 
slaughterhouses, because lesioned livers can only be marketed as raw material for animal feed 
or have to be disposed of. As of July 2004 the Dutch pig sector uses a reduction in producer 
payment of €1 per pig with a lesioned liver to induce finishing pig producers to control A. 
suum infections. As a result mean liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs in the Netherlands 
decreased from 9% in 2003 to 5% in 2006, but a large spread in liver lesion prevalence 
between finishing pig producers remained (Van Wagenberg et al., 2010). Mean liver lesion 
prevalence could decrease further if finishing pig producers with high liver lesion prevalence 
reduce it. To reduce liver lesion prevalence a finishing pig producer with high liver lesion 
prevalence can change management practices that impede him to reach low liver lesion 
prevalence. Management practices associated with high liver lesion prevalence can indicate 
impeding factors. This chapter aims to identify management practices associated with high 
liver lesion prevalence by analysing liver lesion inspection data in relation to results of a 
survey on management practices used and factors underlying the decision to control A. suum 
infections. Section 4.2 provides the material and methods. Section 4.3 presents the results and 
section 4.4 the discussion. Finally, section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2. Materials and methods 
 
To identify management practices associated with high liver lesion prevalence this chapter uses 
a framework to analyse the decision process to change management practices associated with 
liver lesion prevalence. The framework is based on organizational change processes (Zaltman 
et al., 1973) and is given in Figure 4.1. Real liver lesion prevalence results from management 
practices to control A. suum infections used on the farm (A). A performance gap can exist 
between real and the lowest possible liver lesion prevalence (B). A finishing pig producer feels 
a need to change management practices if he perceives such a performance gap between 
perceived liver lesion prevalence and perceived lowest possible liver lesion prevalence (C). To 
close the perceived performance gap, a finishing pig producer can decide to change 
management practices used on the farm (D). The new management practices then result in 
changed liver lesion prevalence. 
 
4.2.1. Liver lesion prevalence data 
For liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs a dataset with liver inspection results of finishing 
pigs delivered to a major Dutch slaughter company from January 2005 to December 2007 was 
used. The dataset contained 6.4 million pigs (44% of all slaughtered pigs in the Netherlands) 
delivered by 5359 finishing pig producers in 2005, 7.9 million pigs (56%) of 5708 producers in 
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2006, and 8.1 million pigs (57%) of 5117 producers in 2007. Liver lesion prevalence decreased 
from 2005 to 2007, but a large spread between individual finishing pig producers remained 
(Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Framework to analyze finishing pig producer decision to change management 
practices to control Ascaris suum infections (based on Zaltman et al., 1973). 
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Figure 4.2: Quarterly mean, 5% and 95% percentile of liver lesion prevalence in 
deliveries to a major Dutch slaughter company of 5359 finishing pig producers in 2005, 
5708 producers in 2006, and 5117 producers in 2007. 
 
 
 
 
A) Management practices used to 
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Chapter 4 
 
66 
4.2.2. Management practices associated with liver lesion prevalence 
Differences in management practices between individual finishing pig producers could explain 
heterogeneity in liver lesion prevalence. A preliminary list of possible management practices 
was identified in a literature review on management practices associated with liver lesion 
prevalence and A. suum prevalence. The list was checked for completeness by two Dutch 
specialist pig veterinarians. Table 4.1 provides the list of possible management practices that 
might be associated with liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs in the Netherlands used in 
this chapter. 
 
Table 4.1: Management practices (farm size, housing conditions, general management, 
anthelmintics management, hygiene management) possibly associated with liver lesion 
prevalence in finishing pigs in the Netherlands. 
Farm size  Number of finishing pigs, number of sows 
  Housing conditions foam from manure pit rising above slatted floor, slatted floor needing 
replacement, flies coming from manure pit  
  General management Hours per week working on pigs 
  Anthelmintics management Not using anthelmintics, active compound (doramectin, febantel, febendazole, 
flubendazole, ivermectin, levamisole), application method (through feed, over 
feed (topdressing), in water, injections), number of cures per production cycle, 
number of application days per cure, central application in water or feed, person 
responsible for usage 
  Hygiene management Disinfecting every pen after every production cycle, using worm medicines in 
rest compartment, visitors strictly following hygiene guidelines, functioning of 
mats and trays for disinfection, perceived judgment of vet about hygiene 
measures  
 
Not using anthelmintics was considered an important explanatory variable for high liver 
lesion prevalence and as a consequence, the process underlying the decision to treat A. suum 
infections was further specified. Several theories exist to understand and predict goal–directed 
behaviour as treating A. suum infections (Venkatesh et al., 2003). We used the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen and Madden, 1986) to analyse why a finishing pig producer 
decided to treat A. suum infections. The TPB is the most widely applied theory, applicable to a 
wide variety of settings (Venkatesh et al., 2003), and has an easy to implement analytical 
framework (Leone et al., 1999). In the TPB outcome beliefs refer to subjective probabilities 
that the behaviour of treating A. suum infections will produce a given outcome such as low 
liver lesion prevalence (Figure 4.3). Outcome beliefs are precedents of attitude, which refers to 
how favourable a person predicts treating infections. Referent beliefs are perceived behavioural 
expectations of referent groups about treatment of infections. Referent beliefs are precedents of 
subjective norm, which refers to the perceived social pressure to treat infections. Control 
beliefs refer to presence of factors that facilitate or impede treating infections. Control beliefs 
are precedents of perceived behavioural control, which refers to a person’s beliefs as to how 
easy treating infections is likely to be. Attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural 
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control are precedents of intention, which indicates the readiness of a person to treat infections. 
The items underlying the TPB–constructs for infection control used in this chapter are 
presented in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen and Madden, 1986) with the items 
underlying the TPB–constructs for Ascaris suum infection control in finishing pigs. 
 
4.2.3. Questionnaire 
A questionnaire was developed to measure 1) management practices associated with liver 
lesion prevalence on Dutch finishing pig farms, 2) perceived liver lesion prevalence, and 3) 
items underlying the TPB–constructs related to the decision to treat A. suum infections. Prior to 
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distribution a draft version of the questionnaire was presented to two finishing pig producers to 
check whether the items in the questionnaire were understandable. 
Farm size was measured by open questions. General management practices were measured 
by an interval scale. Anthelmintics management practices were measured by yes/no questions. 
Perceived liver lesion prevalence was measured by the item “At the moment, what is the 
average percentage of liver lesions on your farm?” Intention was measured with an eleven–
point Juster scale from zero (almost no probability, 1% probability) to ten (certain, 99% 
probability) (Juster, 1966). Items related to TPB–constructs, housing conditions and hygiene 
management practices were measured with a seven–point Likert scale from disagree (or never) 
to agree (or always) (Likert, 1932). 
The questionnaire was sent by mail–service on 20 December 2007. It was accompanied by 
an introduction letter and a postage–free return envelop. The introduction letter clarified the 
research aim of identifying possibilities for finishing pig producers to reduce liver lesions. 
Producers had the opportunity to fill in the questionnaire through Internet or to return it on 
paper. The finishing pig producers who responded within two weeks had a chance of receiving 
one of four €50 gift vouchers. 
 
4.2.4. Construct measures 
Intention to treat A. suum infections was measured as the sum and as the maximum of six 
items. Each item asked how likely it would be that the producer intended to use a specific type 
of active compound in the next production cycle (appendix 4.1). For the other constructs, 
principal component analysis was used to identify components consisting of items that capture 
the same underlying construct. Reliability analysis was used to determine how well the items in 
each component captured the underlying construct (Hair et al., 2005). Components that 
explained more variance than the average component, i.e. components with eigenvalue 1.0 or 
higher, entered the analysis. Varimax rotation was used to minimize the number of variables 
with high loadings on more than one component. Items with a factor loading of 0.6 or higher 
after rotation were used in the constructs. Cronbach’s alpha was used to measure the reliability 
of the set of items in each construct. For sufficient reliability Cronbach’s alpha should be at 
least 0.6 (Field, 2005). Table 4.2 gives the measurement properties and interpretation of each 
TPB–construct and appendix 4.1 gives the underlying items. All constructs explain at least 
60% of the variance in the items. For three out of four constructs in control beliefs the 
Cronbach’s alpha is below 0.6, indicating that the items only partially capture the underlying 
construct. 
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4.2.5. Finishing pig producers 
Finishing pig producers were selected from the 1069 finishing pig producers participating in a 
previous study on liver lesion prevalence (Van Wagenberg et al., 2010). No address was 
available for 100 producers, and 192 were related to multiple locations of a producer. 
Producers with multiple production locations were asked to fill out a separate questionnaire for 
each location. Finally, the questionnaire was sent to 777 finishing pig producers. Of these, 250 
(32%) responded, of whom 9 did it through Internet and 241 through mail–service. The 
questionnaire results were combined with the liver lesion inspection data using the unique 
production location number (UBN, Uniek BedrijfsNummer). Of the 250 producers, 32 did not 
provide an UBN, 206 provided one UBN, and 12 producers provided more than one UBN. 
Results of the 32 producers who did not provide an UBN were excluded from the analysis, 
because no liver lesion prevalence could be linked. Results of the 12 producers who provided 
more than one UBN were also excluded from the analysis, because responses of the 
questionnaire could not be linked to one of the multiple UBN provided. In addition, 21 
producers who provided one UBN could not be linked to the liver lesion inspection data, and 
results were also excluded from the analysis. As a consequence, results from 185 producers 
were analyzed. 
Table 4.3 compares basic general characteristics of the respondents with the Dutch 
average. Respondents had a lower average number of finishing pigs and a higher average 
education level. They had a lower average number of sows, because breeding farms were not 
included in the sample. For number of hours per week spent on finishing pigs no average 
figures for the Netherlands are available. 
 
Table 4.3: General characteristics of 185 Dutch finishing pig producers who responded to 
the questionnaire and of Dutch finishing pig producers. 
Characteristic Respondents The Netherlands  
Number of finishing pigs 1151 (st.dev. 1010) 1418 a 
Number of sows 76 (st.dev. 177) 132 b 
Education   
Higher agricultural education 18.9% 4.2% c 
Secondary agricultural education 60.5% 57.1% c 
Lower agricultural education 16.8% 
Other education 3.8% } 38.7% c 
Year of birth 1960 (st.dev. 9.5) 1958 d 
Labour hours per week spend on finishing pigs   
<=20 50.8% n.a. 
20–30 29.7% n.a. 
30–40 5.4% n.a. 
>40 10.8% n.a. 
a
 Average number on farms with 500 finishing pigs or more in 2007 (CBS Statline, 
http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?LA=en). 
b
 Average number of sows on farms with pigs in 2007 (LEI, 2008). 
c
 In 2005 (LEI, 2008). 
d
 Average age of 49 years of self–employed pig and poultry producers in 2007 (LEI, 2008). 
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Table 4.4 presents anthelmintics management practices of the respondents. Of the 
respondents 95.7% (177) did treat A. suum infections using combinations of application 
methods, active compounds and application durations. Application through feed and 
flubendazole were used most. 
Table 4.5 shows that in each year from 2003 until 2007 respondents had a lower average 
liver lesion prevalence than non–respondents (p<0.001), indicating a possible response bias. 
 
Table 4.4: Anthelmintics management practices of 185 Dutch finishing pig producers who 
responded to the questionnaire. 
Respondents Anthelmintics management practices 
Percent  Number 
Not using anthelmintics 4.3 8 
Application method a   
Over feed (topdressing) 36.8 68 
Through feed 44.9 83 
Injections 20.5 38 
Water 13.0 24 
Used active compound a   
Doramectin 0.5 1 
Febantel 5.9 11 
Febendazole 22.2 41 
Flubendazole 47.0 87 
Ivermectin 17.8 33 
Levamisole 18.9 35 
Number of cures per production cycle b   
1 47.0 87 
2 36.8 68 
3 or more 11.4 21 
Number of application days per cure c   
1 58.4 108 
2 17.8 33 
3 or more 15.7 29 
Central application in water 7.6 14 
Central application in feed 14.1 26 
Person responsible for usage   
Farm owner 93.0 172 
Farm manager 2.2 4 
Employee 3.2 6 
Other person 1.1 2 
Nobody 0.5 1 
a
 Percentages exceed 100% because some finishing pig producers used multiple application methods and multiple 
active compounds simultaneously. 
b
 Percentages do not add to 100% because eight finishing pig producers did not apply anthelmintics and one did not 
provide an answer to the question. 
c
 Percentages do not add to 100% because eight finishing pig producers did not apply anthelmintics, two did not 
provide an answer to the question, and five indicated to apply it differently than in a fixed number of days. 
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Table 4.5: Liver lesion prevalence statistics of 185 Dutch finishing pig producers who 
responded to the questionnaire and of non–respondents in the dataset. 
Liver lesion prevalence 
Year Respondent 
Number of 
producers a Mean Standard deviation 
2003 Non–respondent 2233 11.8%  11.7% 
 Respondent 185 9.4%  9.9% 
2004 Non–respondent 2054 11.0%  11.0% 
 Respondent 163 7.8%  7.5% 
2005 Non–respondent 4651 8.7%  8.6% 
 Respondent 185 6.6% 7.0% 
2006 Non–respondent 4890 6.4%  6.5% 
 Respondent 185 4.8%  4.6% 
2007 Non–respondent 4350 5.1%  6.2% 
 Respondent 185 4.0%  5.2% 
a
 Number of non–respondents varied over years because the number of producers delivering to the slaughter company 
varied over the years. The number of respondents varied over years, because not all respondents delivered at least 500 
pigs to the slaughter company each year. 
 
4.2.6. Statistical analysis 
The relationship between management practices and liver lesion prevalence were analyzed 
using the following linear regression model 
 
εββα +⋅++⋅+= KK XXllp ...11  (1) 
 
where llp is liver lesion prevalence of a farm in 2007, α is the intercept, βk is the regression 
coefficient for management practice Xk (see Table 1 for management practices), and ε the 
residual random error. To identify management practices that influence liver lesion prevalence 
a stepwise selection procedure was used. 
Differences in liver lesion prevalence between finishing pig producers who did and did not 
use anthelmintics in 2007 were analyzed with a nonparametric exact Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
test with Monte Carlo simulation, because liver lesion prevalence was not normally distributed. 
The eight respondents who did not use anthelmintics in 2007 were excluded from further 
analysis of management practices associated with high liver lesion prevalence. The relationship 
between measured and perceived liver lesion prevalence was analyzed using the following 
quadratic model 
 
εββα +⋅+⋅+= 221 centcentperc llpllpllp  (2) 
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where llpperc is perceived liver lesion prevalence in 2007 and llpcent centralized liver lesion 
prevalence in 2007 around mean liver lesion prevalence of 4.1%. Using centralized liver lesion 
prevalence in (2) ensures that 1β  has meaning, because the intercept of llpcent, i.e. mean liver 
lesion prevalence, lays within a range of realistic values of liver lesion prevalence (Irwin and 
McClelland, 2001). Without centralization a coefficient of llp would have low meaning, 
because it would be estimated at an intercept of llp of zero, which hardly any finishing pig 
producer has. 
Relationships between perceived liver lesion prevalence, management practices, and 
factors underlying decision making behaviour represented by the TPB–constructs were 
analyzed with Pearson correlation analyses. 
 
4.3. Results 
 
4.3.1. Management practices related to high liver lesion prevalence 
The result of the linear regression model of management practices on liver lesion prevalence 
(llp) is presented in (3) with p–values in parentheses. Application of anthelmintics by 
sprinkling over feed (appl_over_feed) resulted in a 2.4% higher liver lesion prevalence. Other 
management practices, including not using anthelmintics, were not associated with liver lesion 
prevalence. Although only little variance was explained by the model (model R2 was 0.04), an 
analysis of variance showed that the model was significant (F–value was 5.83 and p was 
0.017). 
 
feedoverapplllp __ 0.024  0.032  
(0.017)(0.000)
⋅+=  (3) 
 
Not using anthelmintics failed to explain variation in liver lesion prevalence. The eight 
finishing pig producers who did not use anthelmintics had an average liver lesion prevalence of 
2.2%, about half of the average liver lesion prevalence of 4.1% of finishing pig producers who 
did use anthelmintics (p was 0.086). Interestingly, the finishing pig producers apparently were 
able to control liver lesion prevalence without anthelmintics. 
 
4.3.2. Relationship real with perceived liver lesion prevalence 
The result of the quadratic regression model of centralized real liver lesion prevalence (llpcent) 
on perceived liver lesion prevalence (llpperc) is presented in (4) with p–values in parentheses. 
Finishing pig producers with higher real liver lesion prevalence perceived higher prevalence 
(coefficient of llpcent is positive), but most finishing pig producers underestimated it (constant 
smaller than 4.1 and coefficient of llpcent smaller than 1). Underestimation of liver lesion 
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prevalence increased as finishing pig producers had higher liver lesion prevalence (coefficient 
of llpcent smaller than 1 and coefficient of 2centllp  is negative). The model R2 was 0.43. 
 
2
(0.0000)(0.000)(0.000)
 0.014   0.734  3.385  centcent llpllppercllp ⋅−⋅+=  (4) 
 
4.3.3. Relationship perceived liver lesion prevalence with decision factors 
Table 4.6 presents Pearson correlations between perceived liver lesion prevalence and factors 
underlying the decision to treat A. suum infections. Finishing pig producers with high 
perceived liver lesion prevalence showed lower willingness to treat A. suum infections in the 
next production cycle (negative correlation with intention (max)), indicated to have less control 
over liver lesion prevalence (negative correlation with perceived behavioural control and 
perception of control), and perceived to lack technical knowledge about A. suum infections and 
labour availability. 
 
Table 4.6: Pearson correlations (p–value in brackets) of perceived liver lesion prevalence 
and application methods with TPB construct underlying the decision to treat Ascaris 
suum infections. Pearson correlations with p–value<0.05 are bold. 
Pearson correlation (p–value) 
Application method Factors underlying 
decision to treat Ascaris 
suum infections 
Perceived 
liver lesion 
prevalence 
Through 
feed Water Injections 
Over feed / 
topdressing 
Intention (max) -0.16 (0.043) 0.07 (0.369) 0.06 (0.474) 0.06 (0.408) 0.01 (0.859) 
Intention (sum) -0.05 (0.505) 0.07 (0.376) 0.12 (0.115) 0.24 (0.001) 0.18 (0.020) 
      Attitude -0.04 (0.606) -0.05 (0.484) -0.07 (0.352) -0.01 (0.864) -0.02 (0.811) 
      Subjective norm 0.10 (0.225) 0.05 (0.488) 0.07 (0.391) 0.16 (0.031) 0.05 (0.508) 
    
 
 Perceived behavioural 
control 
-0.17 (0.033) -0.07 (0.351) -0.04 (0.568) -0.23 (0.003) -0.01 (0.908) 
      Positive outcome beliefs -0.04 (0.611) -0.04 (0.587) -0.18 (0.021) 0.01 (0.858) -0.02 (0.795) 
Negative outcome beliefs 0.10 (0.224) 0.12 (0.130) 0.00 (0.957) 0.15 (0.056) -0.04 (0.614) 
      Opinion advisors -0.00 (0.979) 0.17 (0.035) 0.06 (0.443) -0.04 (0.641) 0.12 (0.142) 
Opinion environment 0.02 (0.804) 0.14 (0.079) 0.10 (0.244) 0.05 (0.571) 0.10 (0.244) 
Value opinion advisors 0.12 (0.138) 0.14 (0.070) -0.11 (0.168) 0.09 (0.225) 0.03 (0.736) 
Value opinion 
environment 
-0.02 (0.858) 0.08 (0.339) 0.00 (0.982) 0.05 (0.507) 0.13 (0.103) 
      Technical knowledge -0.30 (0.000) 0.15 (0.058) 0.00 (0.952) -0.11 (0.151) 0.05 (0.531) 
Labour availability -0.16 (0.041) -0.08 (0.327) -0.03 (0.653) -0.35 (0.000) 0.09 (0.263) 
Water system suitable for 
application 
-0.12 (0.133) -0.19 (0.013) 0.49 (0.000) -0.17 (0.029) 0.04 (0.572) 
Central application in 
feed 
-0.14 (0.071) 0.31 (0.000) 0.05 (0.498) -0.10 (0.198) -0.20 (0.009) 
Perception of control -0.38 (0.000) -0.04 (0.583) 0.09 (0.234) -0.13 (0.078) -0.09 (0.245) 
Flies -0.01 (0.904) 0.04 (0.589) 0.09 (0.251) 0.10 (0.203) -0.06 (0.427) 
Manure 0.06 (0.456) 0.04 (0.597) -0.03 (0.672) 0.02 (0.748) 0.04 (0.561) 
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4.3.4. Relationship management practices with decision factors 
Table 4.6 present Pearson correlations between application methods for anthelmintics and 
decision factors underlying the decision to treat A. suum infections. Finishing pig producers 
with intention to treat A. suum infections applied anthelmintics by injections and over feed 
(positive correlation intention (sum) with injections and over feed). The lower perceived 
control and higher pressure from peers, the more likely a finishing pig producer used injections 
(negative correlation perceived behavioural control and positive correlation subjective norm 
with injections). Application by injections was perceived as labour intensive (negative 
correlation injections with labour availability). Having a feeding or water system suitable to 
centrally apply anthelmintics was positively correlated with application of anthelmintics 
through feed or water, respectively, and negatively with other application methods. 
 
4.3.5. Concluding statements 
This section summarizes the results using the framework from Figure 4.1. Sprinkling 
anthelmintics over feed (A in Figure 4.4) resulted in a performance gap of 2.4% higher liver 
lesion prevalence (B). Finishing pig producers underestimated liver lesion prevalence, thereby 
decreasing the need to lower liver lesion prevalence (C). A change from sprinkling over feed to 
a more effective application method was hampered by finishing pig producers indicating a lack 
of technical knowledge and perceived control. Application by injections was hampered by its 
perceived labour need and central application of anthelmintics through feed or water by the 
need for a suitable water or feeding system (D). 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Management practices associated with high liver lesion prevalence on Dutch 
finishing pig farms. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
 
To our knowledge, no research exists that associates management practices with liver lesion 
prevalence in finishing pigs. Several studies, however, have been conducted to identify 
management practices associated with A. suum prevalence in pigs. Roepstorff and Jorsal 
A) Sprinkling anthelmintics over feed B) Performance gap of 2.4% liver 
lesion prevalence 
C) Underestimation of liver lesion 
prevalence lowers need to change 
management practices 
D) No change to alternative application 
method due to lack of labor availability, 
technical knowledge, perceived control, and a 
suitable feeding and water system 
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(1990) associated A. suum prevalence rates in finishing pigs with having a Specific Pathogen 
Free system, weaning age and daily cleaning. This chapter, however, did not associate cleaning 
with liver lesion prevalence. A cause might be that in normal management practices used on 
Dutch finishing pig farms cleaning after each production cycle is more common than daily 
cleaning. In line with this chapter Roepstorff and Jorsal (1990) did not associate active 
compound, application strategy, and floor type with A. suum prevalence. Joachim et al. (2001) 
associated number of piglet–supplying farms, number of treatments in a production cycle, and 
state of A. suum infection at the beginning of a production cycle with A. suum burden at 
slaughter. In this chapter, however, number of treatments per production cycle was not 
associated with liver lesion prevalence. In agreement with this chapter, Gerwert et al. (2004) 
did not associate number of treatments, active compound and cleaning method with nematode 
infections in sows.  
Those pig producers applying anthelmintics over feed (topdressing) had 2.4% higher liver 
lesion prevalence than those applying it through feed, through water or by injections. This 
suggests that finishing pig producers who change from application over feed to another 
application method could lower liver lesion prevalence. However, high labour requirements 
restrict application by injections. Lack of a feeding or water system suitable for central 
application constrains using more effective application methods through feed or water. 
Encouraging finishing pig producers to invest in a feeding or water system that allows for 
central application of anthelmintics, could increase application through feed and water and 
lower liver lesion prevalence in the Netherlands. Roepstorff and Nansen (1994) found that 
Danish sow producers were not motivated to change hygiene practices to control A. suum 
infections for reasons of convenience. Further research is needed to identify how to encourage 
finishing pig producers to change to a more effective application method. 
This chapter showed that finishing pig producers underestimated liver lesion prevalence 
and that underestimation was larger when liver lesion prevalence was higher. Decreasing the 
gap between real and perceived liver lesion prevalence could increase a finishing pig 
producer’s need to lower liver lesion prevalence and induce him to increase A. suum control. 
Finishing pig producers with high perceived liver lesion prevalence indicated lack of control 
over liver lesion prevalence and lack of intention to treat A. suum infections. Moreover, these 
finishing pig producers indicated lack of technical knowledge and lack of labour availability. 
Provision of technical knowledge and information about labour–extensive management 
practices to treat A. suum infections could help to increase perceived control and lower liver 
lesion prevalence. 
Group application of anthelmintics in feed or water can result in uncontrollable variation in 
individual intake (Donald, 1985), possibly resulting in uneven protection amongst the pigs and 
a high infection pressure. This can explain the difference in liver lesion prevalence between 
application over feed and by injections. No difference in liver lesion prevalence was observed 
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between application through feed and water and by injections. Whether efficacy of application 
over feed is lower than efficacy of application through feed or water, and whether higher liver 
lesion prevalence is caused by infection from finishing pigs with insufficient protection, 
infection pressure from the surroundings or another cause remains for further research. 
Of the finishing pig producers in this chapter, 96% applied anthelmintics which is in 
agreement with other research (Beloeil et al., 2003; Gerwert et al., 2004). The 4% finishing pig 
producers who did not treat A. suum infections had lower liver lesion prevalence (2.2%) than 
the users of anthelmintics (4.1%). Mercy et al. (1989) also found that nematode prevalence was 
lower in pig herds not treated with anthelmintics than in herds occasionally treated. This 
indicates that treatment might not always be necessary to reach low liver lesion prevalence. 
Possibly, these finishing pig producers purchased piglets from only few breeding farms and the 
piglets were A. suum free (Joachim et al., 2001), but this was not investigated in this chapter. 
Further research is needed to determine why finishing pig producers retained low liver lesion 
prevalence without treating A. suum infections. 
The R2 of equation (3) was 0.04. The R2 of regression analyses of data from questionnaires 
are generally lower than the R2 of regression analyses of data from controlled experiments. 
Uncontrolled variables in practice increase variation and lower statistical strength of 
relationships. An additional source of variation in this chapter is the questionnaire measuring 
producer’s perception of reality, which could deviate from the real farm situation. 
Notwithstanding the low R2, our results offer valuable insight into management practices 
associated with liver lesion prevalence. 
This chapter aimed to identify management practices associated with high liver lesion 
prevalence. It used cross–sectional analysis, because this is especially suited to identify 
associations (Mann, 2003). A drawback of cross–sectional analysis is, however, that it cannot 
assess causal relationships. To determine whether application over feed indeed causes higher 
liver lesion prevalence compared to other application methods experimental studies or cohort 
studies should be performed. 
The lower liver lesions prevalence of respondents compared to non–respondents indicates 
a possible response bias, where finishing pig producers with a better performance on A. suum 
infection control responded. In this chapter some management practices might, therefore, not 
have been associated with high liver lesion prevalence, while they are in real life. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter showed that most Dutch finishing pig producers treat Ascaris suum infections 
using combinations of application methods, active compounds, and application durations. 
Sprinkling anthelmintics over feed (topdressing) and finishing pig producers underestimating 
liver lesion prevalence resulted in high liver lesion prevalence. Changing the current incentive 
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mechanism aimed at liver lesion prevalence so it encourages finishing pig producers to apply 
anthelmintics through feed, through water or by injections and improves the perception of liver 
lesion prevalence, could lower mean liver lesion prevalence in the Netherlands. 
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Appendix 4.1: Items in each component identified with principal 
component analysis 
 
Intention 
• How likely is it that the next production cycle you apply Doramectin? 
• How likely is it that the next production cycle you apply Febantel? 
• How likely is it that the next production cycle you apply Febendazole? 
• How likely is it that the next production cycle you apply Flubendazole? 
• How likely is it that the next production cycle you apply Ivermectin? 
• How likely is it that the next production cycle you apply Levamisole? 
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Outcome beliefs 
Positive outcome beliefs 
• Applying worm medication improves technical results of finishing pigs (growth, feed 
conversion) on my farm 
• Applying worm medication improves animal health of finishing pigs on my farm 
• Applying worm medication improves quality of finishing pigs on my farm 
• Applying worm medication improves animal welfare of finishing pigs on my farm 
• Applying worm medication lowers usage of other medicines on finishing pigs on my farm 
• Applying worm medication improves profitability of finishing pigs on my farm 
 
Negative outcome beliefs 
• Applying worm medication increases costs of finishing pigs on my farm 
• Applying worm medication increases needed labour of finishing pigs on my farm 
 
Referent beliefs 
Opinion advisors 
• My vet urges me to use worm medication 
• My feed advisor urges me to use worm medication 
• My slaughter plant manager urges me to use worm medication 
 
Opinion environment 
• Specialist journals urge me to use worm medication 
• My colleagues urge me to use worm medication 
• My supplier of medicines (he is not my vet) urge me to use worm medication 
 
Control beliefs 
Technical knowledge 
• I have a lot of knowledge about applying worm medication 
• I have a lot of experience with applying worm medication 
• I understand exactly how worm medication works 
• I know the life cycle of round worms 
 
Labour availability 
• My daily schedule provides sufficient time to apply worm medication 
• I only need little labour to apply worm medication 
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Water system suitable for application 
• My drinking water system is most suited to apply worm medication 
• Can you add the worm medication centrally to the drinking water? 
 
Central application in feed 
• Can you add the worm medication centrally to the feed in the feeding kitchen? 
 
Perception of control 
• I can control liver lesions well 
 
Flies 
• Flies from the manure pit regularly cause me inconveniences 
 
Manure 
• Foam from the manure pit sometimes rises above the slatted floor 
• The slatted floor in the housing needs replacement urgently 
 
Attitude 
• Applying worm medication to finishing pigs on my farm for me is: Unattractive–
Attractive 
• Applying worm medication to finishing pigs on my farm for me is: Unwise–Wise 
• Applying worm medication to finishing pigs on my farm for me is: A bad idea– A good 
idea 
 
Subjective norm 
• Most people who’ s opinion I value, urge me to apply worm medication 
 
Perceived behavioural control 
• Applying worm medication to me is: Difficult–Easy 
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Chapter 5 
 
Impact of testing accuracy on incentives for 
pig producers to control Mycobacterium avium 
infections in finishing pigs4 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter analyses impact of testing accuracy on pig producer incentives to control 
Mycobacterium avium in finishing pigs. Using a dynamic optimization model and a grid search 
of deliveries of herds from pig producers to slaughterhouse, optimal control measures for pig 
producers and optimal penalty values for deliveries with increased Mycobacterium avium risk 
were identified for different sensitivity and specificity values. Results showed that higher 
sensitivity and lower specificity induced use of more intense control measures and resulted in 
higher pig producer costs and lower Mycobacterium avium seroprevalence. The minimal 
penalty value needed to comply with a threshold for Mycobacterium avium seroprevalence in 
finishing pigs at slaughter was lower at higher sensitivity and lower specificity. With imperfect 
specificity a larger sample size decreased pig producer incentives to control Mycobacterium 
avium seroprevalence, because the higher number of false positives resulted in an increased 
probability of rejecting a batch of finishing pigs irrespective of whether the pig producer 
applied control measures. We conclude that testing accuracy must be considered in incentive 
system design to induce pig producers to control Mycobacterium avium in finishing pigs with 
minimum negative effects. 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Food business operators (FBOs) can control safety of their products by using effective control 
measures in their production process. The behaviour of FBOs actually using control measures 
is thus an important factor to control food safety (Hausken, 2002). Insufficient control can lead 
                                                 
4
 C.P.A. van Wagenberg, G.B.C Backus, H.J.W. Wisselink, J.G.A.J. van der Vorst and H.A.P. Urlings. 
Submitted to an ISI journal. 
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to damaged relationships between supplier and customer with subsequent trade implications, to 
product recalls, and to liability costs. In the EU Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 lays primary 
food safety responsibility with FBOs and prescribes that food safety control must be based on 
an integrated approach throughout the supply chain, including primary production. It also 
prescribes FBOs to use quality control systems based on basic hygiene measures supplemented 
with hazard analysis critical control points (HACCP). With HACCP, specific food safety 
hazards are controlled within the FBO. If control points for a hazard are located in production 
processes of suppliers, in addition to HACCP buyers can induce suppliers to control critical 
food safety attributes of the raw materials. Buyers often have imperfect information about 
suppliers using control measures. Furthermore, it is often costly for buyers to measure safety 
attributes of all raw materials. To induce suppliers to take control measures that improve 
quality and safety of the raw materials in settings with imperfect information, buyers can use 
incentive mechanisms as bonuses (Hueth and Ligon, 2002) and penalties (King et al., 2007) 
which reward supplier performance. To determine supplier performance incentive mechanisms 
use results from classification systems which classify raw materials in levels of food safety 
risk. For microbiological and chemical hazards, classification is done with diagnostic tests. The 
accuracy of diagnostic tests is often imperfect (Unnevehr et al., 2004). Testing accuracy is 
defined by test sensitivity and test specificity. Test sensitivity is the probability of correctly 
qualifying a product with increased risk. Test specificity is the probability of correctly 
qualifying a product without increased risk. Diagnostic testing accuracy can influence supplier 
incentives through the incentive mechanism. This chapter analyses how diagnostic testing 
accuracy influences supplier incentives to use food safety control measures in the presence of 
imperfect information. 
Weiss (1995) identified the relationship between imperfect information amongst FBOs in a 
supply chain and food safety. Various studies highlighted the role of traceability and liability in 
inducing FBOs to control food safety (Hirschauer and Musshoff, 2007; Hobbs, 2004; Pouliot 
and Sumner, 2008). Incomplete tracing increases profitability of rule–breaking behaviour of 
farmers (Hirschauer and Musshoff, 2007). A number of studies focused on imperfect 
information between buyers and suppliers in the supply chain. Imperfect information can result 
in adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Adverse 
selection refers to the problem of how a buyer can ensure contracting only good performing 
suppliers. Moral hazard refers to a buyer’s inability to monitor whether a supplier exerts 
sufficient effort, once the supplier is contracted. Jin and Leslie (2003) showed that displaying 
hygiene grade cards in restaurants induced restaurants to make hygiene improvements and 
reduced adverse selection problem of choosing a high quality restaurant for consumers. 
Starbird (2007) concluded that testing accuracy can be used to segregate safe and unsafe 
suppliers. A number of studies addressed the issue of moral hazard and food safety. Elbasha 
and Riggs (2003) showed with a double moral hazard model that information provision can 
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improve food safety. Van Wagenberg et al. (2010) demonstrated that a penalty on products off 
specification induced pig producers to improve food safety performance. King et al. (2007) 
concluded that reducing the probability of testing a pig producer in response to a favourable 
production history lowered system testing costs without endangering food safety. Starbird 
(2005) analysed the impact of the sampling inspection procedure, defined by the sample size 
and acceptance number, on producer incentives and concluded that regulation of sampling 
inspection procedures is an effective tool for policy makers to improve food safety. The 
importance of the inspection procedure on farmer incentives to control food safety was also 
highlighted by Hirschauer and Musshoff (2007). All these moral hazard studies assumed that 
the test used to assess supplier performance was accurate. The accuracy of diagnostic tests is, 
however, often imperfect (Unnevehr et al., 2004). To induce suppliers to improve product 
quality of delivered products grading errors can be used (Chalfant and Sexton, 2002). No 
literature existed to our knowledge, which analysed the relationship between testing accuracy 
and moral hazard in food safety control. This chapter aims to fill this gap. It aims to analyze 
whether or not diagnostic testing accuracy has a significant impact on supplier incentives to 
implement food safety control measures and to characterize this impact. It uses the hazard 
Mycobacterium avium in finishing pigs. 
Different species of Mycobacterium avium (Ma) can be found in pigs such as Ma spp. 
avium and Ma spp. Hominisuis. These species are a subspecies of the Mycobacterium avium 
Complex (MAC), which can cause infections in humans. Although human MAC infections are 
scarce, they can have serious consequences. In immunocompetent people MAC mainly caused 
lung infections in adults and lymph node infections in children, and worsened effects of other 
diseases (Falkinham 3rd, 1996). In immunocompromised people, especially AIDS patients, 
MAC infections are disseminated and consequences are severe. The expected survival period 
of AIDS patients with a MAC infection, for example, was half of those without a MAC 
infection (Biet et al., 2005; Falkinham 3rd, 1996). Of AIDS patients up to 50% was infected 
with MAC depending on the country (Falkinham 3rd, 1996). The expected growth in number 
of immunocompromised people such as AIDS and cancer survivors and diabetes patients 
increases the need to control sources of human MAC infections. 
Pigs may be a reservoir for MAC infections in humans and therefore Ma needs to be 
excluded from the pork supply chain (Komijn et al., 1999). Control points of Ma in the pork 
supply chain can all be found at the primary producer level (Pavlík et al., 2005). Detection of 
mycobacterial infections in pigs is laid down in EU Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 and includes 
palpation and incision of lymph nodes, because Ma infections can cause lymph node lesions in 
pigs (Thorel et al., 1997). However, this method is characterized by relatively high false 
positive and false negative results (Komijn et al., 2007; Wisselink et al., 2006). In addition, it 
supports cross–contamination of other food safety hazards. For detection of Ma infections in 
pigs, a new serodiagnostic test has been developed to improve testing accuracy and to reduce 
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cross–contamination (Wisselink et al., 2010). The new test examines blood samples for Ma 
antibody titers. But, the new test needs further optimization of the accuracy to improve 
performance (Wisselink et al., 2010). 
Currently, two control systems for Ma in finishing pigs exist in the Netherlands. The first 
uses palpation and incision of lymph nodes, the second uses the new serodiagnostic test. 
Neither system includes financial consequences for pig producers of finishing pigs detected 
with Ma infection. To analyse how testing accuracy influences pig producer incentives to take 
Ma control measures, we modelled an alternative Ma control system which includes the new 
serodiagnostic test and a penalty on finishing pigs in herds detected with Ma infection. The 
alternative Ma control system uses an operational classification system used by a major pig 
slaughter company in the Netherlands. From each delivery of pigs from a pig producer to the 
slaughterhouse, a specific number of blood samples are examined to detect Ma infections at 
herd level. Test results from current and several previous deliveries determine the Ma risk level 
for a pig producer. The Ma risk level determines the optimal value of the selected incentive 
parameter, a penalty on pigs in a delivery classified with increased Ma risk, applicable to the 
pig producer. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides the solution 
procedure and model specification. Parameter settings and assumptions are presented in section 
5.3. Section 5.4 elaborates on the results. Section 5.5 describes the sensitivity analysis. Section 
5.6 provides the discussion and section 5.7 concludes. 
 
5.2. Method 
 
A dynamic optimization model with a grid search of a slaughterhouse and its supplying pig 
producers has been developed. The model deals with imperfect information between 
slaughterhouse manager and pig producers, because the manager can not observe the 
production process of a pig producer. This might induce pig producers to use less Ma control 
measures than the slaughterhouse requires. 
The decision problem of the slaughterhouse manager of selecting an optimal penalty on 
pigs in a delivery classified as with increased Ma risk was solved using the method proposed 
by King et al. (2007). The model consists of two stages (Figure 5.1). A dynamic optimization 
model in stage 1, or pig producer model, determined Ma control measures that minimize pig 
producer costs for a given set of sensitivity, specificity and penalty values. This model is a 
Markov chain with discrete periods of one month and an infinite horizon with the Ma control 
package as the control variable and a combination of Ma risk levels in successive periods as 
the state variable. MATLAB routines developed by Miranda and Fackler (2002) were used to 
solve the pig producer model. The solution program uses policy iteration to identify an optimal 
Ma control package for each Ma risk level state in the steady–state. The steady–state exists 
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because all states are recurrent, aperiodic, and communicate with each other (Winston, 1991). 
The solution procedure also identified the state transition matrix associated with the optimal 
policy, which was used to determine a long–run probability for each possible state under the 
optimal policy. This was used along with the optimal policy to calculate expected pig producer 
costs, expected slaughterhouse costs, and expected average Ma seroprevalence levels for a 
representative producer operating under the optimal policy. In stage 2 a grid search 
systematically explored the parameter space of sensitivity, specificity and penalty values to 
determine the optimal penalty value for the slaughterhouse to reach a threshold value for Ma 
seroprevalence. Input and output of the stage 1 pig producer model was used as input of the 
stage 2 slaughterhouse model. Output was the optimal penalty, optimal Ma control packages, 
Ma seroprevalence, pig producer costs, slaughterhouse costs and chain costs. Chain costs are 
the sum of pig producer costs and slaughterhouse costs. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: General outline of the model. 
 
5.2.1. Model specification 
The decision problem of a pig producer in (1a) is to choose a Ma control package cpi,t, i.e. a 
specific combination of Ma control measures, in each period t that minimizes total discounted 
producer costs tdpc. Control packages are reversible and have a direct impact when 
implemented. Pig producers choose one control package cpi,t in each period t (1b), where cpi,t is 
an dummy variable (1c). A producer is assumed to be risk neutral. In each period t a pig 
producer has costs from the penalty 
tRLpen on pigs in deliveries classified with increased risk 
and Ma control package costs cpci. Furthermore, it has part β1 from additional processing costs 
apc for the slaughterhouse, because the pigs’ heads and gastro–intestinal tracts are unfit for 
human consumption and should be disposed of safely, and part β2 from testing costs tc. The 
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penalty depends on risk level RLt of the pig producer and on the probability that a delivery is 
classified without increased risk s RLi tp , . 
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where 
apc = additional processing costs for the slaughterhouse of pigs with increased risk (euro per 
pig in a delivery classified with increased risk); 
β1 = fraction of the additional processing costs apc passed on to a pig producer; 
β2 = fraction of the testing costs tc passed on to a pig producer; 
cpci = costs of control package i (euro per pig); 
cpi,t = dummy variable for control package i in period t; 
δ = monthly discount factor; 
i = index for Ma control packages; 
k = number of Ma control packages; 
tRL
n  = number of pigs in a sample at Ma risk level RLt; 
N = number of pigs in a delivery; 
s
RLi tp ,  = probability a delivery of pig producer i is classified without increased risk at Ma 
risk level RLt; 
tRLpen  = penalty (euro per pig in a delivery classified with increased risk at Ma risk level 
RLt); 
RLt = pig producer Ma risk level in period t; 
t = index for period; 
tc = Ma testing costs to classify a delivery (euro per tested pig); 
tdpc = total discounted producer costs. 
 
General relationships for the evolution of the pig producer Ma risk level RLt and related 
aspects are given in (2a), (2b) and (2c). Specific parameters settings used in the model 
calculations are given in (5a), (5b) and (5c). Evolution of the Ma risk level depends on the Ma 
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risk levels from up to tˆ  previous periods and the test result of the current delivery TRt (2a). 
The sample size (2b) and penalty level (2c) depend on RLt. 
 
tt,TR,...,RLRLfRL ttt-tt ∀∈=+           ,...}2,1,0{ˆ    )( ˆ11  (2a) 
tRLfn tRLt ∀=                                                 )( 2  (2b) 
tRLfpen tRLt ∀=                                             )( 3  (2c) 
 
where 
f1 = function that gives pig producer Ma risk level evolution; 
f2 = function that relates sample size to pig producer Ma risk level; 
f3 =  function that relates penalty to pig producer Ma risk level; 
tˆ = number of previous periods used to determine pig producer Ma risk level; 
TRt = test result in number of pigs classified with increased risk in period t. 
 
The probability that a delivery is classified without increased risk is calculated with (3a) 
and (3b). The probability ),,,,,( spsemdNnp
tRL  that d or less pigs in a sample are classified 
without increased risk is based on a hypergeometric distribution (Cameron and Baldock, 1998) 
and depends on the sensitivity se and the specificity sp of the test (3a). For y pigs with Ma 
infection in sample 
tRLn , the number of pigs correctly classified with increased risk has a 
binomial distribution with parameters y and se, and the number of pigs incorrectly classified 
with increased risk has a binomial distribution with parameters 
tRLn  – y and 1 – sp. For x pigs 
classified with increased risk, j are correctly classified and x – j are incorrectly classified. 
Considering all possible prevalence levels m, s RLi tp ,  is the probability that a delivery is 
classified without increased risk (3b). 
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where 
d = maximum number of pigs classified with increased risk in a sample to classify the 
delivery without increased risk; 
hi(m) = probability of Ma prevalence level m under control package i; 
j = number of pigs in a sample correctly classified with increased risk; 
m = Ma prevalence level as percentage of pigs in a delivery with Ma infection; 
),,,,,( spsemdNnp
tRL  = probability of d or less pigs classified with increased risk when a 
sample 
tRLn  from a delivery N contains m·N pigs with Ma infection using a test with 
sensitivity se and specificity sp at Ma risk level RLt; 
se = test sensitivity; 
sp = test specificity; 
x = number of pigs in a sample tested with increased risk; 
y = number of pigs with Ma infection in a sample. 
 
Slaughterhouse costs sct per delivery of a pig producer with Ma risk level RLt in period t 
are calculated with (4). The slaughterhouse is assumed to be risk neutral. It absorbs part 1 – β1 
of additional processing cost apc, revenue 
tRL
pen  from the penalty to pig producers on pigs 
in deliveries classified with increased risk with probability 1 – s RLi tp , , and part 1 – β2 of testing 
costs tc per tested pig in sample 
tRL
n . Expected slaughterhouse costs in the steady–state are 
calculated as described in section 5.2. 
 
tcncppenapcpNsc
tttt RLti
k
i
RL
s
RLitRL ⋅⋅−+⋅−⋅⋅−⋅= ∑
=
)1()))-((1)1(( 2,
1
1,, ββ  (4) 
 
where 
tRLtsc , = slaughterhouse costs for a producer with Ma risk level RLt in period t (euro per 
delivery). 
 
5.3. Model parameters and assumptions 
 
Optimal control packages for pig producers in the steady–state were calculated for sensitivity 
0.50, 0.70 and 0.90, and for specificity 0.95, 0.97 and 0.99. Sensitivity and specificity values 
were set arbitrarily but reasonably to cover the range of possible values of an optimised 
serodiagnostic test for Ma. Sensitivity of the non–optimised serodiagnostic test was 0.14 and 
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specificity was 0.83 (Wisselink et al., 2010). The values of sensitivity and specificity were 
combined with penalty values €0, €2, €4, €6, €8 and €10 per pig in a delivery classified with 
increased risk. 
In each period t a pig producer was categorized in one of six Ma risk levels RLt ∈  
{1,2,3,4,5,6}. We modelled the Ma prevalence measurement system used in practice by a 
major Dutch slaughter company. Levels 1 and 2 are levels with high risk, levels 3 and 4 with 
medium risk, and levels 5 and 6 with low risk. The Ma risk level RLt+1 depends on risk levels 
from 7 previous periods (5a). If a delivery has more than 1 positive pig, the producer is 
classified in risk level 1. If the next delivery has no positive pigs the producer moves to level 2. 
If a producer was in level 2 for two deliveries and the next delivery has no positives pigs, he 
moves to level 3, otherwise to level 1. The producer stays in level 3 the next 7 deliveries if no 
positive pig is found. If one positive pig is found, he moves to level 4. If two or more positive 
pigs are found, he moves to level 1. If a producer in level 4 has no positive pigs he moves to 
level 3, otherwise he moves to level 1. If a producer stayed in level 3 for 8 consecutive 
deliveries, he moves to level 5. The producer stays in level 5 if no positive pig is found. If one 
positive pig is found, he moves to level 6. If two or more positive pigs are found, he moves to 
level 1. If a producer in level 6 has no positive pigs he moves to level 5, otherwise to level 1. A 
sample size of 2 or 6, depending on the Ma risk level, was sufficient, because the system aims 
to identify Ma infections on herd level (5b). A sample size of 6 was used for producers with a 
high Ma risk level and for producers with low and medium Ma risk levels and one positive pig 
in the last delivery. Because this could be a false positive, the producer remained in the low or 
medium risk level but a sample size of 6 was used to ensure detection of a possible Ma 
infection in the herd. The penalty depends on the Ma risk level (5c). For this system, the 
decision problem of a pig producer was a Markov chain with 2,008 states. 
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Pig producers delivered 100 pigs each month. A delivery was classified with increased risk 
if one or more pigs from the sample were classified with increased risk (d = 0). The monthly 
discount factor δ was assumed to be 0.9967, implying an annual interest rate of 4.0%. The 
additional processing costs apc of €0.92 per pig, based on lost revenue of a head of €0.06 (3 kg 
at €0.02 per kg), lost revenue of a gastro–intestinal tract of €0.50 per tract, and rendering costs 
for head and tract of €0.36 (head 3 kg and tract 6 kg at €0.04 per kg)5, were assigned to the 
slaughterhouse (β1 = 0). The testing costs tc of €8 per test6 were assigned to the slaughterhouse 
(β2 = 0). 
Ma commonly occurs in the external environment of pig farms (Biet et al., 2005). The 
infection route is primarily via oral ingestion (Mátlová et al., 2004b). For Ma infection in pig 
herds, organic materials as saw dust, wood chips, and peat used as bedding material or feed 
supplements on pig farms are particularly hazardous. The number of Ma bacteria in these 
materials was higher compared to other sources in the external environment of pig farms, and 
the genotype of the strains found in these materials was comparable with the strains found in 
pig lymph nodes (Komijn et al., 1999; Mátlová et al., 2003; Mátlová et al., 2004b). Control 
measures used in this research focused on the hazardous infection routes, and included 
avoidance of usage feed, feed supplements as kaolin and peat, and drinking water contaminated 
with Ma, and prevention of contact of pigs with Ma contaminated bedding material as pig–
compost, birds, invertebrates and small terrestrial mammals (Mátlová et al., 2003; Pavlík et al., 
2005; Pavlík et al., 2007). Note that the control measures are reversible; they only require 
purchased inputs and extra labour time and do not need long term investments. Five Ma control 
packages were defined with increasing effectiveness that combine individual control measures 
(Table 5.1). Literature and expert knowledge was used to estimate Ma seroprevalence 
distributions for each control package. Control packages aim to prevent possible Ma 
contamination sources entering the farm. Not controlling a Ma contamination source increases 
probability of infection of pigs. Only one study about the impact of control measures on Ma 
seroprevalence was available. On a pig farm where preventive Ma control measures were not 
consistently put into effect Ma seroprevalence was 1.9%, whereas after introduction of good 
quality straw as bedding material, implementation of regular cleaning, and prevention of access 
of free living birds to the herd, Ma seroprevalence lowered to 0.0% (Pavlík et al., 2007). To 
determine the Ma seroprevalence distribution for each control package, also literature about 
                                                 
5
 L. Heres, VION Fresh Meat West, personal communication, 2007. 
6
 V.M.C. Rijsman, Animal Sciences Group, Wageningen UR, personal communication, 2007. 
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impact of control measures on lymph node lesions in pigs was used. Lymph node lesion were 
found in 16.1% (4.7–33.1%) of pigs fed with kaolin contaminated by Ma, whereas these 
lesions were found in 2.4% (0.4–6.8%) of pigs not fed with contaminated kaolin (Mátlová et 
al., 2004a). Lesions were found in 69% of pigs (81 of 117) fed with peat contaminated by Ma 
(Mátlová et al., 2005). Lesions were found in 7 of 8 pigs provided with pig–compost 
contaminated by Ma, whereas in 0 of 4 pigs not provided with pig–compost these lesions were 
found (Engel et al., 1978). Lesions were found in 7.2% (3.6–12.7%) of pigs kept on Ma 
contaminated sawdust as bedding material and only in 0.9% (0.0–2.0%) of pigs not kept on 
contaminated sawdust (Mátlová et al., 2004b). The Ma seroprevalence probability distributions 
if uncontrolled contamination sources were contaminated (contamination probability of 1 in 
Table 5.1), were validated by two experts in Ma infections in pigs. The least intense control 
package 1 had the highest average Ma seroprevalence (46.0%) and the most intense control 
package 5 the lowest (0.1%). 
Uncontrolled contamination sources are not necessarily contaminated with Ma. Table 5.2 
provides the contamination probabilities that an uncontrolled Ma source was contaminated 
with Ma (Mátlová et al., 2003). These contamination probabilities lower the probabilities of a 
specific seroprevalence infection level compared to contamination probabilities of 1. Table 5.1 
also provides Ma seroprevalence distributions at slaughter considering the contamination 
probabilities of Table 5.2. The Ma seroprevalence probability distribution of control package 5 
equalled the distribution with the contamination probability of 1. The Ma seroprevalence 
probability distributions of the other control packages were calculated with the distribution 
with contamination probability 1 for that control package, the Ma seroprevalence probability 
distribution of the next tighter control package, and the contamination probabilities from Table 
5.2. For example, the probability of 0% seroprevalence in control package 4 is 0.266·95.0 + (1–
0.266)·99.0 = 97.9 and for control package 3 is 0.042·80.0 + (1–0.042)·97.9 = 97.2. Control 
package 1 had the highest Ma seroprevalence (3.9%) and control package 5 the lowest (0.1%). 
Costs for bird, small terrestrial mammal and invertebrate control were €0.07 per pig, and 
for water quality control €0.20 per pig (King et al., 2007). Costs for feed supplements were 
additional costs of pigs fed supplement mix (€5.12 per pig: 2.5 kg of supplement mix at €135 
per 100 kg and 2.5 kg of weaner feed at €70 per 100 kg) above costs of pigs provided with pig–
compost (€3.62 per pig: 2.5 kg of pig–compost at €75 per 100 kg and 2.5 kg of weaner feed at 
€70 per 100 kg). Costs of uncontaminated bedding material were those of commercially 
available bedding material. 
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Table 5.1: Ma control packages with control package costs, Ma seroprevalence 
probability distributions and average Ma seroprevalence at contamination probabilities 
of Table 5.2 and of 1. 
Ma control package 
Control measure 1 2 3 4 5 
Bird, terrestrial mammal, and 
invertebrate control (€0.07/pig) 
 
X X X X 
      Use of uncontaminated bedding 
materials (€0.15/pig) 
 
 X X X 
      Water quality control 
(€0.20/pig) 
 
  X X 
      Use of uncontaminated feed and 
feed supplements (€1.50/pig) 
 
   X 
      Control package costs (€/pig) 0.00 0.07 0.22 0.42 1.92 
      
Cont.prob.a Cont.prob. Cont.prob. Cont.prob. Cont.prob. Ma seroprevalence 
probabilities at slaughter =T2b =1 =T2 =1 =T2 =1 =T2 =1 =T2 =1 
 0%  81.8 5.0 84.8 5.0 97.2 80.0 97.9 95.0 99.0 99.0 
 5% 5.6 5.0 5.6 25.0 2.6 15.0 2.1 5.0 1.0 1.0 
 10% 3.0 5.0 2.9 20.0 0.2 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 15% 2.8 5.0 2.7 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 20% 1.5 5.0 1.3 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 25% 1.7 10.0 1.3 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 50% 2.4 30.0 1.3 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 70% 1.1 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 100% 0.2 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
            Average Ma seroprevalence (%) 3.9 46.0 2.2 15.8 0.2 1.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 
a
 Contamination probability. 
b
 T2 = Contamination probability in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Total No. of samples, No. of samples infected with Ma spp. avium and Ma spp. 
hominisuis, and contamination probability of sources of Ma spp. avium and Ma spp. 
hominisuis infections (Mátlová et al., 2003). 
Source of Ma infection Total No. of samples 
No. of infected 
samples 
Contamination 
probability 
Birds, flies, and invertebrates 510 19 0.037 
Bedding material 231 31 0.134 
Water (water and biofilm) 450 19 0.042 
Feed and feed supplements (peat, kaolin, 
charcoal, feed concentrates) 
713 190 0.266 
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5.4. Results 
 
For different sensitivity and specificity values, the impact of penalty values €0 to €10 on 
steady–state probabilities, expected average Ma seroprevalence, expected pig producer costs, 
expected slaughterhouse costs, and expected chain costs were calculated. Table 5.3 provides 
results at sensitivity 0.50, 0.70 and 0.90, and specificity 0.95. Table 5.4 provides results at 
specificity 0.95, 0.97 and 0.99, and sensitivity 0.70. Expected pig producer costs consist of 
control package costs and penalty costs. Expected slaughterhouse costs consist of testing costs, 
additional processing costs and penalty revenue. Negative slaughterhouse costs indicate 
positive benefits. 
The penalty system is implemented to reach an objective for Ma contamination of pork. 
Consider an objective of a threshold value for average Ma seroprevalence in finishing pigs at 
slaughter of 4.0%. Table 5.3 shows that irrespective of the sensitivity level a penalty is not 
needed to comply with the threshold, because without a penalty the expected average Ma 
seroprevalence was 3.9%. Pig producers did not use control packages and the slaughterhouse 
bared costs of Ma control of €0.43, of which €0.26 testing costs and €0.17 additional 
processing costs. To comply with a threshold value of 3.5%, a penalty of €4 per pig was 
needed at sensitivity 0.50. The penalty induced pig producers to use a combination of control 
packages 1 to 3, which resulted in expected Ma seroprevalence of 2.7%. Pig producer costs 
were €0.33, which consisted of €0.07 control package costs and €0.26 penalty costs. Penalty 
costs were almost four times higher than control package costs. Slaughterhouse costs were 
€0.13, consisting of €0.24 testing costs, €0.15 additional processing costs and a penalty 
revenue of €0.26. Chain costs were equal to the lowest chain costs at penalty €0. For sensitivity 
levels 0.70 and 0.90, a penalty value of €2 was sufficient to lower expected average Ma 
seroprevalence below 3.5%. At higher sensitivity more pigs were classified with increased risk, 
increasing the reduction in penalty costs of a lower Ma seroprevalence. Pig producers used 
more intense control packages at the same penalty, resulting in a lower penalty needed to reach 
a threshold of 3.5%. For both sensitivity values, penalty costs for the pig producer also were 
about four times higher than control package costs. Slaughterhouse costs were €0.33 per pig 
lower than without a penalty, mainly due to the penalty revenue. Chain costs were between 
€0.00 and €0.01 higher than in the situation without a penalty. With tighter threshold values 
than 3.5%, higher penalty values were needed for compliance with a threshold. Chain costs 
increased. Control package 4 and 5 were never optimal, because the control package costs were 
too high (€0.42 and €1.92) compared to a possible reduction in expected Ma seroprevalence 
(from 0.2% of control package 3 to 0.1% for control packages 4 and 5). At higher sensitivity 
pig producers used more intense control packages, which lowered the minimal penalty needed 
to decrease expected average Ma seroprevalence below a specific threshold value. Higher 
sensitivity increased pig producer and chain costs, but did not influence slaughterhouse costs. 
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Irrespective of the specificity no penalty is needed to comply with a threshold value of 
4.0%, because without a penalty the expected average Ma seroprevalence was 3.9% (Table 
5.4). At a threshold value of 3.5%, a penalty of €2 was needed at specificity 0.95. The penalty 
induced pig producers to use a combination of control packages 1 to 3, which resulted in 
expected average Ma seroprevalence of 3.2%. Pig producer costs were €0.22, which consisted 
of €0.04 control package costs and €0.17 penalty costs. Penalty costs were four times higher 
than control package costs. Slaughterhouse costs were €0.25, consisting of €0.25 testing costs, 
€0.17 additional processing costs and a penalty revenue of €0.17. For specificity levels 0.97 
and 0.99, a penalty value of €4 and €6 respectively was needed to lower expected average Ma 
seroprevalence to 3.5%. At higher specificity fewer pigs were classified with increased risk, 
lowering Ma seroprevalence and the possible reduction in penalty costs. At a higher specificity 
pig producers used less intense control packages at the same penalty value, resulting in a higher 
penalty value needed for reaching a threshold value of 3.5%. At specificity 0.97 penalty costs 
for the pig producer were double the control package costs, and at specificity 0.99 they 
equalled the control package costs. Higher specificity lowered the penalty for producers and 
thereby pig producer incentives to use intense control packages, and increased the needed 
penalty to comply with a Ma seroprevalence threshold. Penalty costs for the pig producer 
reduced if specificity increased. With tighter threshold values than 3.5%, higher penalty values 
were needed for compliance with the threshold and chain costs increased. At higher specificity 
pig producer costs were lower. Chain costs were higher with increased specificity. For penalty 
values lower than the additional processing costs, €0 and €2, penalty revenue was lower than 
savings on additional processing costs. At these penalty values higher specificity lowered 
slaughterhouse costs, because less pigs were classified with increased risk. For penalty values 
of €4 or higher, slaughterhouse costs increased with higher specificity. 
 
5.5. Sensitivity analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted with 1) alternative Ma contamination probabilities, 2) 
alternative control package costs, 3) alternative additional processing costs, 4) attributing 
additional processing costs to pig producers, 5) alternative testing costs, 6) attributing  testing  
costs  to  pig  producers, and  7)  alternative  sample  sizes.  Higher sensitivity and lower 
specificity resulted in increased usage of more intense control packages irrespective of the 
alternative values of the first six variables, but model outcomes did change. Alternative sample 
sizes did, however, change impact of testing accuracy on producer usage of control packages. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are provided subsequently. 
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Ma contamination probabilities of 1.00 for each control package resulted in higher average 
Ma seroprevalence of each control package (contamination probability of 1 in Table 5.1). It 
increased pig producer costs from €0.00 to €0.18 per pig, depending on sensitivity, specificity 
and penalty value. Slaughterhouse costs changed from a decrease of €0.07 to an increase of 
€0.93. Chain costs increased from €0.07 to €0.93. The penalty value that resulted in lowest 
chain costs changed from €0 per pig in the base situation to €2 or €4 with high contamination 
probabilities. Higher contamination probabilities increased financial gains of using a control 
package, because the decrease in expected average Ma seroprevalence was larger. Higher 
contamination probabilities also lowered the penalty value, which was sufficient to comply 
with a Ma seroprevalence threshold value. 
If control package costs were half of the costs in Table 5.1, pig producers used more 
intense control packages resulting in lower expected average Ma seroprevalence. It decreased 
pig producer costs from €0.00 to €0.11 per pig, depending on sensitivity, specificity and 
penalty value. Slaughterhouse costs decreased from €0.00 to €0.04. Chain costs decreased from 
€0.00 to €0.11. The penalty value that resulted in lowest chain costs changed from €0 per pig 
in the base situation to €2 if control package costs were half. Savings on penalty costs more 
quickly exceeded additional costs of more intense control measures, if control measure costs 
were lower. Lower control package costs also lowered the penalty value, which was sufficient 
to comply with a Ma seroprevalence threshold value. 
Pig producer and slaughterhouse manager decision remained unchanged if additional 
processing costs varied from €0.92 per pig to €0.46 and €1.38. If additional processing costs 
were assigned to the pig producer (β1 = 1), more intense control packages were optimal. Pig 
producer costs were between €0.06 and €0.20 higher than if additional processing costs were 
assigned to the slaughterhouse, depending on sensitivity, specificity and penalty value. 
Additional costs consisted of additional processing costs and control package costs. Usage of 
more intense control packages lowered penalty costs slightly. Slaughterhouse costs were 
between €0.05 and €0.20 lower. Gains from lower additional processing costs outweighed 
lower penalty revenues. Chain costs were between €0.00 and €0.05 higher, because the 
increase in control package costs cancelled out the reduction in additional processing costs. 
Pig producer and slaughterhouse manager decision remained unchanged if testing costs 
varied from €8 per test to €4 and €12. If testing costs were assigned to the pig producer (β2 = 
1), more intense control packages were optimal. Pig producer costs were between €0.19 and 
€0.28 per pig higher than if testing costs were assigned to the slaughterhouse, depending on 
sensitivity, specificity and penalty value. Additional costs consisted of testing costs and control 
package costs. Usage of more intense control packages lowered penalty costs slightly. 
Slaughterhouse costs were between €0.18 and €0.28 lower, because it faced no testing costs 
and the lower expected average Ma seroprevalence decreased additional processing costs. 
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Chain costs were between €0.00 and €0.04 higher, because the increase in control package 
costs cancelled out the reduction in additional processing costs and testing costs. 
The impact of a doubled (from 2 and 6 to 4 and 12, respectively), tripled (6 and 18) and 
quadrupled (8 and 24) sample size RLn  on expected average Ma seroprevalence in the steady–
state was analysed. Figure 5.2 presents the results for specificity sp 0.95, 0.97, and 0.99, 
sensitivity 0.70 and penalty value €2. It shows that a larger sample size not always resulted in 
lower expected average Ma seroprevalence. At specificity 0.95, expected average Ma 
seroprevalence was lower at sample size 4/12 than at sample size 2/6. However, it was higher 
at sample size 6/18 and 8/24 than at sample size 4/12. A larger sample size and a low 
specificity resulted in a higher probability of incorrectly classifying a delivery with increased 
risk. This lowered benefits of a lower probability of a delivery being classified with increased 
risk to such extent that benefits were lower than the additional costs of more intense control 
packages. This resulted in usage of less intense control packages and a lower expected average 
Ma seroprevalence at a higher sample size. Similarly, a sample size of 6/18 at specificity 0.97 
and a sample size of 8/24 at specificity 0.99 minimized expected average Ma seroprevalence. 
The sample size minimizing expected average Ma seroprevalence increased with specificity, 
because at higher specificity the probability of incorrectly classifying at least one pig with 
increased risk was lower. Alternative penalty values and sensitivity values showed similar 
results. 
 
5.6. Discussion 
 
This paper analysed influence of sensitivity and specificity of a new serodiagnostic test for 
detection of Ma infections on pig producer incentives to control Ma infections in finishing 
pigs. Incentives were provided through a penalty on pigs in a delivery classified with increased 
Ma risk. A dynamic optimization model with a grid search of deliveries of pig producers to a 
slaughterhouse was used to provide insight into how test sensitivity, test specificity and penalty 
values influenced pig producer incentives to implement Ma control packages. The minimal 
penalty value needed to comply with a threshold value for average Ma seroprevalence in 
finishing pigs at slaughter depended on test sensitivity and specificity. Higher sensitivity and 
lower specificity induced usage of more intense control packages, resulting in lower expected 
average Ma seroprevalence and lower minimal penalty values, and also in higher expected pig 
producer costs and chain costs. Expected slaughterhouse costs were hardly influenced. 
Sensitivity and specificity weighed relative importance of expected producer costs to that of 
expected average Ma seroprevalence. A higher penalty increased usage of more intense control 
packages. King et al. (2007) similarly reported that penalties intensify control of salmonella 
infections in pig herds.  Specificity had a larger impact than sensitivity on expected costs of pig 
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Figure 5.2: Impact of specificity sp and sample size RLn  on expected average 
Mycobacterium avium seroprevalence in the steady–state at penalty value €2 and 
sensitivity 0.70. 
 
producers and slaughterhouse. This originated from a low expected average Ma seroprevalence 
within the herd. Jordan (1996) similarly reported that specificity has a larger impact than 
sensitivity on the sample size to detect Mycobacterium paratuberculosis infections in cattle 
herds. Starbird (2005) showed that larger sample size lowered the fine needed to induce 
suppliers to deliver safe products. Our research showed that if a test with imperfect specificity 
is used and hazard prevalence is low, a larger sample size can result in lower incentives to take 
control measures. Policy makers should thus consider the specificity of the test while setting 
the sample size, to prevent adverse effects on supplier incentives. 
In the analysis pig producers were assumed to be risk–neutral for simplification. However, 
primary producers are often assumed to be risk–averse. King et al. (2007) showed that the level 
of risk aversion has no influence on the relationships among expected welfare and monetary 
gains and almost no effect on the quality premium for salmonella control by pig producers. 
Although specific parameter values might differ, we expect that impact of testing accuracy on 
optimal parameter values of the financial incentive system with risk–neutral producers is 
comparable to impact with risk–averse producers. 
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The research used a partial analysis on Ma. But, food safety control measures can be 
effective in reducing multiple pathogens and can improve production results. This research did 
not include such benefits, because these were outside our research scope. Improvement of 
farmer production results de facto lowers control package costs and increases incentives for 
implementation of more intense Ma control packages. 
The model did not include a participation constraint of pig producers, because the research 
aimed to analyse how testing accuracy influences optimal parameter values of an incentive 
system. In countries where no long–term contracts exist between pig producers and slaughter 
companies, such as the Netherlands, pig producers can regularly shift deliveries from one 
company to another. If only part of the slaughter companies in such a country introduce a 
penalty, the penalty costs could induce their supplying pig producers to switch to another 
slaughter company. Thus, slaughter companies can only set a penalty up to a specific level, 
depending on the individual participation constraints of supplying pig producers. Extending the 
model with a participation constraint limits the optimal penalty value to a maximum. It would 
not change the impact of testing accuracy. 
The research aim was to analyse the impact of the accuracy of a serodiagnostic test on 
supplier incentives to implement food safety control measures. It did not aim at analysing the 
feasibility of adopting the proposed incentive system in practice. Notwithstanding, some 
comments on the feasibility can be made based on this research. In a situation with a threshold 
value for Ma seroprevalence which necessitates a penalty, chain costs compared to the current 
situation without a penalty (results at penalty value €0) were between €0.00 and €0.12 per pig 
higher, depending on sensitivity, specificity and penalty value. Gains of a Ma control 
programme in terms of lower public health costs must outweigh these additional chain costs for 
it to be cost–effective for society and a sufficient part of these gains must be redistributed to 
the slaughter company and pig producers. Without redistribution voluntary implementation of 
such system is unlikely. However, if control package costs decrease, for example through 
technical development, or contamination probabilities of individual Ma sources are higher than 
the ones used in this research, a penalty system can be more cost–effective than a system 
without a penalty irrespective of public health gains, because minimal chain costs occurred at 
penalty values of €2 or €4. For implementation by an individual slaughter company in practice 
it also is important that gains of finishing pig producers exceed their costs, because finishing 
pig producers would otherwise shift deliveries to other slaughter companies (participation 
constraint). A slaughter company can, for example, introduce a quality premium for 
participation in the control programme used in King et al. (2007) to increase pig producer 
gains. Alternatively, voluntary adoption across all slaughter companies or prescription by the 
government could solve the problem of shifting of finishing pigs to another slaughterhouse as 
in the Netherlands. 
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Consequences for consumers originate from consumption of meat from pigs infected with 
Ma which remained undetected in the chain. The probability that a delivery with Ma infection 
is incorrectly classified without increased risk and marketed towards the consumer is the so–
called type–II–error. The model does not include the type–II–error, because the reservoir for 
human MAC infections is unclear. Pig meat could be a source, but it is also possible that 
humans and pigs share common sources (Komijn et al., 1999). Traceability is necessary to 
attribute costs originating from these infections to a food business operator (Hobbs, 2004). 
Currently, traceability of human MAC infections to the pork supply chain is not possible. If 
human MAC infections can be traced to the pork supply chain, passing on costs originating 
from these infections to a food business operator can be an additional incentive to induce it to 
control Ma infections (Pouliot and Sumner, 2008). The model can be adapted to include the 
type–II–error and to analyse impact of such costs. The type–II–error can be calculated using an 
altered version of (3b), as the sum of the probabilities a delivery which has at least one Ma 
infected pig, is classified without increased risk (sum m>0 to 1). Multiplication by the number 
of Ma infected pigs m·N in the delivery within the altered sum yields the expected average 
number of undetected Ma infected pigs. Table 5.5 provides the expected type–II–error and 
expected average number of undetected Ma infected pigs per delivery in the steady–state for 
sensitivity, specificity and penalty values of Tables 5.3 and 5.4. Table 5.5 shows that higher 
sensitivity, lower specificity and higher penalty values decreased the expected type–II–error 
and average number of undetected Ma infected pigs. The public health gains of a penalty 
system is the difference between the expected average number of undetected Ma infected pigs 
at penalty value €0 and at another penalty value. Relating the gains in expected average 
number of undetected Ma infected pigs to additional expected chain costs compared to the 
chain costs at penalty value €0 (Tables 5.3 and 5.4), yielded a cost–effectiveness between 
€9.47 and €19.41 per undetected Ma infected pig. Public policy makers and food business 
operators in the pork supply chain can use the cost–effectiveness in the decision whether an 
penalty on Ma infected finishing pigs to induce Ma control by pig producers is appropriate. 
The model provides insight into impact of testing accuracy on incentives of pig producers 
to implement Ma control measures. However, the model can be adapted to analyse 
consequences of testing strategy for any quality attribute for which diagnostic tests are used to 
measure supplier performance. The model can be a valuable tool for analysing impact of 
diagnostic testing strategies on costs, benefits and supplier incentives to take food safety 
control measures in a setting of an incentive system with a penalty to induce performance. 
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Table 5.5: Expected type–II–error and expected average number of Ma infected pigs per 
delivery of 100 pigs in the steady–state for sensitivity, specificity and penalty values of 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
 Expected type–II–error Expected average number Ma infected pigs 
per delivery (100 pigs) 
Sensitivity 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.70 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.70 
Specificity 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.99 
Penalty 
(€/pig) 
          
0 0.095 0.080 0.069 0.095 0.111 1.36 1.00 0.76 1.24 1.53 
2 0.091 0.071 0.062 0.090 0.111 1.31 0.90 0.68 1.18 1.53 
4 0.079 0.065 0.051 0.087 0.106 1.12 0.71 0.52 1.13 1.47 
6 0.076 0.055 0.049 0.083 0.106 1.08 0.60 0.50 1.09 1.47 
8 0.063 0.055 0.018 0.078 0.104 0.73 0.60 0.10 0.89 1.45 
10 0.063 0.019 0.018 0.078 0.102 0.73 0.10 0.10 0.89 1.42 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
Higher sensitivity and lower specificity resulted in use of more intense control measures, 
higher producer costs and lower Mycobacterium avium seroprevalence. The minimal penalty 
values to comply with a threshold for average Ma seroprevalence in finishing pigs at slaughter 
was lower at higher sensitivity and lower specificity. With imperfect specificity a larger sample 
size decreased pig producer incentives to control Mycobacterium avium seroprevalence. 
Sensitivity, specificity, sample size and penalty value must be attuned in an incentive system to 
induce pig producers to implement Mycobacterium avium control in finishing pigs with 
minimum negative effects. 
 
References 
 
Biet, F., Boschiroli, M.L., Thorel, M.F. and Guilloteau, L.A. (2005). Zoonotic aspects of 
Mycobacterium bovis and Mycobacterium avium–intracellulare complex (MAC). 
Veterinary Research 36(3), pp. 411-436. 
Cameron, A.R. and Baldock, F.C. (1998). A new probability formula for surveys to 
substantiate freedom from disease. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 34(1), pp. 1-17. 
Chalfant, J.A. and Sexton, R.J. (2002). Marketing orders, grading errors, and price 
discrimination. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84(1), pp. 53-66. 
Elbasha, E.H. and Riggs, T.L. (2003). The effects of information on producer and consumer 
incentives to undertake food safety efforts: A theoretical model and policy implications. 
Agribusiness 19(1), pp. 29-42. 
Impact of testing accuracy on incentives for pig producers to control Mycobacterium avium infections in finishing pigs 
 
105
Engel, H.W.B., Groothuis, D.G., Wouda, W., König, C.D.W. and Lendfers, L.H.H.M. (1978). 
"Pig–compost" as a source of Mycobacterium avium infection in swine. Zentralblatt für 
Veterinarmedizin Reihe B 25(5), pp. 373-382. 
Falkinham 3rd, J.O. (1996). Epidemiology of infection by nontuberculous mycobacteria. 
Clinical Microbiological Reviews 9(2), pp. 177-215. 
Hausken, K. (2002). Probabilistic risk analysis and game theory. Risk Analysis 22(1), pp. 17-
27. 
Hirschauer, N. and Musshoff, O. (2007). A game–theoretic approach to behavioral food risks: 
The case of grain producers. Food Policy 32(2), pp. 246-265. 
Hobbs, J.E. (2004). Information asymmetry and the role of traceability systems. Agribusiness 
20(4), pp. 397-415. 
Hueth, B. and Ligon, E. (2002). Estimation of an efficient tomato contract. European Review 
of Agricultural Economics 29(2), pp. 237-253. 
Jin, G.Z. and Leslie, P. (2003). The effect of information on product quality: Evidence from 
restaurant hygiene grade cards. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(2), pp. 409-451. 
Jordan, D. (1996). Aggregate testing for the evaluation of Johne's disease herd status. 
Australian Veterinary Journal 73(1), pp. 16-19. 
King, R.P., Backus, G.B.C. and Van der Gaag, M.A. (2007). Incentive systems for food quality 
control with repeated deliveries: Salmonella control in pork production. European Review 
of Agricultural Economics 34(1), pp. 81-104. 
Komijn, R.E., de Haas, P.E.W., Schneider, M.M.E., Eger, T., Nieuwenhuijs, J.H.M., Van den 
Hoek, R.J., Bakker, D., Van Zijd Erveld, F.G. and Van Soolingen, D. (1999). Prevalence 
of Mycobacterium avium in slaughter pigs in the Netherlands and comparison of IS1245 
restriction fragment length polymorphism patterns of porcine and human isolates. Journal 
of Clinical Microbiology 37(5), pp. 1254-1259. 
Komijn, R.E., Wisselink, H.J., Rijsman, V.M.C., Stockhofe–Zurwieden, N., Bakker, D., Van 
Zijderveld, F.G., Eger, T., Wagenaar, J.A., Putirulan, F.F. and Urlings, B.A.P. (2007). 
Granulomatous lesions in lymph nodes of slaughter pigs bacteriologically negative for 
Mycobacterium avium subsp. avium and positive for Rhodococcus equi. Veterinary 
Microbiology 120(3-4), pp. 352-357. 
Laffont, J.–J. and Martimort, D. (2002). The theory of incentives: the principal–agent model. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Mátlová, L., Dvorská, L., Ayele, W.Y., Bartos, M., Amemori, T. and Pavlík, I. (2005). 
Distribution of Mycobacterium avium complex isolates in tissue samples of pigs fed peat 
naturally contaminated with mycobacteria as a supplement. Journal of Clinical 
Microbiology 43(3), pp. 1261-1268. 
Chapter 5 
 
106
Mátlová, L., Dvorská, L., Bartl, J., Bartos, M., Ayele, W.Y., Alexa, M. and Pavlík, I. (2003). 
Mycobacteria isolated from the environment of pig farms in the Czech Republic during the 
years 1996 to 2002. Veterinární Medicína 48(12), pp. 343-357. 
Mátlová, L., Dvorská, L., Bartos, M., Docekal, J., Trckova, M. and Pavlík, I. (2004a). 
Tuberculous lesions in pig lymph nodes caused by kaolin fed as a supplement. Veterinární 
Medicína 49(10), pp. 379-388. 
Mátlová, L., Dvorská, L., Palecek, K., Maurenc, L., Bartos, M. and Pavlík, I. (2004b). Impact 
of sawdust and wood shavings in bedding on pig tuberculous lesions in lymph nodes, and 
IS1245 RFLP analysis of Mycobacterium avium subsp. hominissuis of serotypes 6 and 8 
isolated from pigs and environment. Veterinary Microbiology 102(3-4), pp. 227-236. 
Miranda, M.J. and Fackler, P.L. (2002). Applied computational economics and finance. The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Pavlík, I., Mátlová, L., Dvorská, L., Shitaye, J.E. and Parmova, I. (2005). Mycobacterial 
infections in cattle and pigs caused by Mycobacterium avium complex members and 
atypical mycobacteria in the Czech Republic during 2000–2004. Veterinární Medicína 
50(7), pp. 281-290. 
Pavlík, I., Mátlová, L., Gilar, M., Bartl, J., Parmova, I., Lysak, F., Alexa, M., Dvorská–
Bartosova, L., Svec, V., Vrbas, V. and Horvathova, A. (2007). Isolation of conditionally 
pathogenic mycobacteria from the environment of one pig farm and the effectiveness of 
preventive measures between 1997 and 2003. Veterinarni Medicina 52(9), pp. 392-404. 
Pouliot, S. and Sumner, D.A. (2008). Traceability, liability, and incentives for food safety and 
quality. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90(1), pp. 15-27. 
Starbird, S.A. (2005). Moral hazard, inspection policy, and food safety. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 87(1), pp. 15-27. 
Starbird, S.A. (2007). Testing errors, supplier segregation, and food safety. Agricultural 
Economics 36(3), pp. 325-334. 
Thorel, M.F., Huchzermeyer, H.F., Weiss, R. and Fontaine, J.J. (1997). Mycobacterium avium 
infections in animals. Literature review. Veterinary Research 28(5), pp. 439-447. 
Unnevehr, L., Roberts, T. and Custer, C. (2004). New pathogen testing technologies and the 
market for food safety information. AgBioForum 7(4), pp. 212-218. 
Van Wagenberg, C.P.A., Backus, G.B.C., Kuiper, W.E., Van der Vorst, J.G.A.J. and Urlings, 
H.A.P. (2010). Incentive mechanisms for liver lesion control in finishing pigs in the 
Netherlands. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 93(1), pp. 19-24. 
Weiss, M.D. (1995). Information issues for principals and agents in the "market" for food 
safety and nutrition. In Caswell, J.A. (Eds). Valuing food safety and nutrition. Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp. 69-79. 
Winston, W.L. (1991). Operations research. PWS–KENT Publishing Company, Boston, Ma. 
Impact of testing accuracy on incentives for pig producers to control Mycobacterium avium infections in finishing pigs 
 
107
Wisselink, H.J., Van Solt–Smits, C.B., Oorburg, D., Van Soolingen, D., Overduin, P., 
Maneschijn–Bonsing, J., Stockhofe–Zurwieden, N., Buys–Bergen, H., Engel, B., Urlings, 
H.A.P. and Thole, J.E.R. (2010). Serodiagnosis of Mycobacterium avium infections in 
pigs. Veterinary Microbiology 142(3-4), pp. 401-407  
Wisselink, H.J., Van Solt–Smits, C.B., Stockhofe–Zurwieden, N., Bergen–Buijs, H., Rijsman, 
V.M.C., Overduin, P., Van Prehn, M., Van Soolingen, D. and Thole, J.E.R. (2006). 
Comparison of pathological and bacteriological examination of mandibulary and 
mesenteric lymph nodes in pigs, experimentally infected with Mycobacterium avium spp. 
avium. In proceedings of the 19th IPVS congress, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 185. 
Reliability of food chain information about antibiotic usage in finishing pigs provided by pig producers to a Dutch 
slaughter company 
 
109
Chapter 6 
 
Reliability of food chain information about 
antibiotic usage in finishing pigs provided by 
pig producers to a Dutch slaughter 
company7 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The EU prescribes food business operators to use food chain information in order to control 
food safety. This research analyzes reliability of food chain information about antibiotics usage 
during 60 days prior to delivery to a large Dutch slaughter company. A dataset with 479 test 
results for antibiotics residues in tissue samples of finishing pigs was linked to information on 
delivery documents provided by pig producers about antibiotics usage in these pigs. A Pearson 
chi–square test showed that twice as much pig producers reported using antibiotics in the group 
of 82 pig producers with detected antibiotics residues (11.0%) as in the group without detected 
antibiotics residues (5.5%). For 89% of deliveries with a finishing pig with detected antibiotics 
residues ‘did not use antibiotics’ was reported. Food chain information about antibiotics usage 
provided by pig producers was no guarantee for absence of antibiotics residues in delivered 
finishing pigs. To improve reliability of this food chain information policy makers should 
focus on increasing control depth, the probability of detecting unreliable food chain 
information if a non–compliant pig producer is checked. Research is needed to determine 
benefits and costs of increased control depth. If costs exceed benefits food chain information 
about antibiotics usage is not a relevant instrument to improve food safety and pig producers 
should not be requested to provide it. 
 
                                                 
7
 C.P.A. van Wagenberg , G.B.C. Backus, J.G.A.J. van der Vorst and H.A.P. Urlings. 
Submitted to an ISI journal. 
Chapter 6 
 
110
6.1. Introduction 
 
Food safety is an important food attribute for consumers, governments and food business 
operators (FBOs) that has to be further improved continuously. As food safety legislation in the 
EU at the end of the 20th century was insufficiently equipped to do so, the EU adopted new 
food safety legislation with the General Food Law (EFSA, 2007). This states that food safety 
must be controlled throughout the supply chain, FBOs have primary legal responsibility for 
food safety, and governments keep the final responsibility to supervise that marketed products 
are safe (Regulation (EC) No 178/2002). In this setting, for FBOs it is essential that, next to 
intra–company application of control measures, purchased raw materials are of sufficient safety 
(Van Wagenberg et al., 2009). For governments it is essential that marketed products are of 
sufficient safety to guarantee public health. But, whether or not intermediate and consumer 
food products are of sufficient safety is often difficult to verify. This can result in information 
asymmetry about product safety between supplying and buying FBOs in food supply chains 
and between FBOs and governments, possibly leading to opportunistic behaviour with 
consequential public health risks (Hennessy et al., 2003; Hirschauer and Musshoff, 2007). To 
reduce information asymmetry, a buyer or government can measure food safety performance 
with testing technologies. This can, however, be costly and time consuming (Unnevehr et al., 
2004). So, FBOs and governments are searching for more cost–effective strategies to reduce 
information asymmetry about food safety. Provision of information by supplying FBOs to a 
buying FBO or from FBOs to a government can be such a strategy (Van Wagenberg et al., 
2009). Sharing relevant information between suppliers and buyers can improve chain 
performance through information and relational alignment (Tan et al., 2010), better 
coordination and planning of the supply chain (Lee and Whang, 2000) and can increase 
customer satisfaction (Eggert and Helm, 2003). Completeness and correctness, or reliability, of 
the information is essential for the user to prevent negative social and economic impacts 
(DeLone and McLean, 1992; Feldmann and Müller, 2003; Wang, 1996). However, fear of the 
information being misused (Mohtadi, 2008; Mohtadi and Kinsey, 2005) and expected negative 
financial consequences can result in provision of unreliable information. If a buying FBO 
adjusts logistical and production processes to unreliable information, it can result in lower 
chain performance, decreased customer satisfaction, and food safety and public health 
problems. If governments adjust control strategies to unreliable information, it can result in 
food safety and public health problems. It is, therefore, important that FBOs provide reliable 
information about food safety. 
The public control system for food safety in the EU increasingly relies on information 
provided by FBOs under control. Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 prescribes FBOs in the EU to 
use appropriate hygiene measures and to keep records from which relevant information, on 
request, must be made available to receiving FBOs and the competent authority. For public 
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health it is essential that this food chain information (FCI) FBOs provide is reliable. However, 
a literature review showed a lack of literature on the reliability of FCI as prescribed by EU 
legislation. This research aims to fill this gap by analyzing the reliability of FCI about 
antibiotics usage in finishing pigs in the Netherlands. 
 
6.2. Food chain information about antibiotics usage in finishing pigs 
in the Netherlands 
 
Prior to delivery to a slaughterhouse, pig producers in the EU have to provide FCI that helps 
slaughterhouses to control food safety such as the pigs health status, farms the pigs originate 
from, veterinary medicinal products administered to the pigs, occurrence of diseases affecting 
meat safety, results of analyses on the pigs of interest to food safety and public health, relevant 
reports about previous ante– and post–mortem inspections of pigs, production data which 
might indicate presence of diseases, and name of the attending veterinarian (Regulation (EC) 
No 853/2004). Pigs treated with an antibiotic slaughtered during the antibiotic’s withdrawal 
period, the period in which pigs treated with the antibiotic are not allowed for slaughter, can 
result in products with a too high level of antibiotic residues and pose a risk for public health 
(Pikkemaat et al., 2009). In Council Regulation (EEC) 2377/90 the EU establishes allowed 
residue levels through maximum residue limits (MRL) for veterinary medicinal products in 
foodstuffs of animal origin. Since 2008 pig producers in the Netherlands legally have to 
provide FCI to Dutch slaughter companies about antibiotics usage in delivered pigs during 60 
days prior to delivery in order to improve control of antibiotics residues in pork. A major 
Dutch slaughter company already asked for FCI about used antibiotics during 60 days prior to 
slaughter since 2007. To analyse the reliability of the provided FCI this research focused on 
pig producers with detected antibiotics residues in finishing pigs. Under the assumption that 
provided FCI was reliable, i.e. correct and complete, it was expected that the percentage of pig 
producers who reported antibiotics usage, was higher for the group of pig producers with 
detected antibiotics residues than for the group of pig producers without detected antibiotics 
residues. Furthermore, because the withdrawal periods of detected antibiotics are less than 60 
days (Table 6.1), it was expected that pig producers with detected antibiotics residues used 
antibiotics during 60 days prior to delivery. So, under the assumption that these pig producers 
provided reliable FCI, it was expected that they reported antibiotics usage in finishing pigs to 
the slaughter company. 
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Table 6.1: Withdrawal period of antibiotics found in finishing pigs delivered to a Dutch 
pig slaughter company in 2007 and 2008. 
Antibiotic Withdrawal period (days)a 
Doxycycline 5 – 28 
Oxytetracycline 3 – 53 
Tetracycline 3 – 53 
Sulfadiazine 5 – 28 
Sulfamethoxazol 3 – 12 
Dihydrostreptomycine 35 – 49 
Penicillin G 5 – 10 
Tulathromycine 33 
a
 From database veterinary medicines of the Medicine Evaluation Board of the Netherlands (http://www.cbg-
meb.nl/CBG/en/veterinary-medicines/database-veterinary-medicines/default.htm). 
 
6.3. Material and method 
 
6.3.1. Residues of antibiotics 
Information about residues of antibiotics in finishing pigs was obtained from a dataset with 
screening results of tests for antibiotics residues in tissue samples of finishing pigs delivered to 
a major Dutch pig slaughter company in 2007 and 2008. This slaughter company was chosen 
because it had screening system for antibiotics residues and slaughtered 60% of the total 
number of pigs slaughter in the Netherlands (8.5 million pigs) in 2007 and 57% (8.2 million 
pigs) in 2008. The screened finishing pigs in the dataset were from multiple slaughter 
locations. For each slaughter location, screened pigs were selected randomly from deliveries of 
finishing pigs from farms that had double the lung lesion prevalence and pleurisy prevalence 
compared to the average of all farms delivering to that slaughter location. The dataset 
contained screening results of tests for antibiotics residues of 22,633 finishing pigs; 11,490 in 
2007 and 11,143 in 2008. 
Residues of antibiotics were determined with the three–step method described in 
Pikkemaat et al. (2009). First, a Nouws Antibiotics Test–screening (NAT–screening) on pre–
urine kidney fluid was carried out. Second, if the NAT–screening indicated the possible 
presence of antibiotics, two post–screening test on meat juice (NAT–meat test) and on kidney 
juice (NAT–kidney test) were performed simultaneously. Third, if one or both of the post–
screening tests indicated the possible presence of antibiotics, chemical confirmation based on 
extraction, separation and detection procedures described in Stolker and Brinkman (2005) was 
conducted on meat. 
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6.3.2. Information about antibiotics usage 
For 141 finishing pigs from the dataset with screening results (93 in 2007, 48 in 2008) 
chemical confirmation showed residues of antibiotics. Of 45 of the finishing pigs with a 
chemical confirmation (31 in 2007, 14 in 2008) the laboratory only reported compliance with 
the MRL without reporting the measured quantitative residue level. The results from these 
finishing pigs were excluded from the analysis, because lack of information about the 
measured quantitative residue level could also mean that the level was zero, i.e. no residues. 
The 96 positive finishing pigs with detectable levels of antibiotics were from 74 pig producers, 
of whom 61 pig producers had one delivery with one positive finishing pig, 12 pig producers 
had two deliveries with one positive finishing pig in each delivery, and one pig producer had 
11 finishing pigs in nine deliveries (two deliveries with each two positive finishing pigs). The 
pig producer with 11 positive finishing pigs was excluded from the analysis, because he was 
first subjected to intensified surveillance and finally excluded from delivery to the slaughter 
company. This resulted in 85 deliveries with each one positive finishing pig. 
Delivery documents provided FCI about antibiotics usage in the finishing pigs during 60 
days prior to delivery. For each delivery of finishing pigs arriving at a slaughterhouse the pig 
producer must fill out a delivery document with the FCI questions at least 24 hours prior to 
delivery. All pig producers declared they filled out the delivery document correctly and 
completely by signing the delivery document. In 2007 and 2008, different delivery documents 
concerning treatment statements about antibiotics usage during the 60 days prior to delivery 
existed. Of the 85 deliveries with a positive finishing pig, 60 delivery documents contained a 
statement about a group treatment, 22 about treatment of individual pigs, and three did not 
include a statement8. These last three were excluded from the analysis, resulting in 82 
deliveries with a corresponding delivery document with a statement about antibiotics usage. 
The deliveries without antibiotics residues were selected from the deliveries of the 22,492 
screened finishing pigs without a chemical confirmation (11,397 in 2007 and 11,095 in 2008). 
Because the delivery documents were only available as hardcopies, a sample of 397 deliveries 
without antibiotics residues was randomly selected for analysis using an arcsinus–
transformation (Cohen, 1977). This sample size allows for detection of statistical difference of 
5% point between the percentage of pig producers who indicated antibiotics usage in the 
sample with a quantitative residue level on the one hand and in the sample without a 
quantitative residue level on the other hand, with a power of 0.95 and an alpha of 0.01 (Cohen, 
1977). To exclude a possible bias in slaughter location, year and season, the numbers of 
deliveries from each slaughter location, year and month in the sample of deliveries without 
antibiotics residues were set proportional to the numbers in the sample of the deliveries with 
                                                 
8
 Three documents were of an older type in use prior to the time a statement about antibiotics usage was included on 
the document. Pig producers used this older type, probably because they had a stock of delivery documents and only 
asked for new documents once their stock needed replenishment. 
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antibiotics residues. Of the 397 delivery documents of deliveries without antibiotics residues, 
299 included a statement about group treatment and 98 about treatment of individual finishing 
pigs. 
 
6.3.3. Statistical analysis 
A Pearson chi–square test of goodness of fit (Pearson, 1900) was used to test if the percentage 
of pig producers who indicated antibiotics usage was higher for the group of pig producers 
with detected antibiotics residues than for the group of pig producers without detected 
antibiotics residues for all treatment statements. 
A pig producer could, however, have correctly indicated he did not use group treatment 
with antibiotics, even if a finishing pig in a delivery was found to have antibiotics residues, 
because he could have treated only this individual finishing pig. A separate analysis was, 
therefore, conducted for deliveries with only statements about treatment of individual finishing 
pigs on the delivery document. Because of the low number of deliveries, more than 25% of the 
expected cell counts had a value of less than five, a Pearson chi–square test of goodness of fit 
was not appropriate (Fingleton, 1984) and instead a Fisher’s exact test (Agresti, 1992) was 
performed to test if the percentage of pig producers who indicated antibiotics usage in 
individual finishing pigs was higher for the group of pig producers with detected antibiotics 
residues than for the group of pig producers without detected antibiotics residues. 
If antibiotics residues were detected with chemical confirmation, it can be expected that the 
finishing pig producer reported ‘did use antibiotics’ on the delivery document. So, the expected 
number of delivery documents with ‘did not use antibiotics’ would be zero. It is, however, 
possible that for a delivery with residues the delivery document correctly reported ‘did not use 
antibiotics’ during 60 days prior to delivery, because it can not be excluded that an individual 
finishing pig is found to have antibiotics residues at slaughter, even when the pig producer did 
comply with the withdrawal period. This is because withdrawal periods are set based on 
probabilistic analysis of medicine clearing times in experiments and for an individual finishing 
pig the medicine clearing time could exceed 60 days. In other words, it is not possible to 
univocally set the expected number of delivery documents reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’ in 
the deliveries with residues at zero, but it is expected to be low. The expected number of 
delivery documents reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’ was (reasonably but arbitrary) set at 10% 
of the 82 delivery documents found with residues of antibiotics, which is eight. A Pearson chi–
square test of goodness of fit was used to compare the real number of delivery documents 
reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’ to the expected number of delivery documents reporting ‘did 
not use antibiotics’. Setting the expected number of delivery documents reporting ‘did not use 
antibiotics’ at 20% (16) or 30% (25) yielded similar empirical results. 
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6.4. Results 
 
Table 6.2 provides the number and percentage of pig producers with and without detected 
antibiotics residues reporting ‘did use antibiotics’ and ‘did not use antibiotics’ during 60 days 
prior to delivery. The percentage of pig producers who reported ‘did use antibiotics’ was twice 
as high for the group of pig producers with detected antibiotics residues by chemical 
confirmation in finishing pigs (11.0%) as for the group of pig producers without detected 
antibiotics residues in finishing pigs (5.5%) (p=0.0686). Using the statements about treatment 
of individual finishing pigs yielded comparable results (p=0.4066). The majority of delivery 
documents of the 82 deliveries with a finishing pig with detected antibiotics residues (89.0%) 
and of the 22 deliveries with a finishing pig with detected antibiotics residues exceeding the 
MRL (86.4%) did report ‘did not use antibiotics’ prior to delivery. The real number of delivery 
documents reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’ (73 of 82 deliveries) in deliveries with residues 
was higher than the expected number of eight (p<0.001). 
 
Table 6.2: Number (n) and percentage (%) of deliveries of pig producers to a Dutch 
slaughter company in 2007 and 2008 with the pig producer reporting ‘did use antibiotics’ 
and ‘did not use antibiotics’ in the finishing pigs during 60 days prior to delivery for 
deliveries in which residues of antibiotics were and were not detected per type of 
treatment statement. 
 
Delivery documents reporting  
 ‘did use antibiotics’ ‘did not use antibiotics’ Total 
Deliveries n % n % n 
Statements about group treatment and treatment of individual finishing pigs 
Without antibiotic residue 22 5.5 c 375 94.5 397 
With antibiotic residue a 9 11.0 c 73 89.0 82 
 - Under MRL b 6 10.0 54 90.0 60 
 - Exceeding MRL b 3 13.6 19 86.4 22 
    Statements about treatment of individual finishing pigs 
Without antibiotic residue 6 6.1 d 92 93.9 98 
With antibiotic residue a 2 10.0 d 18 90.0 20 
a
 Based on chemical confirmation. 
b
 MRL = Maximum residue limit. 
c
 Statistical difference at p = 0.0686. 
d
 Statistical difference at p = 0.4066. 
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6.5. Discussion 
 
The analysis shows that 89% of pig producers with detected antibiotics residues reported they 
did not use antibiotics in the finishing pigs during the 60 days prior to delivery to a Dutch 
slaughter company. This shows that the provided information ‘did not use antibiotics’ was no 
guarantee for the absence of antibiotics residues in pork, and that the FCI was unreliable. 
In 16.3% (73) of the 448 deliveries of which the delivery documents reported ‘did not use 
antibiotics’ a finishing pig with a quantitative level of antibiotics residue was detected. The 
non–compliance to provide correct FCI about antibiotics usage hampers control of antibiotics 
residues in pork. For the FCI to be useful, the non–compliance needs to be decreased. Non–
compliance for provision of reliable information can be due to errors, because of lack of 
knowledge or concern, or deliberate actions (Elffers et al., 2003). It was not possible to assess 
whether or not pig producers with detected antibiotics residues accidently or deliberately 
reported ‘did not use antibiotics’. But, the reasons for the presence of antibiotics residues can 
provide an indication for this. These reasons were identified through telephone and email 
contact of slaughter company personnel with the pig producers with detected antibiotics 
residues. Of 47 of these pig producers reasons for presence of antibiotics residues were 
retrieved (Table 6.3). Most reasons provided seem related to errors: cross–contamination with 
medicated water and feed, forgetfulness about the withdrawal period, incorrectly recording and 
marking of medicated finishing pigs, and the sickness of treated pigs. This is supported by the 
fact that 73 of the 74 pig producers, who had deliveries with a finishing pig with antibiotics 
residues in 2007 and 2008, had one or two deliveries with a finishing pig with residues. The 
…. 
Table 6.3: Reasons provided by pig producers for presence of antibiotics residues in 
finishing pig deliveries to a Dutch slaughter company in 2007 and 2008. 
Reason 
Number of 
deliveries 
Cross–contamination through water 2 
Cross–contamination through feed 10 
Incorrectly adjusted feeding system 2 
Incorrectly adjusted medicated water system 5 
Incorrectly recording antibiotics usage 4 
Delivered finishing pigs were medicated, but forgot to comply with the withdrawal period 12 
Delivered medicated finishing pigs due to incorrect marking of sick finishing pigs 6 
Delivered finishing pigs were treated for sickness, but recovered at delivery 8 
  Total 49 a 
a
 From 47 pig producers reasons were retrieved. Two pig producers provided each two reasons. 
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non–compliance with the presence of antibiotics residues thus seems mainly related to errors 
instead of deliberate actions. However, accidentally providing antibiotics in the 60 days prior 
to delivery by itself does not prevent deliberately reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’, because a 
pig producer could have detected the accidental provision of antibiotics prior to filling out the 
delivery document. 
To improve compliance with the law to provide reliable FCI about antibiotics usage, 
factors that induce non–compliance have to be solved. To analyse compliance with regulatory 
laws of Dutch primary producers the Table–of–Eleven (T11) can be used (Elffers et al., 2003). 
The T11 includes six spontaneous compliance dimensions and five induced compliance 
dimensions promoting and opposing compliance with a law (Elffers et al., 2003). The 
spontaneous compliance dimensions, which are not under direct control of a law–enforcing 
agency, include lack of knowledge about and clarity of rules, costs and benefits associated with 
compliance and non–compliance, acceptability of rules, general conformity with respect to 
laws and authorities, informal control by the social environment, and spontaneous detection. 
The induced compliance dimensions, which focus on activities of a law–enforcing agency, 
include the probability that an arbitrary producer will be controlled (control density), the 
conditional probability of detecting non–compliance given that a non–compliant producer is 
checked (control depth), targeting of control activities towards producers with increased risk of 
non–compliance, sanction certainty if non–compliance is detected, and sanction severity. 
Improvement of spontaneous compliance could come from increased knowledge and clarity 
about the rules. Specifically, some pig producers, who provided reasons for detected antibiotics 
residues, indicated to have interpreted the 60 day period in the question on the delivery 
document as the shorter withdrawal period. However, this does not solve the possible problem 
of deliberately providing unreliable FCI. 
The induced compliance dimensions focus on control and sanctioning system. In the 
Netherlands slaughter companies are responsible to check the completeness and correctness of 
provided FCI. The Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority VWA verifies whether 
slaughter companies sufficiently check provided FCI. If the VWA detects a slaughter company 
insufficiently checking FCI, it notifies the slaughter company to improve its checks and issues 
the slaughter company a warning. 
Concerning control and sanctioning of FCI provided by pig producers, a distinction can be 
made between correctness of FCI and completeness of FCI, irrespective of the reliability. First, 
neither the slaughter company in this research nor the official veterinarian of the VWA 
responsible for the ante–mortem assessment of delivered finishing pigs did structurally check 
correctness of provided FCI. Although all delivery documents were checked at the slaughter 
location, it was not possible to check correctness of FCI about antibiotics usage. So, existing 
sanction possibilities could not be used. Only if answers to different FCI questions were clearly 
inconsistent, for example a high mortality rate and no usage of antibiotics, the competent 
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authority for the primary sector, the General Inspection Service AID, was notified, which 
conducted a farm visit to investigate the possible misuse of antibiotics and issued a warning or 
a fine depending on the severity of non–compliance. No verification on the slaughter company 
check of correctness of the provided FCI by the VWA existed. In conclusion, according to the 
induced compliance dimensions of the T11 the control depth for the correctness of provided FCI 
was insufficient. Second, both the slaughter company and the official veterinarian of the VWA 
structurally checked whether FCI was provided. If FCI was lacking for a delivery, it was not 
allowed for slaughter. The pig producer was notified and provided with the opportunity to still 
provide FCI. After FCI was received the finishing pigs were allowed for slaughter without 
further consequences for the pig producer. Concluding, completeness of FCI was actively 
enforced. 
For presence of antibiotics residues in finishing pigs two screening systems were in place. 
The samples from both screening systems were analysed in the state laboratory with the same 
methods and procedures. The first was the Dutch National Surveillance Program for detection 
of antibiotics residues conducted by the VWA according to Council Directive 96/23/EC. It 
randomly searches for antibiotics residues in a specified number of finishing pigs on 
slaughterhouses using prescribed sampling and analysis techniques. In the slaughter company 
in this research 1588 and 1516 finishing pigs were screened in 2007 and 2008, respectively. No 
finishing pigs had antibiotics residues exceeding the MRL in 2007, and 2 in 2008. Non–
compliant cases were investigated by the AID and the pig producer was issued a warning or 
fined depending on severity of non–compliance. The second was the private screening system 
for antibiotics residues of the slaughter company in this research. The screening system was 
risk based using the idea that higher lung and pleurisy prevalence indicates more health 
problems and, therefore, a possible higher usage of antibiotics and higher risk at the presence 
of antibiotics residues. It did not use provided FCI to steer sampling. From each delivery of 
finishing pigs from farms that had double the lung lesion prevalence and pleurisy prevalence 
compared to the average of all farms delivering to a slaughter location one finishing pig was 
randomly selected for screening. This resulted in a sample size of over 11,000 finishing pigs in 
2007 and in 2008. If a sample with antibiotics residues was detected, slaughter company 
personnel contacted the pig producer to identify the cause of the presence of residues (Table 
6.3). Because the samples were analysed in the state laboratory, results of samples that 
exceeded the MRL were also directly from passed on to the AID for legal assessment. Such 
cases were equally dealt with as cases detected in the National Surveillance Program. Of the 74 
pig producers, who had deliveries with a finishing pig with antibiotics residues in 2007 and 
2008 detected with the private screening system, 73 pig producers had one or two deliveries 
with a finishing pig with residues. The slaughter company personnel pointed out to these pig 
producers that they incorrectly indicated no usage of antibiotics during the 60 days prior to 
delivery on the delivery document. The slaughter company did not apply further sanctions 
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towards these pig producers. The single pig producer who repeatedly had antibiotics residues 
was first subjected to intensified surveillance and finally excluded from delivery to the 
slaughter company. 
Currently, without a control and sanctioning system for reliability of provided FCI about 
antibiotics usage in finishing pigs, the provided FCI was unreliable. To improve reliability of 
the provided FCI, the control depth, i.e. the conditional probability of detecting incorrect FCI 
given that a non–compliant pig producer is checked, should be increased. Control could for 
example focus on a crosscheck of provided FCI with the medicine logbook of the pig producer, 
although this relies on the pig producer filling out the logbook correctly. For cost–effective 
control benefits of increased control depth in terms of public health improvement should 
outweigh increased control cost. Difficulty for the government or a slaughter company to 
verify actual antibiotics usage by pig producers and to relate this to the FCI provided on the 
delivery documents would probably result in high control costs. Further research is needed to 
determine benefits and costs of increased control depth. If costs exceed benefits, FCI is not a 
relevant instrument to improve food safety and pig producers should not be requested to 
provide this FCI. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
This paper showed that food chain information about antibiotics usage during the 60 days prior 
to delivery to a Dutch slaughter company provided by pig producers was no guarantee for 
absence of antibiotics residues in delivered finishing pigs, and that this information was, 
therefore, unreliable. To improve reliability of food chain information about antibiotics usage 
in finishing pigs, policy makers should focus on increasing control depth, the probability of 
detecting unreliable food chain information if a non–compliant pig producer is checked. 
Further research is needed to determine benefits and costs of increased control depth. If costs 
exceed benefits, food chain information is not a relevant instrument to improve food safety and 
pig producers should not be requested to provide it. 
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Chapter 7 
 
General conclusions and discussion 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis analyzed incentive mechanisms for food safety control in the Dutch pork supply 
chain between pig producers and slaughterhouses. Chapter 2 developed a framework for 
designing and analysing incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control. It was concluded 
that key elements of incentive mechanisms for food safety control are the performance and 
compliance measurement system and the compensation scheme. Chapters 3 to 6 analysed the 
impact of characteristics of these key elements on supplier performance and compliance. In 
chapter 3 the effectiveness of two incentive mechanisms with different financial performance 
compensation to improve food safety performance was investigated. Chapter 4 analysed the 
relationship between measured performance, the decision process about the usage of control 
measures, and the actual control measures a pig producer used, while being subjected to an 
incentive mechanism with a penalty on products off–specification. Chapter 5 elaborated on the 
impact of performance measurement accuracy on control measures used by pig producers and 
on performance with a penalty on products off–specification in place. Finally, reliability of 
compliance information provided by pig producers about control measures used without a 
compensation scheme was analysed in chapter 6. 
In each chapter the objectives, methods and results have been discussed. This chapter 
discusses general aspects and integrates all findings. Section 7.2 answers the research 
questions. Section 7.3 provides the general discussion. The general conclusions are presented 
in section 7.4. Section 7.5 elaborates on the theoretical contribution and section 7.6 on the 
managerial implications. Finally, section 7.7 provides an outlook for further research. 
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7.2. Answers to the research questions 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to improvement of food safety by analysing incentive 
mechanisms aimed at food safety control between pig producers and slaughter company. To 
reach the aim five research questions were posed in chapter 1. This section provides answers to 
the research questions. 
 
RQ1 What are key elements of incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control? 
In chapter 2 the key elements of incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control were 
determined with a literature review on incentive mechanisms for food quality and food safety 
control. An incentive mechanism aimed at food safety control was defined as the set of 
performance and compliance measurement system and compensation scheme between buyer 
and supplier, which aims to induce the supplier to apply measures to control food safety 
hazards as the buyer requests. The performance and compliance measurement system is 
characterised by the indicator used to determine food safety performance and compliance, the 
accuracy of the measurement, and the actor who conducts performance and compliance 
measurement and determines performance and compliance. The performance and compliance 
compensation scheme is characterised by the type of compensation used. A combination of 
incentive mechanisms between multiple supply chain stages make up an incentive system for 
food safety control. 
Chapter 2 determined the performance and compliance measurement system and the 
performance and compliance compensation scheme as the key elements of an incentive 
mechanism aimed at food safety control. 
 
RQ2 How effective are incentive mechanisms with a collective insurance premium and a 
price reduction per lesioned liver in reducing liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs? 
In chapter 3 the effectiveness of two types of performance compensation in an actual incentive 
mechanism aimed at liver lesion control in finishing pigs was investigated: a collective 
insurance premium for each delivered finishing pig, in place prior to July 2004, and a reduction 
in pig producer payment for each delivered finishing pig with a liver lesion, in place from July 
2004. Liver inspection data of finishing pigs slaughtered in 2003–2006 by a major Dutch 
slaughter company were analysed with an out–of–sample dynamic forecast test and non–
parametric bootstrapping. Results showed that after introduction of the price reduction per 
finishing pig with a lesioned liver, mean liver lesion prevalence decreased from 9 to 5%. A 
reduced liver lesion prevalence ranging from 0 to 46 percentage points was observed on 67% 
of the 1069 farms that delivered both during the insurance and the price reduction period. The 
number of farms with a liver lesion prevalence of 5.0% or less increased from 52 to 68%. 
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However, even with the incentive mechanism with price reduction, variability in liver lesion 
prevalence between individual pig producers was observed. 
Chapter 3 showed that an incentive mechanism with a penalty on products off–
specification was more effective in inducing pig producers to lower liver lesion prevalence in 
finishing pigs than an incentive mechanism with a collective insurance premium. 
 
RQ3 What causes variability in liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs of finishing pig 
producers subjected to an incentive mechanism with a price reduction per lesioned 
liver? 
Chapter 4 analysed causes for variability in liver lesion prevalence for the pig producers 
subjected to the price reduction per finishing pig with a lesioned liver as observed in chapter 3. 
Liver lesion inspection data was matched with results from a farmer survey. In the survey, pig 
producers provided data about the control measures used and factors underlying their decision 
making process for the treatment of Ascaris suum infections, the main cause for liver lesions in 
finishing pigs. The factors underlying the decision making process were based on the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour. Results showed that 96% of the 185 pig producers in the analysis used 
anthelmintics, i.e. medication to control Ascaris suum infections in finishing pigs. The pig 
producers used a variety of combinations of active compounds, application methods, and 
duration of application. Application of anthelmintics by sprinkling over feed was associated 
with 2.4% higher liver lesion prevalence compared to other application methods. Furthermore, 
pig producers underestimated their liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs, thus reducing their 
need to apply effective management practices to lower liver lesion prevalence. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that variability in liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs of pig 
producers subjected to an incentive mechanism with a price reduction per lesioned liver was 
caused by using different control measures with varying effectiveness and underestimation of 
liver lesion prevalence. 
 
RQ4 What is the impact of the accuracy of a Mycobacterium avium test on the 
Mycobacterium avium prevalence in finishing pigs of pig producers subjected to an 
incentive mechanism with financial compensation aimed at Mycobacterium avium 
prevalence? 
Chapter 5 studied the impact of accuracy of a serodiagnostic test used in the performance 
measurement system, defined by sensitivity and specificity, on food safety performance of pig 
producers using the hazard Mycobacterium avium. Sensitivity is the probability of correctly 
qualifying a product with increased risk and specificity is the probability of correctly 
qualifying a product without increased risk. With a dynamic optimization model with a grid 
search of deliveries of herds from pig producers to slaughterhouse and a theoretical incentive 
mechanism aimed at Mycobacterium avium control, optimal penalty values for deliveries with 
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increased Mycobacterium avium seroprevalence were identified for different sensitivity and 
specificity values. Higher sensitivity and lower specificity resulted in usage of more intense 
control measures by pig producers, higher producer costs and lower Mycobacterium avium 
seroprevalence. The minimal penalty value needed to comply with a threshold for average Ma 
seroprevalence in finishing pigs at slaughter was lower at higher sensitivity and lower 
specificity. 
Chapter 5 showed that higher sensitivity and lower specificity of a diagnostic test lowers 
Mycobacterium avium seroprevalence in finishing pig deliveries of pig producers subjected to 
an incentive mechanism with a penalty for deliveries with increased Mycobacterium avium 
prevalence. With imperfect testing specificity and low hazard prevalence, a larger sample size 
can decrease pig producer incentives to improve performance. 
 
RQ5 What is the reliability of information about antibiotics usage in finishing pigs 
provided by pig producers used as compliance measurement in an incentive 
mechanism without compliance compensation? 
Chapter 4 showed that variability in performance can also originate from suppliers choosing 
different combinations of control measures with varying effectiveness. To ascertain what 
control actions a supplier used, a buyer can ask the suppliers to provide him with information 
about the control measures used. This information needs to be reliable to be useful in control 
mechanisms on supply chain level. Chapter 6 examined the reliability of information about 
used antibiotics provided by pig producers in a situation without a control system to check the 
reliability of the provided information. A dataset with test results for antibiotics residues in 
tissue samples of finishing pigs was matched with information on delivery documents provided 
by pig producers about antibiotics usage in these finishing pigs. A Pearson chi–square test 
showed that twice as much pig producers reported using antibiotics in the group of pig 
producers with detected antibiotics residues (11.0%) as in the group without detected 
antibiotics residues (5.5%). For 89% of deliveries with a finishing pig with detected antibiotics 
residues ‘did not use antibiotics’ was reported. 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that without a control system to check the reliability of the 
provided information, the information about antibiotics usage in finishing pigs during 60 days 
prior to delivery reported by a pig producer, did not guarantee absence of antibiotics residues 
in the finishing pigs. This information was therefore insufficiently reliable to be used in a 
control system for antibiotics residues in finishing pigs by a slaughterhouse. 
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7.3. Discussion 
 
This thesis showed that private incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control can improve 
average performance of suppliers and thereby food safety performance of a supply chain. 
Chapters 3 to 6 focussed on different characteristics of incentive mechanisms. Figure 7.1 
combines the findings of chapters 3 to 6 in the framework of incentive mechanisms for food 
safety control developed in chapter 2. In this thesis, the slaughter company owned the incentive 
system and incentive mechanism, which were integrated in the slaughter company. The 
discussion in this section relates to various aspects of Figure 7.1. 
 
7.3.1. Performance and compliance measurement system and compensation 
scheme 
A penalty on products off–specification induced most finishing pig producers to intensify 
control on Ascaris suum infections and improved average performance compared to a 
collective insurance fee. This is in line with literature about food quality control, which showed 
that financial piece rates improve average food quality performance of primary producers (e.g. 
Chalfant and Sexton, 2002; Hueth and Melkonyan, 2004; Martinez and Zering, 2004; 
McDonald and Schroeder, 2003). 
This thesis showed that settings of the accuracy of a diagnostic test and sample size in 
combination with a penalty on products off–specification influence supplier incentives to apply 
control measures. Jeschonowski et al. (2009) also argued that measurement scale and reward 
schemes should be attuned for optimal incentive provision. Higher sensitivity and lower 
specificity of a diagnostic test can be used to increase incentives for farmers to improve 
performance. Heinkel (1981) also found that the accuracy of the testing technology influenced 
car dealer incentives to improve car quality. Chalfant and Sexton (2002) and Hueth et al. 
(2007) showed that errors in the grading of products can be used to induce farmers to produce 
high quality. In normative studies on incentive mechanisms, however, generally a perfect 
testing accuracy is assumed (Backus and King, 2008; Hirschauer and Musshoff, 2007; King et 
al., 2007; Resende-Filho and Buhr, 2008). But, testing accuracy in practice is often imperfect 
(Unnevehr et al., 2004). The normative studies, therefore, could have under– or overestimated 
the effect of the incentive mechanisms in reality, depending on the specific values of sensitivity 
and specificity of the test used to determine performance. 
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Another characteristic of the performance and compliance measurement system is the actor 
who carries out performance and compliance measurement and determines performance and 
compliance. The system owner can conduct performance and compliance measurement as in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 and e.g. Hueth et al. (1999). Another option is a third party conducting 
performance and compliance measurement. Often it is assumed that a third party is 
independent and that, therefore, the performance and compliance measurement is reliable. 
Recent research raises questions on the independence of third parties (Hatanaka and Busch, 
2008; Souza Monteiro and Anders, 2009). A third option mostly neglected in literature, is the 
supplier carrying out performance and compliance measurement. This is increasingly used in 
public and private food safety control, for example Food Chain Information in the EU food 
safety policy. If the supplier or a third party caries out performance and compliance 
measurement, information needs to be transferred to the system owner. In supply chain 
research mainly technical aspects of information flows are addressed and opportunistic 
behaviour as a reason for information distortion is neglected (Feldmann and Müller, 2003). 
Chapter 6 showed that if no compensation scheme aimed at reliability of provided compliance 
information existed, the provided information was not reliable and can not be used as 
compliance measurement in an incentive mechanism owned by the buyer. Feldmann and 
Müller (2003) design an incentive scheme to induce suppliers to provide reliable and truthful 
performance information. In this incentive scheme the reliability of provided performance 
information is determined through ex–post delivery determination of actual performance. It is 
unclear whether an adapted version of the incentive scheme of Feldmann and Müller (2003) 
can be used to ex–post determination of compliance with buyer requests. 
 
7.3.2. Supplier performance 
Variability in liver lesion prevalence between pig producers after implementation of the 
penalty was observed in chapter 3. The variability originated from heterogeneity in the use of 
management practices between pig producers, as shown in chapter 4. The heterogeneity could 
be traced to differences in labour availability, farm systems, attitude towards treating Ascaris 
suum infections, and underestimation of the liver lesion problem. Pennings and Garcia (2004) 
also traced heterogeneity in derivative usage of small and medium sized enterprises to 
differences in attitudes and perceptions. This suggests that research into performance 
improvement possibilities for a group of heterogeneous primary producers should not only 
focus on the presence or absence of specific management practices, but also on the underlying 
attitude towards and perception about the problem under research. 
Model based research on incentive mechanisms for food safety and quality control often 
assumes homogeneous primary producers (e.g. Backus and King, 2008; Hirschauer and 
Musshoff, 2007; King et al., 2007; Resende-Filho and Buhr, 2008). Policy advice based on 
Chapter 7 
 
130
results of such normative models can be improved by inclusion of heterogeneity between 
primary producers. 
The variability in reaction to the change in incentive mechanism aimed at liver lesion 
prevalence suggests that performance can be improved by using multiple incentive 
mechanisms. Without transactions costs incentive mechanisms individualised to each supplier 
were optimal in dealing with heterogeneous suppliers (Levy and Vukina, 2002). In practice 
transactions costs of multiple mechanism should be balanced with the gains of performance 
improvement of multiple incentive mechanisms. 
 
7.3.3. Supply chain characteristics 
The objective of research in this thesis was the Dutch pork supply chain between pig producers 
and a slaughter company. In the Netherlands pig producers and slaughter companies are 
independent organisations and no long–term contracts exist between them. Pig producers can 
shift regularly between slaughter companies and slaughter companies compete actively for 
receiving finishing pigs. In this setting it is difficult for an individual slaughter company to 
initialize new incentive mechanisms to improve food safety, because pig producers could shift 
to another slaughter company. Incentive mechanisms can also be used in other stages of a food 
supply chain. Although the number of suppliers often is lower, the amount of food products 
transferred from a supplier to a buyer is often larger. The lower number of suppliers makes 
observance of each supplier easier, but the impact of food safety incidents can be larger due to 
the larger amount of food products. As has been discussed in chapter 2, the parameter settings 
of incentive systems for food safety control depend on the specific characteristics of the 
supplier–buyer relationship and the supply chain, such as supply assurance, information 
asymmetry, ownership structure and market organization. Caution should, therefore, be 
exercised when extending the results from this thesis to other stages in the pork supply chain or 
to other supply chains. 
 
7.3.4. Food safety hazards 
In this thesis several food safety hazards in pork relevant for public health have been used: 
Ascaris suum, Mycobacterium avium, and residues of antibiotics. Ascaris suum was chosen 
because it is an important quality and safety attribute in the pork supply chain, an incentive 
mechanism with two types of performance compensation was implemented in practice, and 
data was available to determine the impact of the type of performance compensation on food 
safety performance. Mycobacterium avium was chosen, while Mycobacterium avium infections 
in humans can have severe consequences, for this hazard a new serodiagnostic test is under 
development, and slaughterhouses in the Netherlands are considering an incentive mechanism 
to reduce the risk of Mycobacterium avium. Antibiotics residues were chosen, because the use 
of antibiotics is strictly regulated, under full control of the farmer, and information provided by 
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the supplier and analytical results of antibiotics residues in the same pigs were available. As 
each hazard has specific characteristics, caution should be practiced in extending specific 
results between these hazards and to other hazards in the pork supply chain, as indicated in 
chapter 2. 
 
 
7.3.5. Usage of field data 
Field data were used in part of the studies in this thesis instead of experimental data. Usage of 
field data assured that the ‘participants’ showed real–life behaviour with real–life performance 
as a result. But, in these situations uncontrolled variables could also have caused changes in 
observed performance, prohibiting determination of causal relationships. However, excluding 
other possible causes makes it likely that the variable under research caused the observed 
change. In contrast, in well controlled experiments causal relationships can be proven because 
all variables except for the one under research, are supposed to be controlled for. But, in a 
purely experimental setting, pig producers could have shown a different behaviour compared to 
their every day behaviour, the so–called Hawthorne effect (Adair, 1984; Sonnenfeld, 1985). 
Different behaviour would occur, because in an experimental setting pig producers would 
realize they were being observed. In this research with a focus on human behaviour, the results 
of well controlled laboratory experiments might have been insufficiently representative for real 
life decision making. 
In this research field data, expert data and survey data were combined. Most researches 
only use field, experimental, expert or survey data. To our knowledge, this research is one of 
the few which combines these types of data in an integrated analysis. The integration showed 
to be of great value to identify management practices used by suppliers, which result in lower 
food safety performance. Furthermore, for identification of underestimation of performance, 
both perceived and actual performance are needed. 
 
7.4. General conclusions 
 
This thesis analyzed incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control in the two stage supply 
chain with pig producers and a slaughter company in the Netherlands. Based on the 5 studies 
described in this thesis, the following can be concluded: 
• The developed framework is a valuable tool for designing and analysing incentive 
mechanisms aimed at food safety control to optimally induce suppliers to control food 
safety. An incentive mechanism is defined as the set of performance and compliance 
measurement system and compensation scheme between buyer and supplier, which aims to 
induce the supplier to apply measures as the buyer requests. 
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• For an incentive mechanism to optimally induce suppliers to control food safety, the 
performance and compliance indicator, the accuracy of the measurement (sample size, test 
sensitivity, test specificity), and the actor who performs the measurement and determines 
performance and compliance must be attuned to the settings of the performance 
compensation scheme. 
• In a setting where suppliers are independent of buyers and no long–term contracts exist, 
incentive mechanisms with a penalty for products off–specification can induce suppliers to 
use control measures and to improve food safety performance. 
• Variability in performance can be expected between suppliers subjected to an incentive 
mechanisms with a penalty for products off–specification due to suppliers using different 
combinations of control measures with varying effectiveness and suppliers underestimating 
performance. 
• If an incentive mechanism with a penalty for products off–specification is used, the 
accuracy of a diagnostic test used to determine performance can also be used to induce 
suppliers to apply control measures through financial consequences of false positives and 
false negatives. 
• When test specificity is imperfect, hazard prevalence is low and a penalty on products off–
specification is used, a larger sample size can decrease incentives for suppliers to apply 
control measures, because the increased number of false positives raise the probability of 
classifying a product as off–specification. 
• Without a check and a compensation scheme, the reliability of compliance information 
provided by the supplier about actions used is insufficient to be useful to control food 
safety hazards. 
 
7.5. Theoretical contribution 
 
This thesis has contributed to food safety management, incentive, and supply chain 
management theory. 
 
7.5.1. Food safety management theory 
This thesis has three contributions to food safety management theory. First, crrently 
implemented food safety control systems focus on controlling food safety hazards on company 
level without considering the rest of the supply chain (Luning et al., 2006). Hirschauer and 
Musshoff (2007) suggested that identification of critical control points at suppliers and 
adequate monitoring procedures could reduce risks arising from malpractice of opportunistic 
suppliers. This thesis showed incentive mechanisms with a correct performance indicator can 
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be used to reduce opportunistic behaviour of suppliers, thereby helping to raise food safety 
control to the next level. 
Second, to aid improvement of food safety control, food safety and quality management 
research and analyses should focus on integral analysis of technological and managerial factors 
that contribute to food safety and quality (Luning and Marcelis, 2007). The framework 
presented in Figure 2.3 combines relevant technological and managerial aspects for food safety 
control on supply chain level and their mutual relationships. It provides guidelines for integral 
analysis of technological and managerial factors concerning food safety control in supply 
chains. Specific relationships of aspects from this framework relating to the relationship 
between food safety performance and human behaviour were analysed in this thesis. As such, 
this thesis provides valuable insights into further improvement of food safety. 
Third, Starbird (2005) showed that sample size and acceptance number, i.e. the number of 
items in the sample to be identified as contaminated, have a significant impact on supplier 
incentives to control food safety. Starbird (2005), however, assumed the test used to assess 
each item to be perfect. In reality, diagnostics tests are often imperfect (Unnevehr et al., 2004). 
This thesis was a first study, to our knowledge, to analyse the impact of the accuracy of a 
diagnostic test on supplier incentives to control food safety. Not only the sampling policy, but 
also the diagnostic testing accuracy should be attuned to the performance compensation 
scheme. 
 
7.5.2. Incentive theory 
This thesis has one contribution to incentive theory, which addresses interactions in the 
presence of imperfect information (Gibbons, 2005; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Incentive 
theory considers how a buyer can cope optimally with private information of a supplier. In 
incentive theory a supplier exerts effort, if expected utility of exerting effort exceeds expected 
utility of not exerting effort. A buyer induces actions through rewarding performance of the 
buyer. Most research based on incentive theory assumes that the performance measurement 
system used as a basis to reward performance is perfectly accurate. This assumption is also 
used in literature about principal–agent models for food safety control (Backus and King, 
2008; Hirschauer and Musshoff, 2007; Resende-Filho and Buhr, 2008). In practice, however, 
performance measurement is generally not perfectly accurate due to the use of samples and 
imperfect testing technologies (Hueth et al., 2007; Jordan, 1996; Unnevehr et al., 2004). This 
thesis showed that inaccuracy of a diagnostic test in relationship with the sample size does 
influence incentives for suppliers to exert effort. This implies that inaccuracy in performance 
measurement must be considered in incentive theory and in principal–agent models. 
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7.5.3. Supply chain management theory 
This thesis has three contributions to supply chain management theory. First, Lundin and 
Norrman (2010) indicated that research is needed on how to deal with misalignments between 
companies in the supply chain which result in reduced supply chain performance. This thesis 
showed that properly designed incentive mechanism can align company interests and thereby 
improve supply chain performance. 
Second, this thesis adds to knowledge about the optimum combination of reward schemes 
and measurement scale for incentive provision (Jeschonowski et al., 2009). It demonstrated 
that the accuracy of a diagnostic test and sample size can be used in combination with a penalty 
on products off–specification to induce suppliers to use control measures. This suggests that 
the settings of the performance and compliance measurement system and compensation 
scheme should be attuned. 
Third, in supply chain management opportunistic behaviour as reason for distortion of 
information exchanged is often neglected (Feldmann and Müller, 2003). This thesis showed 
that information provided by the supplier about used actions was unreliable and that 
opportunistic behaviour cannot be neglected as source of information distortion. 
 
7.6. Managerial implications 
 
This thesis showed that private incentive mechanisms implemented by buyers to induce 
suppliers can effectively improve food safety performance of a supply chain. The following 
practical guidelines for FBOs, governments or other organizations which aim to implement 
incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control can be formulated: 
• The performance and compliance measurement system and compensation scheme should 
be attuned for optimal inducement of suppliers to control food safety. 
• A penalty on products off–specification is more effective to induce suppliers to improve 
food safety performance than a collective insurance fee. 
• Expect variability between individual suppliers in terms of control actions used, food 
safety performance, and food safety performance change from ex–ante to ex–post a new 
incentive mechanism. Not all suppliers will improve performance. It is advised to analyse 
heterogeneity between the suppliers to determine causes of variability in performance to 
further optimize the incentive mechanism. 
• Characteristics of a diagnostic test and sampling strategy to determine supplier 
performance should be attuned to prevent adverse incentives for suppliers to control food 
safety. Higher sensitivity and lower specificity of a diagnostic test increase incentives to 
control food safety hazards in combination with a penalty on products off–specification. If 
test specificity is imperfect, a larger sample size can result in decreased food safety 
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performance of suppliers, due to an increased probability of rejecting a batch of products, 
irrespective of whether a supplier takes control measures. 
• Only if reliability of information about used control actions provided by a supplier can be 
checked easily, it can be used in incentive mechanisms aimed at food safety control as 
compliance measurement. 
 
Additionally, a number of specific managerial implications can be made concerning the pork 
supply chain in the Netherlands and in other regions: 
• Pig producers should be induced to apply anthelmintics to finishing pigs in feed, in water 
or by injections instead of sprinkling over feed, because sprinkling over feed showed to be 
less effective to lower liver lesion prevalence than other application methods. 
• Pig slaughter companies should increase effort to provide pig producers with information 
about their actual liver lesion prevalence in finishing pigs. Pig producers underestimated 
liver lesion prevalence, resulting in lower need to treat Ascaris suum infections. A more 
accurate estimation of liver lesion prevalence can help to increase the need to treat Ascaris 
suum infections and lower liver lesion prevalence. 
• Pig slaughter companies should consider to design and implement incentive mechanisms, 
similar to that of liver lesions, to lower prevalence of other lesions in finishing pigs in the 
Netherlands detected at slaughter, such as lung lesions, pleurisy, skin lesions and leg 
lesions. The specific settings of the incentive mechanisms should be attuned to the lesion. 
• Pig slaughter companies or governments in regions outside the Netherlands should 
consider to introduce an incentive mechanism aimed at liver lesion prevalence in finishing 
pigs comparable to the Dutch mechanism. The specific settings of the incentive 
mechanisms should be attuned to the region. 
 
7.7. Further research 
 
This research resulted in many topics for further research. This section describes the most 
important topics. 
 
7.7.1. Performance and compliance measurement system and compensation 
scheme 
In this research performance and compliance measurement indicators were hazard prevalence 
and information provided by the supplier about actions used. The performance and compliance 
compensation was a penalty on products off–specification. A combination of hazard prevalence 
with a penalty can improve average performance of suppliers, as shown in chapters 3 and 5. 
However, chapter 4 showed that not all suppliers improved performance. Chapter 6 showed 
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that provision of information by the supplier about actions used could not de used as 
compliance measurement in a situation without a check on reliability of provided information. 
Alternative performance and compliance measurement indicators and compensations might be 
needed to induce suppliers. Lazear and Rosen (1981) showed that in a situation with common 
shocks equal for all suppliers, measuring performance of an individual relative to the 
performance of peers, for example as the ordinal rank number, can improve incentives for 
individuals to exert effort over measuring absolute performance of each individual supplier. 
Using a financial compensation as a penalty might diminish intrinsic motivation to exert effort 
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). An alternative might be the use of non–financial awards as 
orders, medals and decorations, which have been widely used in monarchies, republics, non–
profit organizations and companies (Frey, 2007). Further research is needed to analyse 
applicability and effectiveness of alternative performance and compliance measurement 
indicators and alternative types of performance and compliance compensation to induce 
suppliers to control food safety. 
 
7.7.2. Supply chain characteristics and incentive mechanism settings 
This research was conducted in the Dutch pork supply chain between pig producers and 
slaughter company. As has been argued in chapter 2, the parameter settings of incentive 
systems for food safety control depend on the specific characteristics of the hazard and of the 
supply chain. Further research, for example by implementing similar incentive mechanisms for 
other hazards in the Dutch pork supply chain, or in other regions outside the Netherlands or in 
other supply chains, could generalise the findings of this thesis. A comparison of optimal 
parameter settings of incentive mechanisms for different hazards in the same supply chain, for 
example the Dutch pork supply chain, can provide insight into the impact of hazard 
characteristics. A comparison over supply chains with different characteristics can identify 
constraining factors for cost–effective incentive mechanisms. 
 
7.7.3. Food safety, public health and cost–effectiveness 
Incentive mechanisms aim to internalize external failure costs of Food Business Operator 
(FBO) in their decision making process. For food safety, external failure costs occur in society 
due to illness and death. Traceability is essential for assigning external failure costs to a 
specific supply chain or FBO (Van der Vorst, 2006). Many food–borne illnesses and death, 
however, cannot be traced to a specific food product (EFSA, 2010). This research, therefore, 
did not include external failure costs of public health effects into FBO decision making. 
Inclusion of external failure costs of public health effects through incentive mechanisms in 
FBO decision making could improve the balance between private food safety control revenues 
and costs and public health revenues and costs. Quantification of public health effects into 
monetary value is also necessary. Direct public health costs such as hospital and medication 
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costs can be given a monetary value relatively easy. But indirect public health costs, such as 
premature death or living with a disease compared to a healthy life, are more difficult to give a 
monetary value, although variables such as Quality Of Life, Quality Adjusted Life–Year or 
Disability Adjusted Life–Year can be used to do so (Abelson, 2003; Mangen et al., 2005). 
Notwithstanding, for specific hazards data about public health costs are available (Mangen et 
al., 2005; Mead et al., 1999; Scharff, 2010), although often only at a high aggregate level. For 
many hazards public health cost data at a disaggregate supply chain or product level are still 
lacking. Endogenous inclusion of such public health costs in decision models for food safety 
control on supply chain level could improve these models and provide policy advice on food 
safety objectives that optimally balance public health revenues and costs and food safety 
control revenues and costs. 
Food safety is controlled through a combination of private and public food safety control 
and verification systems. In the EU, the USA and other countries FBOs have the responsibility 
that their products are safe. Governments have the responsibility to supervise that marketed 
products are safe. To fulfil this responsibility, FBOs implement food safety control systems 
and governments verify the food safety control systems of the private sector. The question 
arises to what extent governments can outsource food safety control to the private sector for 
cost–effective food safety control. Private ownership is the crucial source of incentives to 
innovate and to become efficient (Shleifer, 1998). Using a quantitative model Hart et al. (1997) 
identified contractibility of quality reducing cost reductions, importance of quality innovations, 
corruption of government personnel, and patronage inside the government as important aspects 
which prevent outsourcing of public services to improve efficiency. Knowledge is, however, 
lacking about cost–effectiveness of combined public and private food safety verification and 
control. With a method to ex–ante determine the effectiveness of combined public and private 
food safety verification and control, the optimal privatization level in food safety control could 
be determined. 
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